Metaphysics of mind question practice
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY ‘MIND’?
1. What are phenomenal properties/qualia (3)
Phenomenal properties are the experiential properties of some or all conscious mental states.
We are aware of these properties through consciousness and introspection. They are intrinsic,
non-intentional (and non-representational) ine>able properties of mental states (i.e. qualia).
2. Define qualia? (3)
Intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible.
3. What is the di<erence between phenomenal properties and intentional properties?
(3/5)
Intentionality/intentional mental properties Phenomenal mental properties
The power of minds and mental states to be They are the introspectively (immediately/non-
about, to represent, or to stand for, things, inferentially/infallibly) accessible properties of
properties and states of a6airs. mental states (i.e. qualia).
Intentional mental states are mental They are intrinsic, non-intentional (and non-
representations or that they have contents. representational) properties of mental states (i.e.
Relational, not intrinsic qualia).
Intrinsic, not relational
They have aboutness/are directed at X They are the experiential properties of some (or
all) conscious (mental) states.
So they are not directed at anything.
May not necessarily be conscious; may be Phenomenal mental states are ine6able and
reducible to physical properties irreducible.
4. What does it mean to say that some mental states have intentional properties (3)
Mental states represent things, properties and states of a>airs. Intentional mental properties
mean that the mental representations are relational, not intrinsic and they have aboutness.
They may not necessarily be conscious – they may be reducible to physical properties.
5. What is supervenience? (3)
A property A supervenes on another property if there cannot be a di>erence in A without a
di>erence in B.
DUALIST THEORIES:
SUBSTANCE DUALISM
6. Define substance dualism (3)
Substance dualism holds that there are 2 types of substances, mental substances and physical
substances. It holds that minds are not bodies, parts of bodies or properties of bodies. Not all
metal properties supervene on the physical. There can be a change in mental state without a
change in physical states. Bodies are divisible into spatial parts, but minds have no such parts.
Therefore the mind is a distinct substance from the body.
,7. Outline the indivisibility argument (5)
The indivisibility argument is an argument used by Descartes to prove that mind and body are
distinct substances.
P1. My mind is indivisible
P2. My body is divisible
P3. Leibniz law: if an object has a property that the other lacks, they must be di>erent
C. My mind and body are not identical.
Descartes argues that minds have distinct properties from bodies and, by the application of
Leibniz’ law of indiscernibles (if two objects have distinct properties, they cannot be identical).
Minds are unextended, meaning they cannot be divided. Bodies, however, are extended, in that
they have shape and size and numerical identity, they can be divided. Therefore, because minds
have distinct properties from bodies, they are not identical and are thus distinct substances,
showing that dualism is true.
8. Outline the conceivability argument for substance dualism (5)
Descartes argues that if he has a ‘clear and distinct’ idea of two things, then it must be possible,
in principle to separate them if they are distinct substances that can exist independently of
eachother. Descartes believed that minds and bodies are separate, distinct substances, which
is called substance dualism. He created the conceivability argument to prove this
The conceivability argument in premises:
P1: I can conceive of my mind existing without my extended physical body (and indeed the
whole physical world) existing
P2: Anything that I can ‘clearly and distinctly’ conceive of is metaphysically possible
C1: Therefore my mind existing without my extended physical body and indeed the whole
physical world is metaphysically possible
P3: If it is metaphysically possible for X to exist without Y, then X is not identical to Y (Leibniz
Law)
C: Therefore, my mind is not identical with my extended physical body – nor is it identical with
any part of the physical world
9. Outline the argument that the mental is divisible in some sense as a response to
substance dualism – indivisibility argument (5)
Substance dualism holds that there are 2 types of substances, minds (mental substances) and
bodies (physical substances) as bodies are divisible but minds aren’t, therefore following
Leibniz’s law, the mind is a distinct substance from the body. However, it can be argued that the
mental is divisible. The mind can be divided into perception, memory, emotions and so on. So,
the mind and body share the same property of divisibility so they could be identical. For
example with cases of mental illness. Multiple personality syndrome suggests that the mind can
be divided as some parts of the mind are unable to communicate with other parts. There are
also divisions of conscious and unconscious and the conscious and unconscious can think
di>erent things, so it is possible to divide them into parts. Freud argued that the mind is
internally conflicted so that part of the mind is actively suppressed by another so that it desires
influence over our conscious experience without us becoming fully aware of it. This attacks the
premise that the mind is indivisible, in which case the mind does have the same properties as
the physical body, making the indivisibility argument fails as the mind and the body are not
distinct.
10. Outline the argument that not everything thought of as physical is divisible as a
response to substance dualism – indivisibility argument (5)
, In the indivisibility argument Leibniz’s law of indiscernibles is used to identify mind and body as
distinct because physical substances have the distinct property of being divisible, while minds
cannot be divided. However, there is a fundamental flaw being that some physical objects are
impossible to divide, for example the smallest physical substances such as quarks or
mathematical objects such as numbers. This shows that the indivisibility argument is false
since quarks are physical yet indivisible. Even if Descartes is correct that the mind is indivisible,
it could be an indivisible yet physical thing There are also physical states or properties of the
body such as being wet or hot, which cannot be divided into parts, but they are non-physical
substances. This serves as a response to substance dualism as it revokes the distinct property
that separates physical and mental substances, meaning therefore there is nothing making the
two substances distinct and so they are most likely to be part of the same.
