MANSLAUGHTER
Common law homicide offence murder and manslaughter with an actus reus of unlawful
conduct causing death of a person
‘mandatory’ life sentence; with manslaughter the judge has discretion up to a maximum of life
imprisonment as types of conduct and mens rea can differ greatly in terms of blameworthiness
Voluntary manslaughter
Actus reus + mens rea of murder with partial defence (not complete defence e.g. self-defence)
Three partial defences: loss of self-control, diminished responsibility, Suicide pact
Partial defences
Loss of self-control – kills whilst lost self-control due to fear of serious violence or sense of being
seriously wronged
LOC is defined in Sections 54 & 55 of Coroners and Justice Act (2009)
Ds role in the killing must have resulted from a loss of self-control
Loss of self-control must have been caused by a qualifying trigger:
o Fear of serious violence from V against D or another
o Or a thing or things done or said constituted an extremely grave character,
caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged
A hypothetical person of Ds age and sex might have reacted the same way
Convicted of manslaughter instead of murder
D kills with intention required for murder, Ds level of culpability (liability) is lower as D due to
exceptional antagonism e.g. D discovers V abusing D’s child or V abuses D and results D to kill
Privy Council for AG for Jersey v Holley (2005) hold the characteristics of a reasonable person
would take into account sex and age
Prosecution has legal burden to prove one or more of these are absent, if cannot manslaughter
D must not act in a considered desire for revenge: will constitute as not losing self-control
D must lose self-control subjective requirementreasonable person in Ds position would have
acted similarly interpreted to require extreme emotion and/or a loss of rationality reason for
mens rea
One important difference between old law of provocation and the new LOC defence is that it is
no longer necessary that Ds loss of self-control is ‘sudden and temporary’ criticised to be
gender biased as men are more likely to react immediately, and women although affected may
react laterAhluwalia
Ahluwalia (1992)
D killed her abusive husband (v) following years of violence, she poured petrol whilst he was
asleep and set fire to it; V died from burns. D admitted murder, but claimed provocation
D appealed, questioning trial judge’s direction that Ds loss of control must be sudden and
temporary
Not convicted of murder on basis of Ds depression may give different defence of diminished
responsibility→ time delay in loss of control not considered pre-2009 law
Jewell (2014)
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, D killed V, a workmate after an extended period of intimidation by V, D gave evidence that he
was unable to sleep in the days before, and was gradually ‘shutting down’ before he acted to kill,
describing act to be done in a dream-like state, D was charged with murder
COA: conviction of murder as planned before killing undermined a claim to a loss of self-control
Must be a qualifying trigger: where D loses self-control and kills in absence of a trigger, no LOC
defence.
2 qualifying triggers: fear of serious violence, and a sense of being seriously wronged
But where D consciously made V to act fearfully to D, it wont be sufficient Dawes and Ors
Dawes and Ors
D discovered his wife sleeping with another man (v), stabbed V with a kitchen knife charged
with murder
Held cannot rely on LOC as said he may have provoked the violence (incited him) and lack of
evidence of LOC
Clinton (2012)
D killed wife following an argument that she informed that she was having an affair and that she
said sexual intercourse with a number of other men; she taunted him about his previous
attempts of suicide claimed LOC
Held: sexual infidelity not a qualifying trigger, but still other triggers, sexual infidelity can be taken
into account
A person of normal tolerance and self-restraint might have reacted similarly: objectively
understandablewith Ds age and sex with provocation in Ds circumstances (e.g. mental
condition, intoxication etc – Asmelash
Asmelash (2013)
D and V spent the day drinking and arguing, D stabbed V twice killing him, charged with murder
Held: voluntary intoxication= guilty of murder
Diminished responsibility – recognised medical condition led to abnormality of mind which
substantially impaired capacity and caused to kill reduces liability to ‘voluntary’ manslaughter
Not held to the standard of a ‘normal’ person because of medical condition
Medical condition creates a defect of reason that completely undermines their ability to
understand the nature of their acts, or to know if they are wrong, will have complete defence of
insanity – even when offence is murder
DR is differentmedical condition causes an abnormality of the mind that substantially impairs
abilities
Burden of proof on D to establish elements of defence on the balance of probabilities
Current post-2009 DR defence is set out in section 2 of Homicide Act 1957
o Kills or is a party to the killing is not to be convicted if D suffers from an abnormality of
mental functioning
Arose from a recognised medical condition
Substantially impaired Ds ability – to understand nature of conduct, rational judgement,
exercise self-control
Provides an explanation for Ds acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing
D must demonstrate an abnormality of mental functioning
The abnormality must have arisen from a recognised medical condition
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, The abnormality must have substantially impaired Ds ability to:
Understand the nature of her conduct; Form a rational judgement; Exercise self-
control
The abnormality must provide an explanation of the killing
if it causes, or is a significant contributory factor in causing, D to carry out the
conduct
difficult when there are multiple causes/motivations e.g. D kills due to her
abnormality and her anger at losing her job
Dietschmann (2003)
D became heavily intoxicated and killed V, and was also suffering from a mental abnormality, a
form of depression following the death of his aunt to whom he was very close raised DR
defence
Held: by HOL liable for only manslaughter, with depression satisfying DR elements
Suicide pact – D kills V in agreement that they will both die together (s.4 of Homicide Act 1957)
Shall be manslaughter, and not murder, for a person acting in pursuance of a suicide pact
between him and another to kill the other or to be a party to the other... being killed by a third
person...
