INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Exam content: Candidates must answer two questions. 3
hours, 2,250 word questions.
POL 2 Revision Content
1. First Encounters and the Beginnings of Global Relations .......................................................................6
2. Europe and the Sovereign State ...........................................................................................................11
3. Westphalia ............................................................................................................................................15
The legal bits of Munster + Osnabruck .....................................................................................................19
The peace of Westphalia revisited (Rowen 1961) ....................................................................................21
30 Years’ War Explained (History matters) ...............................................................................................21
The Habsburgs Explained ..........................................................................................................................21
Treaty of Augsburg 1555 Explained ..........................................................................................................21
The power of the pope + excommunication explained ............................................................................22
4. China and the International Politics of East Asia ..................................................................................22
David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytic Frameworks,” International Security
2003 27 (4): 57-85. (Kang 2003)............................................................................................................22
5. Realism ..................................................................................................................................................23
The tragedy of great power politics Mearsheimer 2014 ......................................................................23
Politics among Nations – (Morgenthau 1948) ......................................................................................26
The Prince – Nicollo Machiavelli (Machiavelli 2019) ............................................................................30
Structural Realism after the Cold War Kenneth Waltz 2000 .........................................................................31
The Origins of Alliances - Stephen M. Walt (1987) ........................................................................................31
Waltz’s realism “The emerging structure of international politics” Waltz 1993 ...........................................32
6. African International Politics and Slavery .............................................................................................33
7. Nations and States in the Americas ......................................................................................................33
8. Liberalism ..............................................................................................................................................36
9. Constructivism ......................................................................................................................................40
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.”
International Organization 1992 46 (2): 391-425. (Wendt 1992) .................................................................40
Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations.” International Security 1998 23 (1):
171-200. ........................................................................................................................................................41
10. Gender in the International System........................................................................................................42
The status of women as a standard of ‘civilisation’ ‘Ann Towns, 2009’ ...................................................42
, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”
International Organization 1998 52 (4): 887-917. ....................................................................................43
11. Anglo-American Hegemony and its Enemies 1914-1945........................................................................45
Christopher Bell “thinking the unthinkable: British and American naval strategies for an Anglo-
American War 1918-1931” (Bell 1997) .................................................................................................45
Andrew Preston, “Monsters Everywhere. A Genealogy of National Security.” Diplomatic History 2014
38 (3): 477-500......................................................................................................................................46
Kori Schake, Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2017)............................................................................................................47
Andrew Williams, Failed Imagination. The Anglo-American New World order from Wilson to Bush
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007)...............................................................................48
12. The historical origins of global governance ............................................................................................49
Why the league of nations was doomed before it began (Erin Blakemore 2020) National geographic ........52
G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major
Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), chaps. 1, 4-5. ..............................................................52
“Governing the World: the history of an idea” Mazower 2012 .....................................................................53
12. The German Challenge to Pax Anglo-America ........................................................................................55
German challenge – lecture notes ........................................................................................................55
Adam Tooze, The Deluge. The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order (London: Penguin,
2014). ....................................................................................................................................................57
The Tragedy of great power politics (Mearsheimer 2014) ...................................................................60
David Motadel, “The Global Authoritarian Moment and the Revolt against Empire.” American
Historical Review 2019 124 (3): 843-877. .............................................................................................61
Reto Hofmann, “The Fascist New-Old Order.” Journal of Global History 2017 12 (2): 166-183. .........61
13. The Soviet Challenge to Pax Anglo-America ...........................................................................................62
Lecture notes ........................................................................................................................................62
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 2014 Mearsheimer .....................................................................62
Alexander Hill, “Stalin and the West.” In Gordon Martel (Ed.), Companion to International History
(Hoboken: Wiley, 2007), pp.257-268. ...................................................................................................64
Stephen Kotkin, Stalin: Volume I: Paradoxes of Power, 1878–1928 (London: Allen Lane, 2014), pp.