11. Outline the argument that the mind without body is not conceivable as a response to
substance dualism – conceivability argument (5)
In the opening premise of Descartes’ conceivability argument, which reinforces substance
dualism, he states that he can conceive of a mind existing without his body. Hume directly
opposes this by stating a mind without body cannot be perceived, you cannot experience a
sense impression of the mind. Hume argues that you cannot have a sense impression of the
mind existing separately to the body, this means that you cannot have an idea of the mind
existing without the body and therefore you can’t conceive of it. If it is inconceivable for the
mind to exist without the body then the premise is false. As a deductive argument with an
incorrect premise the argument is invalid. Descartes conceivability argument fails to prove that
the mind and the body are not identical, as Hume shows that mind without body is not
conceivable.
One criticism of the conceivability argument and thus of substance dualism is that it is not
possible to conceive of mind without body, as Descartes claims it is. This criticism addressed
P1 of the conceivability argument. Behaviourists argue that to speak of mental states is to refer
to one’s behaviour, which undermine the claim that they are separate. Desires, beliefs, choices,
are mental states, but they are observed and defined via behaviour; without a body one cannot
exhibit behaviour. Therefore, a mental state is something that only a physical substance can
have, that means I cannot conceive clearly and distinctly of my mind existing without my
physical body. For example I may try to imagine myself as a pure mind, separate from my body,
but then I cannot imagine myself not feeling or perceiving. Therefore, making a distinction
between the mind and the body is incorrect. This undermines substance dualism because the
conclusion Descartes draws depends on P1 being true, if it is inconceivable for the mind to exist
without the body, then P1 is false. Since the conceivability argument is deductive (the truth of
the conclusion depends on the truth of the premises), if the first premises is false, the rest of the
argument is invalid. Therefore, Descartes’ conceivability argument fails to prove that the mind
and the body are not identical If, as behaviourists claim, it is not conceivable for the mind to
exist without the body, then Descartes’ whole argument, that mind and body are separate
substances, is incorrect
12. Outline the argument that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible as a
response to substance dualism – conceivability argument (5)
Descartes states that anything that I can ‘clearly and distinctly’ conceive of is metaphysically
possible, and although we may acknowledge that it is conceivable that the mind and the body
are distinct, it doesn’t mean that it is metaphysically possible. In the same way that it is
conceivable that water is not H20, it is not metaphysically possible for water to not be H20. The
same argument applies to the mind and body. It is logically possible that they are distinct, but
, they could still be a part of the same substance, even though they have distinct properties.
Arguments that rely on what is conceivable is metaphysically possible fall susceptible to the
masked man fallacy. The fallacy parallels Descartes’ conceivability argument using Leibniz’s
law:
P1. I recognise that Batman is a masked crusader
P2. I recognise that Bruce Wayne is a playboy millionaire
C. Therefore, Batman is not Bruce Wayne
This idea is fallacious as unknown to me, Bruce Wayne is dressed up as Batman as a masked
crusader, meaning the conclusion is false.
Descartes commits the masked man fallacy when talking about substance dualism because he
misapplies Leibniz’s law of indiscernibles. In the same way that I may wrongly conclude that
Batman is distinct from Bruce Wayne, Descartes idea of his mind may be incomplete He fails to
establish beyond that mind and body are distinct substances and only establishes that they
have distinct properties. This shows that the conceivability argument doesn’t establish that
mind and body are distinct substances because metaphysical possibility cannot be established
from logical possibility. Therefore, Descartes fails to prove that the mind and the body are
distinct.
13. Outline the argument that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the
actual world as a response to substance dualism – conceivability argument (5)
The conceivability argument establishes that what we can clearly and distinctly conceive is
metaphysically possible. Therefore, if Descartes is right about clear and distinct ideas, it is
metaphysically possible that mind and body are distinct substances. But equally, given what
was just argued, it is metaphysically possible that thought and extension are two properties of a
single substance,. What we need to know is which option is true in the actual world. Simply
knowing what is metaphysically possible does not tell us which possibility correctly describes
reality. So, just because it is metaphysically possible for mind and body to be separate
substances doesn’t show that they are separate substances.
In the actual world, we have plenty of empirical evidence to show that mind and body are not
distinct substances. Modern neuroscience and materialist views argue that there is no mental
substance. A famous example of Benjamin Libet has been interpreted as showing that our
brains initiate voluntary movements before we are aware of having decided to move, and that
this calls into question the e>icacy of our wills. Therefore, while it may be logically and
metaphysically possible that mind and body are distinct, in the actual world, empirical evidence
suggest that they are not distinct substances, the conceivability argument therefore fails to
prove substance dualism.
Descartes argues that because it is logically possible for mind to be distinct from bodies, it is
the case in this world, that there is metaphysical possibility for them to be distinct. However,
even if it is metaphysically possible because of the clear and distinct idea of mind and body
being conceivably separate, due to the body being divisible, does not mean it is necessarily in
this world. This is due to Descartes never proving that physicalism is metaphysically impossible,
that it is equally conceivable that minds are not distinct from bodies. We know on the basis of
empirical evidence that the distinction between mind and brain is far from self-evident.
Competing hypothesis such as mind is part of the brain is equally possible because it is also
conceivable and therefore metaphysically possible, as there is nothing contradictory in
supposing that mental states are produced by the brain. We can also use the example that
water is identical to H2O, but it seems that we can conceive of water not being H2O, especially
before we discovered that it is. So, following Descartes’ logic, it seems conceivable for water to
