PARTIES TO CRIME
• Where principle offence completed by P, other parties no longer only liable for inchoate roles,
but accomplices
• Where liable as accomplices, punished same way as P
• Complicity is a common law doctrine, codified by s.8 of Accessories and Abettors Act 1861
o Aid, abet, counsel or procure any offence, will be punished as a principle offender
• Derivative liability: one person’s liability is derived from another, who commits the principal
offence.
o Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring (s.8 AAA 1861)
o Joint enterprise liability (common law)
Reasons for unsatisfactory state of law:
• Inevitable complexity: due to need to see actus reus; mens rea of own conduct, also mens rea of
future principle offence, with beyond inchoate liability complicity involves commission of
principle offence→ additional requirement that mens rea as to Ps principle offence must be
sufficiently similar (factually)
• Problem of policy: results matter
R v Jogee (2016)
Jogee and his co-defendant, Hirsi, spent the evening taking drugs and drinking alcohol causing their
behaviour to become increasingly aggressive, Jogee was outside house shouting encouragement to
Hirsi who stabbed and killed
Jogee was given a life sentence despite not killing the man, as he foresaw that his friend will kill.
Supreme Court recognised this is unfair, which liable if Jogee intended or assisted his friend to kill.
Jogee’s conviction quashed and faced retrial, which SC turned over 30years of law on joint
enterprise
Principle of accomplice?
Courts have struggled with complicity laws– Gnango
Gnango (2011)
Gunman wearing bandana had gun fight with another. A woman is shot in the head. D was liable
because:
• He assisted or encouraged P to shoot; was a principal offender; joint principal with P
D as a principle offender: if completes actus reus and mens rea of principle offence
D as a co-principle: D and others complete actus reus and mens rea→ commit as co-principles e.g.
D1 & D2 attack V with intention to kill/cause GBH, V dies, both liable of murder as principle
offenders
• where D does not commit actus reus e.g. D hires P as a contract killer, P in law is taken as free
and informed choice to kill with Ds encouragement or assistance→ D has no caused Ps acts→ P
sold author→ Kennedy (No.2)
• Kennedy (No.2): Principals cause, accomplices encourage (or otherwise influence) or help
• Despite the foundational importance of the distinction between principals and accessories, as
both parties will be labelled and punished in the same way→ like in Gnango, D does not shoot V
himself, Ps shots not caused by D, they are free and voluntary acts→ D does not commit actus
reus of murder→ Supreme Court judges, Lords Brown, Clarke and Dyson support D to be liable as
principle offender
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,D as a principle via innocent agency:
Free and voluntary acts of a third party will break the chain of causation –not the case where the
actions of that party are uninformed. Where D uses a party (X) as a tool to commit an offence, and
that party is unaware of the circumstances→ D may still be liable as a principal offender by doctrine
of innocent agency e.g. D gives X a parcel bomb to deliver to V and V is killed→ unaware it’s a
bomb→ not informed→ D principle of murder, X innocent
Michael (1840)
D, intending to kill her baby (V), gave nurse (Y) ‘medicine’, she asked Y to administer, actually
contained a drug which would kill at dose instructed. In the event, Y did not administer the drug but
left it on the mantelpiece. Whilst Y was absent, her 5- year- old son (X) took the drug and
administered it to V, causing death. X had no understanding of the drug. D was charged with
murder→ actions of Y and X were uninformed (innocent agents)→ D cause death
D as an accomplice: aids, abets, counsels or procures P to commit→ D assists or encourages P→
liability is derivative on Ps conduct
KEY TERMS
• Complicity: also referred to as accomplice liability; accessorial liability; and secondary liability.
• Accomplices also referred to as accessories and secondary parties.
• Principals: principal offenders are sometimes referred to as perpetrators.
Uncertainty if D principle of accomplice
• Legal: legal issues separating principle offenders and accomplices, in terms of innocent agency
• Factual: that makes role in principle offence unclear – Giannetto
Giannetto (1997)
D threatened to kill his wife (V) and hired another party (Y) to kill her. V was killed, but it could not
be proved who killed her. D was charged with murder on the basis that he either killed V himself as a
principal or she was killed by someone on his behalf (i.e. he was an accomplice)
Complicity by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring
• Liability goes beyond inchoate as principle offence has been committed
• D does not commit as P as Ps choice breaks chain of causation→ D accomplice
Actus Reus Mens rea
Conduct Act/omission causing Voluntary
result
Circumstan Ds conduct assists or Knowledge
ce encourages P to commit
principle offence
OR
Procuring: conduct
capable of causing Ps
offence
Result P to commit principle None
offence
Ulterior Conduct: D must intend P will
mens rea complete conduct element of
principle offence
Circumstance: intend/know
circumstances for principle offence
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, Result: intent to cause results for
principle offence
Ps mens rea: D must intend P will act
with mens rea for principle offence
Ps principle offence: must be completed in the absence of a supervening event
Actus reus of complicity
To aid, abet, counsel or procure a principal offence
• ‘Aid’: to help, support or assist
• ‘Abet’: to incite, instigate or encourage
• ‘Counsel’: to advise, encourage
• ‘Procure’: ‘to produce by endeavour’ (AGs Ref (No 1 of 1975) – D spiked P’s drink – P commits
driving offence)
✓ Can assist or encourage by omission – Du Cros v Lambourne [1907]
✓ D must cause Ps offence – Stringer
✓ D assists P – Bryce
✓ Procuring: as long as D played a causal role for the principle offence to come about – AGs Ref
(No.1 1975)
R v Clarkson [1971]: D1 & D2 entered room where a women was being raped by other soldiers, no
evidence they assisted or encouraged, but remained present→ mere presence is capable of
satisfying
Du Cros v Lambourne [1907]: complicity by omission: where D has power or right to intervene. D
charged with speeding, but could not be proved where D was driving or passenger→ omission→
failing to intervene
R v Stringer [2011]: there must be some connecting link between D’s conduct and the principal
offence (but no causation)
R v Bryce [2004]: Despite time delay (12 hrs) D’s acts still provided some assistance
R v Giannetto [1997]: Simply nodding could amount to encouragement
AG’s Reference No. 1 of 1975: D spiked P’s drink, knowing P’d be driving later. D guilty of procuring
P’s offence; the offence has no MR
[The principal offence] has been procured because, unknown to the driver and without his
collaboration, he has been put in a position in which in fact he has committed an offence which he
never would have committed otherwise
Problem cases and procuring:
• D assists or encourages P who knowingly commits principle offence: not procuring as D not
cause P
• D causes the unknowing P to complete actus reus of an offence that requires mens rea: not
procuring as P commits no crime – D liable as principle offender as innocent agency
• D causes the unknowing P to commit a strict liability offence: is procuring – D commits P
offence, D caused
• D causes the unknowing P to complete actus reus of an offence that requires mens rea, but
offence cannot be committed by an innocent agent: some offences cannot be committed by
innocent agent e.g. rape→ procure
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