553-563. ................................................................................................................................................65
14. The Japanese Challenge to Pax Anglo-America ......................................................................................66
Lecture notes ........................................................................................................................................66
The Tragedy of great power politics (Mearsheimer 2014) ...................................................................67
Makino’s speech at Treaty of Versailles (Lauren 1978) ........................................................................68
Eri Hotta, Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy (New York: Random House, 2013), 164-177. ...............68
Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (London: Routledge,
1998), 89-116. .......................................................................................................................................69
Steven Ward, “Race, Status, and Japanese Revisionism in the early 1930s.” Security Studies, 22
(2013), 607-639.....................................................................................................................................70
, Jonathan Marshall, To Have and to Have not. Southeast Asian Raw Materials and the Origins of the
Pacific War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). ................................................................71
15. The Cold War and Nuclear Weapons ......................................................................................................72
Lecture notes ........................................................................................................................................72
Harvested History – timeline.....................................................................................................................73
Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), pp.68-87 .............................................................................................................74
Jervis 2001 “was the cold war a security dilemma”? ................................................................................75
Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better.” London, Adelphi Paper 177,
1981 ..........................................................................................................................................................76
“Back to the Future: instability in Europe after the cold war” Mearsheimer 1990 ..................................77
CASE STUDIES............................................................................................................................................79
Budapest memorandum 1994 ..................................................................................................................79
16. De-colonisation and the end of empires ................................................................................................79
Lecture notes ........................................................................................................................................79
Adom Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2019), intro. and chap 3. ....................................................................................................80
Christian Reus-Smit, “Struggles for Individual Rights and the Expansion of the International System.”
International Organization 2011 65 (2): 207-242. [Intro and conclusion read, a constructivist view] ..........83
Inequality, Human Rights, and the New International Economic Order Antony Anghie 2019 ......................84
17. The end of the cold war ..........................................................................................................................84
Lecture notes ........................................................................................................................................84
Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Re-evaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas (Brooks &
Wohlforth 2001) .......................................................................................................................................87
Matthew Evangelista, “Explaining the Cold War’s End: Process Tracing All the Way Down?” In Andrew
Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Eds) Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 153-85........................................................................................89
Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 9-10. ..................................................................89
18. International human rights .....................................................................................................................90
Morgenthau “politics among nations” 1948 ............................................................................................90
Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010),
prologue and chap. 5. ...............................................................................................................................91
Kathryn Sikkink, Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century (NB Chapt 4 is on
Cold war + decolonisation) .......................................................................................................................93
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights ...........................................................................................97
Adam Branch, “Uganda's Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention.” Ethics & International Affairs
2007 21 (2): 179-198.................................................................................................................................98
The Politics of International Law - Martti Koskenniemi 1990...................................................................99
, The Rise of the African Union Opposition to the International Criminal Court's Investigations
and Prosecutions of African Leaders Ssenyonjo, Manisuli (2013) ..........................................................100
America and the ICC – case study ...........................................................................................................100
International law and human rights (Baylis et al 2022) – Christian Reus-Smit .......................................101
Baylis et al 2022 – Human rights by Ratna Kapur ...................................................................................102
Martha Finnemore, The Purposes of Intervention: Changing Ideas about the Use of Force. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2003), pp.1-23..................................................................................................................102
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.13-49 .............................................................................................103
Alex J. Bellamy, “The Changing Face of Humanitarian Intervention.” St Antony’s International Review 2015
11 (1): 15-43 ................................................................................................................................................104
19. Regulating the use of force ...................................................................................................................106
The league of nations..............................................................................................................................106
The laws of war – Baylis et al 2023 .........................................................................................................106
Tanisha M. Fazal, “Why States No Longer Declare War.” Security Studies 2012 21 (4): 557-593. ........107
Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force.”
