100% satisfaction guarantee Immediately available after payment Both online and in PDF No strings attached
logo-home
ECN214 Games and Strategies – 2014 Questions and Answers £3.99   Add to cart

Exam (elaborations)

ECN214 Games and Strategies – 2014 Questions and Answers

1 review
 30 views  1 purchase

High-quality past paper questions and answers for the ECN214 Games and Strategies module for the Queen Mary University of London (QMUL) Economics Course. Each question is reproduced and high-quality full-mark scores are written up clearly for each one. Great for preparing for exams, studying and so...

[Show more]

Preview 2 out of 7  pages

  • June 7, 2020
  • 7
  • 2013/2014
  • Exam (elaborations)
  • Questions & answers
All documents for this subject (5)

1  review

review-writer-avatar

By: kush • 2 year ago

avatar-seller
londoneconomicstutors
FOR MORE HIGH-QUALITY PAST PAPER MODEL ANSWERS, ONLINE TUTORING AND
ECONOMICS HELP, visit LondonEconomicsTutors.co.uk.
Discounted prices compared to all other websites

ECN214 Games and Strategies – 2014
Questions and Answers

Part A
Question 1




a. One outcome Pareto dominates another if it is weakly preferred by all players and strictly
preferred by at least one. That is, the payoff for one player is greater for another strategy and the
payoff for the other player is at least as large as that payoff.

b. An outcome is Pareto efficient (or Pareto optimal) if it is not Pareto dominated by any other
outcome. That is, there are no other payoffs which have outcomes which are at least as big for both
players.

Question 2




a. Alice has 4 decisions to make in the final stage of the game. The number of possible combinations
of these are then 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 = 16. She has two possible decisions at the beginning of the game, and
therefore she possesses 16 * 2 = 32 possible pure strategies.

b.

, FOR MORE HIGH-QUALITY PAST PAPER MODEL ANSWERS, ONLINE TUTORING AND
ECONOMICS HELP, visit LondonEconomicsTutors.co.uk.
Discounted prices compared to all other websites

To find the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using backwards induction, we first find player A’s
preferred outcomes at the last stage of the game. These are:




Working backward from these, B would prefer 4 over 2, and 1 over 0. Therefore, they would choose
the following actions:




A prefers 2 to 0. Therefore, they would choose b as their first action:

The benefits of buying summaries with Stuvia:

Guaranteed quality through customer reviews

Guaranteed quality through customer reviews

Stuvia customers have reviewed more than 700,000 summaries. This how you know that you are buying the best documents.

Quick and easy check-out

Quick and easy check-out

You can quickly pay through credit card for the summaries. There is no membership needed.

Focus on what matters

Focus on what matters

Your fellow students write the study notes themselves, which is why the documents are always reliable and up-to-date. This ensures you quickly get to the core!

Frequently asked questions

What do I get when I buy this document?

You get a PDF, available immediately after your purchase. The purchased document is accessible anytime, anywhere and indefinitely through your profile.

Satisfaction guarantee: how does it work?

Our satisfaction guarantee ensures that you always find a study document that suits you well. You fill out a form, and our customer service team takes care of the rest.

Who am I buying these notes from?

Stuvia is a marketplace, so you are not buying this document from us, but from seller londoneconomicstutors. Stuvia facilitates payment to the seller.

Will I be stuck with a subscription?

No, you only buy these notes for £3.99. You're not tied to anything after your purchase.

Can Stuvia be trusted?

4.6 stars on Google & Trustpilot (+1000 reviews)

78252 documents were sold in the last 30 days

Founded in 2010, the go-to place to buy revision notes and other study material for 14 years now

Start selling
£3.99  1x  sold
  • (1)
  Add to cart