Unit 36 – Fire Investigation
Assignment 3
Below are two case studies in relation to where fire outbreaks have occurred in buildings, however, this isn’t
so much concerned with what was carried out during the fire investigation but more the communication
aspects;
1. Atherstone- on-Stour Fire –
On the 2nd November 2007, four firefighters, from Warwickshire Fire & Rescue Service, died carrying out their
duties. At 17:40hrs Warwickshire Fire & Rescue Service were mobilised to a building fire at Wealmoor, a
vegetable packing and processing facility in Atherstone-on-Stour near Stratford-Upon-Avon. The firefighting
objective was to limit damage to the building along with the related impact on the local community by taking a
proactive approach. For the initial attendance two fire appliances were mobilised. Numerous attempts were
made to locate the fire but, despite having on scene advice from Wealmoor’s engineering manager, fire crews
were unable to locate the fire and tackle it until it had breached the building three to four hours into the
incident. It must be noted that this was the largest and most complex incident Warwickshire Fire & Rescue
Service had attended in recent history, therefore, to bring operations to a conclusion regional and national
support was required. It was four days into the incident before all four firefighters had been recovered from
the building and it took an extra day for the fire to be completely extinguished. Following this incident, there
was a lengthy legal process, ending with three operational incident commanders being charged and acquitted
for Manslaughter through Gross Negligence as well as Warwickshire County Council pleading guilty on a
limited basis to charges under section 2 of the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974. The incident attracted major
national interest, not only was it the largest loss of firefighters lives since 1972, but it was also the first
occasion that incident commanders had faced criminal charges through their firefighting actions. A range of
investigations were conducted by needed agencies, some of these agencies are as follows;
Structural engineers – these were employees who were needed in the investigation in providing the
fire service in information regarding the layout of the building.
Fire Services: Hereford & Worchester (these were leading the investigation), West Midlands, Avon,
Hampshire, Devon, Buckinghamshire, Leicestershire, London, Warwickshire, and Merseyside – these
were all involved in trying to put the fire out as well as the initial investigation which followed.
Officer(s) in charge – these were involved in basically controlling the scene and briefing/debriefing
authorised personnel.
Health & Safety Executive(s) – these were involved in the safety of the building, such as; the structure
as the structure of the building suffered significant damage from the fire.
Ambulance Service – These were involved in taking the casualties to hospital whilst providing any
necessary treatment to casualties whilst in their care.
BRE Global – these were involved in bringing together teams of fire investigations and scientists to
support the police, insurers, etc, to ensure that an accident in this doesn’t get repeated.
The Police – they were involved in securing the scene and the criminal investigation aspect, they
would’ve interviewed any witnesses.
SOCO’s (Scene of Crime Officer’s) – these were involved in investigating the scene and collecting any
evidence which could’ve provided clues as to how this fire was caused.
The Media (BBC Reporter) – these were involved in publishing news stories regarding the incident.
National Fire and Resilience team members – these were involved in providing information, support,
and advice as required to key locations.
Courts, Prisons & Crown Prosecution Service – these were involved in the arrest, prosecution and
court trial(s) regarding the incident.
*These are not all of the agencies involved; however, they are the main agencies involved.* These agencies at
the scene will typically communicate through means of radio or CAD (Computer Assisted Dispatch) logs, if not
in one another’s presence, or face-to-face in working near one another or through debriefing process.
However, outside the scene information can be communicated through means of reports or during courts.
A pallet, stacked with cardboard boxes, were spotted on fire within a bay at the far end of the storeroom, an
employee locates this and believes he successfully smothered the fire through using a foam as well as a carbon
dioxide extinguisher, so, he leaves the building to get help from other staff. Upon return with other employees,
they find that the pallet has re-ignited this time the flames reaching the ceiling; therefore, they make the
decision to leave the building and call 999. An employee calls the fire and rescue service using his mobile
telephone – this call is routed to GFRS (Gloucestershire Fire & Rescue Service.) GFRS passed the details of the
call to WFRS (Worcestershire Fire & Rescue Service), however, GFRS fails to distribute information regarding
the use of the building to WFRS and WFRS also fail in recording the postcode – this can already be seen as poor
communication due to the fact that every important detail regarding the building which the employee told
1
, Unit 36 – Fire Investigation
Assignment 3
GFRS should’ve been passed on to WFRS, the fact that the use of the building wasn’t told to WFRS means that
they were unlikely to know what the building was used for and might have failed in taking necessary
equipment required to fight a blaze in a vegetable packing and processing facility, this can be seen as poor
communication on behalf of GFRS, however, WFRS could’ve asked the use of the building. It was poor
communication and actions on behalf of GFRS by not recording the postcode, a postcode is vital quite simply in
knowing where to send the fire service too. However, WFRS did send two fire appliances from Stratford-Upon-
Avon to the scene.