International Organization 2001 55 (2): 215-250. ..................................................................................108
Dan Altman, “The Evolution of Territorial Conquest after 1945 and the Limits of the Territorial Integrity
Norm.” International Organization 2020 74 (3): 490-522. He contests Zacher. ..........................................110
Feigning Compliance: Covert Action and International Law (Poznansky 2019) ...........................................111
Russian Invasion of Ukraine is not an Exception or Rupture but a Continuity (Burra 2023) ........................112
Case study: Iraq versus Kuwait ....................................................................................................................112
20. Post-colonial states and intervention ...................................................................................................114
Lecture notes ..............................................................................................................................................114
22. Governing the global commons ............................................................................................................115
UN CHARTER .............................................................................................................................................115
23. The crisis of the Liberal institutional order? The West .........................................................................118
“THE LIBERAL ORDER IS RIGGED; FIX IT NOW OR WATCH IT WITHER” COLGAN & KEOHANE 2017 .............................118
G. John Ikenberry, “The Plot Against American Foreign Policy: Can the Liberal Order Survive?” Foreign
Affairs 2017 96 (3): 2-9. ..........................................................................................................................119
G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?” International Affairs 2018 94 (1): 7-23. .120
Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace.” International Security 1994 19
(2): 5-49...................................................................................................................................................120
William Wohlforth – The Stability of a Unipolar World ..........................................................................120
Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked
Up to Be (Finnemore 2009) ....................................................................................................................121
Bound to Fail – Mearsheimer 2019 ........................................................................................................122
“The exclusionary foundations of embedded liberalism” Goodman & Pepinsky 2021 ..........................123
, Emanuel Adler and Alena Drieschova, “The Epistemological Challenge of Truth Subversion to the
Liberal International Order.” International Organization 2021 75 (2): 359-86. (Adler & Drieschova
2021): liberals, they argue the LIO has been peaceful “in no small part because of its reliance on
science” ..................................................................................................................................................124
“TAMING AMERICAN POWER” STEPHEN WALT 2005 ......................................................................................124
DEMOCRACIES IN DECLINE (FREEDOM HOUSE; 2021) .......................................................................................124
24. The crisis of the liberal institutional order? Russia and other discontents ..........................................125
Neutrollization: Industrialized trolling as a pro-Kremlin strategy of desecuritization (Kurowska and
Reshetnikov 2018)...................................................................................................................................125
Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Ayşe Zarakol, “Struggles for Recognition: The Liberal International Order and
the Merger of its Discontents.” International Organization 2021 75 (2): 611-34. .................................125
George Lawson and Ayşe Zarakol, “Recognizing Injustice: The ‘Hypocrisy Charge’ and the Future of the
Liberal International Order,” International Affairs 2023 99 (1): 201-217...............................................126
25. The crisis of the liberal institutional order? China and alternative orders ...........................................127
Asian conceptions of international order: what Asia wants Bajpai & Laksmana 2023 ..........................127
Atul Mishra, “The World Delhi Wants: Official Indian Conceptions of International Order, c. 1998–
2023.” International Affairs 2023 99 (4): 1401-1419..............................................................................128
John M. Owen, “Ikenberry, International Relations Theory, and the Rise of China.” British Journal of
Politics and International Relations 2019 21 (1): 55-62..........................................................................128
Ruonan Liu and Songpo Yang, “China and the Liberal International Order: A Pragmatic and Dynamic
Approach,” International Affairs 2023 99 (4): 1383-1400 ......................................................................129
Amitav Acharya, “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order.” Ethics &
International Affairs 2017 31 (3): 271-85. ..............................................................................................131
Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War (Jack Levy 2011) ...........................................131
Partnership or Predation? Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson How Rising States Contend with Declining
Great Powers ..........................................................................................................................................131
Is China in decline, and what does this mean for the US? Financial Times 2003 by Rana Foroohar......132
The Dangers of China’s Decline Hal Brands, Foreign Policy 2022 ...........................................................132
Key figures on China’s rise: .....................................................................................................................132
26. Progress in international politics? ........................................................................................................134
Other questions for next term: ...........................................................................................................134
,1. First Encounters and the Beginnings of Global Relations
Lecture summary
• From c1500 European voyages to the west and eat, 1492 (Colombus) and 1498 (Vasco de Gama rounds southern Africa opening
trade routes with Gulf, India and eventually beyond SE Asia) → voyages of discovery → this birthed the internationally
connected system; Asians, Africans and Americans have traditionally been viewed as dominating non-europeans, taking away
their agency.