Suicide pact means an agreement between two or more persons having for its object the death
of all of them, whether or not each is to take his own life
Partial defence – from murder to voluntary manslaughter
D must have agreed with V that they will die together
D must intend, at the point of killing V, to die herself in line with
agreement
Involuntary manslaughter
Nothing to do with ‘involuntariness’, used to distinguish with voluntary manslaughter where D
commits murder then relies on a partial defence, involuntary is when mens rea is not satisfied for
murder
Actus reus (unlawful killing of a person), involuntary not require intention to kill or GBH (mens
rea of murder)
3 involuntary manslaughter offences – unlawful act, gross negligence and reckless
Unlawful act manslaughter (UAM): D commits criminal act in a dangerous situation, causing death
of V
Also called ‘unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter’ or ‘constructive manslaughter’
Commits a criminal offence (base offence), that carries an objective risk of harm to V, and V dies
as a result
Actus Reus Mens rea
Conduct Any acts causing the result Voluntary
Circumstanc -Any circumstances required for base offence -As required for the base
e -Reasonable person would recognise risk of offence
harm to V -None
Result -Any results required for the base offence -As required for base offence
-Death of V -None
Unlawful act Objectively Causing
UAM
(base offence) dangerous death
Where D kills with death or GBH as a virtual certainty= murder, as a high probability= UAM
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, The unlawful act (base offence)
Most common base offences are offences against the person e.g. D attacks + kills V, without
mens rea of murder
When looking at base offence to construct UAM liability, general doctrines apply e.g. intoxication
rules
General defences also apply for base defences if have defence for base offence, no unlawful act
for liability
E.g. criminal damage Goodfellow (1986) D set fire to his council house, causing death, and
burglary
E.g. Watson (1989) where an elderly homeowner had a heart attack – 2 restrictions on base
offences:
1) Base offence must require subjective mens rea: Andrews v DPP (1937), (D killed a
pedestrian whilst overtaking another car), UAM was made on negligence based dangerous
driving where D acts negligently to cause death= gross negligence manslaughter
2) Base offence must be by act, not omission: (subject for reform to include omission) Lowe
(1973) held not guilty of UAM where his base offence was of omitting care for his child (base
offence of Children and Young Persons Act 1933). All elements of the base offence has to be
satisfied – Lamb (1967)
Lamb [1967]
D pointed a loaded revolver at V as a joke, neither V or D knew how it worked, and when D pulled
the trigger neither realised bullet would fire V was killed Held not guilty as base offence (assault/
battery) was not complete because D lacked mens rea, he did not foresee risk of harm to V or a risk
of causing V to apprehend harm
Base offence must be dangerous to V:
Reasonable person would see acts as a risk to V (objective).
Base offence does not need to be directed at V – Watson (1989), base offence of burglary not
directed at elderly homeowner, but still liable for UAM when V died for stress-induced heart
attack
Test of dangerousness set out by Edmund Davies in Church (1996): “unlawful act must be such
that all sober and reasonable people would see risk of harm, albeit not serious harm”
o Sober and reasonable person must foresee it, but risk of harm not always foreseeable –
Dawson (1985)
o reasonable person would have foreseen, not may have foreseen
o Foresight of risk of harm, albeit not serious harm (church), risk of psychological/emotional
harm short of psychiatric injury (fear or distress) is insufficient
Dawson [1985]
D and others attempted to rob a petrol station using an imitation gun, V, who died of a heart attack,
was not elderly, and in apparent good health, and protected behind bullet-proof glass. D charged
with UAM Held not guilty of UAM as risk not apparent to a reasonable person in Ds shoes at the
time of the acts
Base offence must cause death of V: strict liability element – base offence must cause death, no
need for D to intend, or foresee or had any mens rea for death – issue in AGs Reference (No 3 of
1994)
Fright or flight: V flees from scene of crime (base offence), dies when in flight e.g. by running in
front car D lacks mens rea for murder, but mens rea of murder not needed for UAM
o Not liable if – easy to objectively foresee risk of harm in flight + Vs own conduct in taking flight
has broken chain of causation between Ds base offence and Vs death
Drug supply: V voluntarily takes prohibited drugs supplied by D (base offence), dies from effects –
Kennedy
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