Upon arrival the officer in charge (IC1) is met by the engineering manager of Wealmoor, whereby they discuss
the situation; IC1 asks what is on fire; the location; as well as surrounding hazards. The description obtained
from the engineering manager suggest that the fire is just beyond the double doors at the end of corridor on
the first floor at the reception area – it is good that the officer in charge is communicating with the engineering
manager to gather basic information about the fire. However, the officer in charge failed in asking direct
questions regarding evacuation, due to the fact that there was a general understanding being that the building
is evacuated, so, there could’ve been a possibility of not all employees evacuating the building and still being in
the building at this point – if this was to be the case, this would’ve been a major issue due to the fact
preservation of life is one of the most important aspects during a fire investigation. IC1 then left the building to
brief the fire crews on the information that had been obtained.
Having had been briefed some members of the crew enter the building in an attempt to locate and extinguish
the fire. The crew communicates with IC1 through means of radio, they communicate with IC1 at this stage to
request for a thermal image camera in the attempt to locate the fire, IC1 checks the thermal image camera
before taking it to them – this shows quite effective and systematic communication between the officer in
charge and fire crew at this stage due to how this was carried out, the fire crews requested a thermal image
camera and IC1 provided them with just that in a short time period. IC1 was informed by the engineering
manager about water supplies, IC1 informed some crew members about this water supply and informed them
to go and check out this water supply. At this stage, other crew members enter the building to relieve those
members already in the building, during this relief the teams meet in the corridor and exchange information –
the fact they are exchanging information during the changeover can be seen as quite effective as the current
crew can inform the new crew of what stage they’re at in locating the fire as well as inform them of the use of
the thermal image camera. During this time there is more smoke, and it is hotter, causing the relief team to
withdraw from the building in an agitated state.
Outside the building the engineering manager assists firefighters in drawing a plan of the route to the fire. This
ideally should’ve been drawn before fire crews had even entered the building as it would’ve saved time and
the fire mightn’t have escalated the way as it did if this was done initially. This can show quite poor liaison due
to the fact a diagram or drawing should’ve been given to the officer in charge and fire crews from the get-go.
They were also now given different directions to where the fire was located meaning all that time they had
been searching in the wrong place, this could’ve been prevented if the officer in charge or fire crew had asked
for a diagram or drawing illustrating where the fire was. Therefore, now with ‘improved’ information the relief
crew agree to go back in after previously withdrawing. Their brief was to progress into the lift lobby area, leave
the reference wall and to progress beyond two partitions located ahead and slightly left, to find the fire
location and then extinguish it. They reach the first partition as expected (thanks to the good communication),
they start to move around the end of the partition, but the team leader gets caught by some cables hanging
from the ceiling, however, another crew member releases him. They look to go ahead and slightly off to the
left for the second partition and encounter an unexpected triangular structure which impedes their progress.
Here, they try to make radio contact to seek clarification as to what this is, but the structure is unable to be
verified. Still unable to identify a triangular structure they become concerned that they have gone off-route
and decide to withdraw from the building. The fact, that they might’ve gone off route implies that there is
quite poor communication as they shouldn’t have gone off route after being briefed on where to go, however,
there is also a possibility that they could’ve been briefed wrong this is because perhaps the engineering
manager presented was unsure as to how far each check point was from one another, therefore, ideally the
engineering managers route plan shouldn’t have been religiously followed as it could’ve been subjected to
human errors, particularly as he would’ve been in a state of shock, they should’ve taken it as a rough route
plan.
Shortly after, a station manager arrives (fire cover officer), another fire fighter, enters the building with a new
brief from the officer in charge now with a new plan drawing to conduct a right-hand search of the fire
compartment, locate and extinguish the fire and report back on the conditions insider, if possible they must
also look for another entry point and ventilation options. During a handover between the officer in charge and
fire cover officer a review of the situation is carried out – this can be seen as good communication as it is vital
2