• Asia-European relations - Europeans expansion is not the same as domination, they encountered huge empires (Ming in
China). Spanish = 3million people; China = 150million.
o There were issues of mistaken identities – Hindus thought the Christians were in fact Muslim.
o Asian empires saw no need to import from ‘barbarians’ abroad, instead they were self sufficient. China rejected
requests to trade with them.
o Europeans lacked the military strength to dominate.
o Europeans got on (to a degree) with Asians for trading.
• Americas and European relations – in this case, the view from Jared Diamond is correct, the Europeans had guns and steel
which Americas didn’t (unlike in China) → Europeans destroyed Aztec and Incas. Small explorer groups had local allies (this
shows agency) and they had disease, killing c 90% of the locals.
o The Colombian exchange – widespread transfer of foods, animals, people and metals between old and new world
→ spread of common cold, measles, smallpox which destroys great empires, Europeans get syphilis
o We have therefore ‘read history backwards’ – we have seen eventual conquer and assume we conquered from
the start.
o For the first 350 years it was less the Europeanisation of the Americas, and more the Africanisation of the
Americas.
o Nomadics confused them and were less wealthy, so they stayed away.
• Africa – after the deaths in the Americas, a huge number of African slaves (between 12-15m) were taken to the Americas.
• Overall – people understood eachother in concepts which made sense to them.
Zhang 2014 – Europeans as supplicants in the Chinese Imperium (Zhang 2014)
• Three key ideas → Qing Imperium was a Chinese world order; open to non- Chinese people and states; key to Pax Sinica was
the tribute system.
• It has been assumed in IR that Chinese international relations started with the Opium War 1839-1842 → terms had been
dictated by expanding international relations. Chinese/European relations have been ‘conveniently consigned to the history of
intellectual and cultural exchanges’ → engagement has been only deemed meaningful when Europe expanded the Westphalian
System of Sovereign States in East Asia and ‘imposed civilisation’ from 1842 in China. IR scholarship pays insufficient attention
pre 19thC.
• Started with Portuguese traders in early 16thC → then 3 centuries thereafter. Sometimes engagement on ‘parity’ but mostly
‘inferiority vis-à-vis’ the Chinese. Looks at three different groups of Europeans:
• (1) Jesuits – pioneers of cultural & social engagement – an accommodative approach. → provided Europe with info on Chinese
culture and society. Introduced western learning/science to China. They sought to participate in Chinese society. Sought to
engage through ‘confrontation with the intellectual aristocracy’. The Jesuits took an accommodative approach, pioneered by
Matteo Ricci in 1583 (China’s first European immigrant). Ricci took a Chinese name (Xi Ru), spoke & read classical Chinese. He
produced first map of world with Chinese characters. Sought to create Confucian and Christian synthesis.
o Chinese rites controversy → Ricci accepted rites to ancestors as superstitious but decided they didn’t violate
monotheistic Christian God
o Ricci was granted first European missionary residence in Beijing in 1601 – though he never
met with Emperor of Ming dynasty to agree it.
o Emperor Kangxi in 1720 ‘I, the emperor, do not know any western tongues, and therefore I
do not discuss anything western’.
o Jesuits provided useful services to imperial China → advancing maths, astronomy
o The Jesuits wanted to make china ‘something acceptable to them’ → but terms of
engagement were dictated by Beijing, not the Vatican
(Ricci – RHS picture)
• (2) Warriors and Merchants – tried to establish sustained economic growth & trade – to exploit China’s wealth. They preceded
and accompanied the Jesuits. Portuguese arrive from Malaca in 1514 seeking material commerce agreements with Ming
emperor. They found Chinese ‘people of great skill’ & ‘on a par with ourselves’. The Portuguese were engaging with the
greatest economy in the world of the 16th&17thC. China had a strong military power, and highly bureaucratised state which
tightly regulated Chinese trade. They understood Europe was not superior to China. Early attempts by Portuguese to engage in
trade = dramatic. Portuguese had captured Malacca, a loyal tribute state to Ming = Ming’s displeasure with Portuguese. Stories
of Portuguese abducting and killing children (partially true) = irreparable damage to Portuguese. After 1522, Portuguese
banned from trading with China until 1554. Sino-Portugese war = 1521-1522, but no serious conflict with Europe until Opium
war in 1839.
