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Summary: Finnemore & Sikkink - International Norm Dynamics and Political Change
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Summary of Finnemore & Sikkink - Obliged reading on Social Constructivism
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International norm dynamics and political change – Finnemore & Sikkink- We address theoretical issues facing those of us interested in empirical research n social construction
processes and norm influences in international politics.
o How do we know a norm when we see one?
o How do we know norms make a difference in politics?
o We are particularly interested in the role norms play in political change – both the ways in
which norms, themselves change and the ways in which they change other features of the
political landscape.
- Much of macro theoretical equipment of constructivism is better at explaining stability than change.
Claims that actors conform to logics of appropriateness say little about how standards of
appropriateness might change.
- 3 arguments
o First, the ideational "turn" of recent years is actually a return to some tradition concerns of the
discipline, but it has not brought us back to precisely the same place we began
o Second, we generate some proposition about three aspects of norms their origins the
mechanisms by which they exercise influence and the condition under which norms will be
influential world politics. Specifically, we argue that norms evolve in a patterned "lifecycle"
and that different behavioral logics dominate different segments of the life cycle.
o Norms and rationality are intimately connected, but scholars disagree about the precise nature
up their relationship.
We identify 4 points of debate where the relationship between norms and rationality
is least understood and most important, and we show how these debates cross-cut
research traditions in potentially fruitful ways.
The return to norms
- The turn away from norms and normative concerns begin with the behavioral revolution and its
enthusiasm for measurement. Normative and ideational phenomena were difficult to measure and so
tended to be pushed aside for methodological reasons.
o Realists began creating the pursuit of power as “utility maximization and following
economists, tended to specify utility functions in material terms only
o Liberals drew on microeconomic analyses of collective action game (prisoner’s dilemma) to
reinvigorate their long-standing debate with realists and show that cooperation, welfare
improvement and progress were possible even given some of realism’s pessimistic
assumptions about self-seeking human nature.
Although the move to rational choice is no way required a move to a
material ontology, its proponents showed little interests in ideational or
social phenomena, and study of these issues languished during this period.
Definitions
- There is general agreement on to the definition of a norm as a standard of appropriate behavior for
actors with a given identity, but a number of related conceptual issues still cause confusion and debate.
First, whereas constructivists in political science talk a language of norms sociologists talk a language
of "institutions" or refer to these same behavioral rules.
- Institution as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for
specific groups of actors in specific situations. One difference between "norm" and "institution ("in the
sociological sense)is aggregation: the norm definition isolates single standards of behavior, whereas
institutions emphasize the way in which behavioral rules are structured together and interrelate (a
"collection of practices and rules").
- There are different types of norms
o Regulative norms – which order and constrain behavior
o Constitutive norms – which create new actors, interests or categories of action
o Prescriptive norms – quality of oughtness (has not been studied extensively)
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, However, the oughtness sets norms apart from other kind of rules. Because norms
involve standards of appropriate or proper behavior, both the intersubjective and the
evaluative dimensions are inescapable when discussing norms.
- We recognize norm-breaking behavior because it generates disapproval or stigma and norm confronting
behavior either because it produces praise, or, in the case of highly internalized norm, because it is so
taken for granted that it provokes no reaction whatsoever,
o There are no bad norms from the vantage point of those who promote the norm. norms most of
us would consider bad – norms about racial superiority, divine right, imperialism – were once
powerful because some groups believed in the appropriateness (that is, the goodness) of the
norm, and others either accepted it as obvious or inevitable or had no choice but to accept.
- How do we know a norm when we see one? We can only have indirect evidence of norms just as we
can only have indirect evidence of most other motivations for political action (interests or threats, for
example). However, because norms by definition embody a quality of oughtness and shared moral
assessment, norms prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication
among actors that we can study.
o If not for the norm, there would be no need to mention, explain or justify.
o Note that we separate norm existence or strength from actual behavioral change in our
operationalization. Because one central question of norms research is the effect of norms on
state behavior, it is important to operationalize a norm in a way that is distinct from the state or
nonstate behavior it is designed to explain.
- Life cycle of norms – we show how agreement among a critical mass of actors on some emergent can
create a tipping point after which agreement becomes widespread in many empirical cases, and we
provide some suggestions about common features of critical mass.
Connecting domestic and international norms
- We are concerned with international or regional norms that set standards for the appropriate behavior of
states.
o Domestic norms, however, are deeply entwined with the workings of international norms.
o Many international norms began as domestic norms and become international through the
efforts of entrepreneurs of various kinds.
Women’s suffrage began as a demand for domestic change within a handful of
countries and eventually became an international norm.
In addition, international norms must always work their influence through the filter of
domestic structures and domestic norms, which can produce important variations in
compliance and interpretation of these norms.
o Domestic norm entrepreneurs advocating a minority position use international norms to
strengthen their position in domestic debates.
In other words, there is a two-level game occurring in which the domestic
and the international norm tables are increasingly linked.
Argument: all these domestic influences lessen significantly once a norm has
become institutionalized in the international system.
- International system is characterized by law and norms operating without direct punitive capacity. The
process through which these legal scholars claim that norms work domestically – involving norm
entrepreneurs, imitation, norm cascades and norm bandwagons – are entirely consistent with the
research done on norms by scholars in IR and suggest that IR norms research might also learn from
domestic analogies.
Stability versus change
- Norms channels and regularize behavior, they often limit the range of choice and constraint actors.
o From a constructive perspective – international structure is determined by the international
distribution of ideas. Shared ideas, expectations and beliefs about appropriate behavior are
what give the world structure, order and stability. The problem for constructivists thus
becomes the same problem facing realists – explaining change. In an ideational international
structure, idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation. Norm
shifts are to the ideational theorist what changes in the balance of power are to the realist.
Evolution and influence of norms
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