, o Dutch/Spanish/British engaged in Chinese trade, and occasionally fought over it. I.e. Dutch
Military cooperation with Qing government through Dutch East India company (formed in 1601).
They sought to ‘hassle’ Chinese into letting the dutch enter their trade, sometimes using force.
They offered military and naval assistance. 1638 VOC offered military assistance to the shogun
to pacify Japanese catholics → this won VOC trade concessions, though ‘carefully restricted’.
o European traders were therefore ‘controlled’ by Chinese and Japanese. Portuguese complied
because of ‘prosperity of trade’ → not freedom of movement/trade.
• (3) European diplo initiatives – sought to support Jesuits & traders. Trade in 15th&16thC between Europeans and Chinese was
unofficial, and not via treaties and subject to ‘harassing restrictions’. Formal relations not formed until mid 19thC, but this
doesn’t mean Europeans didn’t actively seek to form them beforehand.
o Macartney mission 1792-93 – proceeded by Portuguese, Dutch & Russian embassies to Beijing. Unlike Jesuits, diplos
were not as persistent. They encountered a ‘well entrenched’ tribute system. They had to comply.
▪ Second British Mission = Lord Amherst in 1816. Britain had defeated Napoleon and was Europe’s most
powerful state. Had power to impose their will on Imperial China → Opium Wars 1839.
o 1520 Tome Pires, representing King Manuel of Portugal – secured permission to travel to Beijing. Not admitted
audience with emperor, presents refused, letters burned. Prostrated selves against walls of forbidden city on 1st &
15th every month – rejected because of behaviour of Portuguese which brought ‘displeasure’ to Ming court.
o European envoys complied with tribute system – carried banner of tributary state in lead boat; designate gifts to
emperor → led to ‘cordial and relaced relationships’ with Imperial China. European envoys helped to create ‘pax
sinica’ in east asia → chinese were ceremonially supreme. Zhang argues all the dutch wanted, for example, was an
imperial decree for unlimited trade with mainland china.
o Chinese also sought to manage/limit foreign contact, keeping foreigners far from capital as part of a broader
security strategy.
o Avoidance of conflict primarily due to Ditch accepting Chinese form of inequality. It was Chinese unilateral
bureaucratic control that prevailed > Dutch assumption of reciprocity. Dutch ideas of ‘the law of all nations’ fell on
deaf ears. There is no evidence that international law/equality of all nations was a goal of the Dutch. The Dutch
were hegemons at this point → therefore significant that they made ‘no explicit attempt’ to impose their values.
• Key arguments of Zhang 2014:
o (1) European expansion in China started in 16thC, not 19thC – lots of notable ‘contestations,
mediations and negotiations’ → sustained & prolonged period of peaceful co-existence. Only
isolated violence.
o (2) No clear evidence European states made a ‘conscious effort’ to pull Imperial China into the
international order. Europeans participated in East Asia on the basis of local interests/institutions
and agendas – this replicated the hierarchical social structure of China, rather than changing it
o (3) This engagement was ‘highly contingent’ on Europeans accommodating/accepting the norms,
values rules and institutions ‘in the prevailing Chinese world order’
• In sum → Imperial China dictated the terms. Macartney mission was the first British diplomatic mission in China which took
place in 1793. British wanted to open new ports for British trade in China, establish permanent embassy in Beijing, secure small
island for British use. The Qianlong Emperor rejected these British requests.
• Chinese never sent similar missions to Europe. Engagement on terms of Imperial China, not Europe. Europeans were
increasingly significant yet marginal participants. Imperial China unilaterally dictated terms. Europeans accepted these terms. In
first 300 years of Asian-European engagement, they didn’t seek to incorporate imperial china in European international system.
• This order ended when European states imposed their standard of ‘civilisation’ to enforce cultural unity.
Own thoughts: Evidence inadequacy of historical narrative. Did this influence European society? China more of an influence in Paris than
Europe was in Peking. Finally, do cultural differences matter in stable international order?
Criticisms:
Adam Clulow 2014 - ‘the company and the shogun the Dutch encounter with Tokugawa
Japan’ (Clulow, 2014)
• Shogun = title of military dictators of Japan
• Agrees with Zhang by challenging the notion there was a ‘European watershed in the early modern period’
• First encounter between west and Asia = 1497→ Vasco de Gama opened trade routes to India
(Portuguese explorer). De Gama is met with resources which ‘far exceeded’ those of European regimes.
Colombus however, who went West, was able to conquer.
• Europeans were not confident or overwhelmingly superior → this is illusory. There were comparative
military regimes (Japan). Asia was paramount until the industrial imperialism which led to unprecedented
expansion → more powerful for far longer than previously imagined.
• Argues westerners struggled with lack of recognition abroad, noting the experience of Peter Nuyts –
ambassador to Shogun of Japan, 1627 → 1 month later, he flees edo in the middle of the night.
• Argues rapid pace of European expansion due to two advantages (1) ‘fearsome’ tech = iron weapons, and
(2) ‘powerful confidence’ = viewed new world as blank page → triumphalist narrative now being silenced.
• De Gama/Colombus viewed as European watershed, reflected in textbooks. Suggested Ming China lacked ‘range, focus and
above all, curiosity’ → narrative of ‘inevitable European mastery around a single imperial time line’
, o Tonio Andrade = says ‘1492 schema’ is wrong & does not equate to rise of the west
o Kenneth Swope = Asian military revolution paralleled Europe.
o Kenneth Pomeranz = European ascension time line should be pushed back to post 1800s.
• Europeans more anxious than confident → weapons could be blunted/taken away. Lessening their leverage in negotiating with
a foreign political order. Asia was ‘fully capable’ of resisting European demands. De Gama in 1498 had to ‘negotiate’ with
Calicut, a minor region compared with Ming China. Westerners were irrelevant, lost their power.
• Studies have failed to look at the relationship between VOC and Tokugawa regime → VOC ships arrive in Japan in 1609, the
Tokugawa Leyasu (founder and first shogun of Japan) central system of governance has over 200 semi-independent dominial
lords – government was willing to engage dutch & prepared them for access to political/commercial centre.
o Charles Boxer = Christian missionaries had ‘transformative’ impact on country, leading to Japanese fearing
subversive power of religion.
o Ronald Toby = Japan remained closely engaged in Asia, with Korea and Ryukyu kingdom (annexed and dissolved by
Japan in 1879)
• VOC, according to Leonard Blusse, relied on diplomacy and violence → but didn’t seek to build an empire, just profit. The result
included violence, with local officials rejecting ‘aggressive interlopers’
• By 1853 → Perry’s fleet of black ships in Edo Bay = turning point for Japan. Meiji leaders worked to
reshape the country by overhauling social/economic/legal structures – to make a ‘civilised nation’ →
process of forced socialisation to be considered a ‘civilised nation’. Look on unfamiliar language of
international law. This is only a short timespan of Western dominance in Asia. [Black ships – 4x sent
by American Navy to threaten Japan if it did not trade with the West]
• In contrast, VOC had to pay a much higher price – accepting set of new rules for proper conduct, new political vocabulary,
abandon established practices. They had to secure a place in the foreign order just like the Meiji in 1853.
Own thoughts: historical narrative written by the ‘winners’ of history, but not reflective of balance of power until 1853. Pre
industrialised expansion of west, Asian military and economy was formidable. As a weaker, foreign power with no recognised
standing, Europeans had to comply, adapt to norms.
Criticism:
James Lockhart ‘of things of the Indies’ (Lockhart, 2000)
• Argues that resistance and acceptance wasn’t as one would expect. He argues Spanish were viewed by Mexicans as ‘Gods’;
brought Spanish presents; no consistent/organised resistance.
• He argues the first nations Nahuas people were willing to borrow Spanish language, and no clear rebellions. He argues this is
because the biggest determinant of reciprocity or resistance is the ‘fit’ of European and indigenous culture and the contract
between the two peoples. He argues there can exist a ‘framework of convergence’ → i.e. indigenous people could see the
‘utility of steel knives’; daily contact reduces differences.
• He argues ‘many of the most basic instances of crosscultural change and continuity in the western hemisphere bear little
relation to resistance no matter how much the notion is refined’. Key was the ‘fit of European and indigenous culture and the
contact between the two populations’ – this dictates the likelihood of acceptance or resistance, and he basically argues
there wasn’t much resistance. Daily contact reduced resistance further.
• Resistance → focuses on native americans towards Europeans. Neither total acceptance nor resistance anywhere. He notes
the contacts was primarily asymmetric, with one group more numerous and better equipped (steel, horses, writing, sea-faring
ships)
o Focusing on Mexico – Spaniards avoided areas without dense sedentary population/precious metals. They accepted
indigenous knowledge of mining/previous metals.
o Spaniards – accepted food, housing until they could plant european wheat/european houses – ate maize/cassava if
nothing else available.
o Indigenous – became servants/employees of Spanish, with indigenous words providing ‘special flavour’ to Spanish
language.
o Argue influence was asymmetrical – indigenous language and culture influenced Spanish, but not vice versa –
signals some resistance. States Europeans avoided non-sedentary people – how do we know they weren’t avoiding
the Spanish?
o Argues patriotic resistance played a ‘smaller role than thought’ → often fragmented. He argues a lack of
acceptance doesn’t mean conscious opposition. Instead it needs to be divided up:
▪ Combat –‘indigenous solidarity against the Europeans is pretty much unheard of’ → Europeans
eventually viewed as a way of improving position of individual groups. Spaniards when they arrived in
Mexico ‘in force’ 1519 → no overt resistance to Spaniards, instead giving food/gifts → groups subjugated
by other indigenous groups instead sought to negotiate with Europeans. He still argues there was
‘European technical superiority’. Non-sedentary populations were best off as they weren’t dependent on
crops and had better weapons ‘poisoned arrows’
▪ Rebellions – most common was ethnic group/state outbreak in defense of rights which had been
undermined in existing system. Lockhart says this is ‘more self-assertion than resistance’. He argues
indigenous people were free to litigate in own interest, using Spanish lawyers, and developing own
expertise, and that lawsuits and petitions weren’t always ‘unsuccessful’ → is this true? Were they given
equal rights?
, ▪ Normal interactions – argues that no Nahuatl tests have ever stated they must retain ‘pure native modes
of speech and avoid Spanish expressions’ – expressions are found everywhere. He argues Spanish
language was gradually accepted, and not thought of as ‘foreign’. He questions why not ‘immediately’
taken up, and the answer according to Lockhart is it was absorbed similarly to how language is ‘seen in
children’ → he suggests language was ‘indoctrination’ where the two were combined, much like
shamanism with Christianity. In central Mexico, they had no issues using money, and ‘money/cash’ was
one of the first Spanish words they used (though you would expect this, seeing as it was a novel
concept!)
• In summary – he argues nothing was clearly rejected because it was Spanish. Foreignness of culture did not matter to the
Nahuas. He notes the Nahua experience is not ‘universal in its content’. He argues we are reading history backwards, and
that local populations had agency, selecting words and technologies akin to an a la carte menu. He argues Europeans were
marginal in the Americas, bar their impact by disease. Lockhart’s argument is therefore that we have confuted correlation with
causation, but he has missed out the deliberate spreading of disease. The presence of genocide. He supposedly wants to take a
local perspective, and yet uses no local sources. He argues there were double misunderstandings – with both Americans and
Spanish thinking they were dominating the other. This enabled coexistence.
Criticism by R.C. Padden 1977: at attempt at using microhistory to shape microhistory. Their ‘well chosen letters’ all written by
Spaniards in the indies to friends/relatives/superiors in Spain represent ‘the micronuclei of social historiography. Shows Spaniards as
pursuing interests with little to do with imperialism.
Own: Very selective choice of research, no indigenous sources, claims legal parity.
Empires of the Weak: The Real Story of European Expansion and the Creation of the New
World Order (Sharman, 2019)
• Contests the ‘military revolution thesis’ – the idea that european expansion from 15-18thC to west across the Atlantic to the
Americas, South & East coast of Africa, and to Asia which happened near simultaneously succeeded because Europeans had
superior weapons and organisation, the product of competition and war at home. He argues Europeans didn’t have a superior
advantage. Inspired by market competition & Darwinian theory.
o Military revolution thesis = recurring wars between great powers = military innovation and state-building in Europe
= competitive advantage
• Success for Europeans ➔ product of deference/subordination, not dominance. These were explorers, not state armies.
Greatest conquerors were instead Asian Empires (Ottomans, Mughals, Ming and Manchu Qing in China) – theory is eurocentric
• Not a state directed effort. European nations were ‘puny in comparison to Asian great powers’.
• This shows us the rise of China and India is not ‘historically unprecedented’ – he argues military revolution thesis is not tested.
• Why does military rev thesis not work? Military tactics used abroad not the same as in Europe (tiny expeditionary forces);
private forces; conquistadors succeeded due to disease + local allies + cold steel; in Africa ‘toeholds’ were kept thanks to
absence of objection from African leaders, when Europeans did challenge Africans, they largely lost
• Expansion is not the same as domination. In early modern Africa and Asia – European presence was maritime, protecting ports
+ sea lanes for trade, whereas rulers were focused on people + land → these were complimentary preferences. Still involved ‘a
great deal of violence’
• Military expertise: Chinese invented gunpowder from 900-1200, reaching most military milestones before Europeans;
Ottomans + Mughals managed larger polities + military power than 16th+17thC Europeans. (1) No single path to military
effectiveness. (2) Undermines idea European polities were success, and Asian empires were ‘merely failures’ → 19thC saw
‘new imperialism’ – prestige projects
• US has experienced more defeats to non-western forces than successes in past 50 years. This brings into question value of
military technology.
• The Military revolution – what was it? Progressed by Michael Roberts 1955 → tactics (battlefield formations in 1590s Holland),
strategy (30 years war – use of multiple armies for single military aim), army size (expanded post 30 years war) and state
development (more money to pay for them).
o Eurocentrism – earlier belief in european superiority → ‘significant biases linger’ despite being discredited.
o Learning in war – Clausewitz argues there is ‘the fog of war’, leaders don’t often discern what are successful
strategies – there’s a lot of luck.
o Selection – military leaders cannot discern cause and effect. To learn effectively, the ‘death rate’ of organisations
would need to be very high. Polities tend to be durable and rarely eliminated by conquest. One of Sharman’s
conclusions is European armies largely absent from Asia/Americas/Africa as they would be ill-suited to local
conditions. John Meyer argues organisations tend not to care much about efficiency/effectiveness.
• Evidence: the example of ‘bulletproofing’ → 1986 uprising in northern Uganda against Museveni government – soldiers led by
Alice Auma who claimed to be medium for several sprits. Soldiers could not take cover; must stand erect with naked torso to
enemy; covered in shea butter & ochre to make them bulletproof; could not aim at enemy; spirit solder sang pious songs for
10-20 mins; when whistle blew they marched forward shouting ‘James Bond’ → similar practices observed in South Africe,
Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria…Organisations are not shaped by learning. Bulletproofing was repeatedly tested. Belief
remained widespread and durable. Death was viewed as failure to observe prohibitions (i.e. no sex, not eating certain foods)
Herman Bennett African Kings and Black slaves (Bennett, 2018)
• Traditional theories assume Europe to have been ‘ascendant, if not hegemonic’, mirroring Europe of the late 18thC
