CAUSATION
START WITH CAUSATION. DEFINE FACTUAL CAUSATION, THEN APPLY EACH DEATH TO FC THEN
MOVE ONTO LEGAL CAUSATION AND THEN APPLY EACH DEATH TO LC.
For any of the relevant offences to be established, both factual and legal causation needs to be
satisfied.
Factual causation asks whether D was the factual cause of V's death using the "but for test" set out
in WHITE. Here but for X [e.g. hitting Y] Y would not have died and therefore FC is satisfied.
Legal causation requires the D to be the “operating and substantial” cause of death, as in CHESIRE.
“Substantial”, means was X’s act was significant, more than minimal cause of death (SMITH)?
[APPLY: e.g. Here D’s actions was as it left Wendy in a fairly serious condition, needing significant
and urgent treatment.]
An operating cause is one that is still on going in the sense that nothing has intervened to supersede
it and break the chain of causation.
[APPLY THE ONES THAT ARE RELEVANT]
In relation to X, there is a possibility of medical negligence as a novus actus interveniens. The
main arguable point here is that of whether the medical treatment broke the chain of causation.
In SMITH, it was held that, for policy reasons, medical negligence should be regarded as
foreseeable and so should not break the chain of causation. However, In JORDAN it was
established that such negligence could break the chain as long as it was “palpably wrong”. Since
1956, Jordan has been treated as a case that is largely confined to its own facts. Therefore, if a
case is, in some way, distinguishable from the facts of Jordan, it is unlikely that Jordan will be
followed. This case [SAY THE NEGLIGENCE, THEN IF IT CAN BE DISTUGISNED FROM JORDAN,
AND WHETHER THE CHAIN IS BROKEN – MOST LIKELY WONT] E.G. is similar to Jordan in that
there are two instances of fairly bad medical negligence. It can however be distinguished from
Jordan in that, in that case, the victim had almost made a full recovery at the time that the
negligence occurred. As a result, it is likely that a court would regard Chris as the operating cause
of Wendy’s death also.
It has been long established that Y's pre-existing condition (e.g. physical weakness/defects –
HAYWARD) will rarely break the chain of causation. The D must take V as he finds him, BLAUE.
Here this rule applies and therefore [e.g. D existing condition] is irreverent since D must take V
as he finds him and so legal causation is satisfied.
Y [e.g. falling out of the window] is an intervening act (Novus actus interveniens) but will not
break the chain of causation as it was reasonably foreseeable, as in PAGETT and CORBETT, so
legal causation is satisfied. (Remember: If not RF, it will break the chain and there will be no legal
causation and so no actus reus)].
MURDER
X may be liable for murder contrary to common law, defined by Coke as the unlawful killing of a
human being within the Queen's Peace with malice aforethought.
The Actus Reus of murder is an unlawful act or omission which factually and legally causes the
death of a human being. Here the unlawful act was (state).
, [APPLY ONLY IF RELEVANT: Here there is an omission as X failed to act where there was a duty to do
so as in [CHOOSE ONE: PITTWOOD (contractual duty), STONE and DOBINSON (voluntary carer
duty) or MILLER (dangerous situation created and not dealt with)].
Here there is an obvious death of a human being as in MALCHEREK and the actus reus is satisfied [or
not].
The Men’s Rea for murder is malice aforethought, which means X must have an intention to kill
(express malice aforethought) or an intention to cause grievous bodily harm (implied malice
aforethought). There is no need for pre-meditation, established in GRAY.
Intention can be specific (direct) or oblique (indirect), but is purely subjective, and the court will
look at what X did intend and foresee, not what he should have intended or foreseen.
[NOW CHOOSE ONE OF THE 4 POSSIBLE MENS REA OPTIONS. MENTION MORE THAN 1 e.g. "In
addition, X at least has specific intention to cause GBH to Y when..."
1. Here X had specific (direct) intention, which means to desire the outcome as in MOHAN, to kill
Y because he (e.g. shot him in the chest) OR
2. Here X had specific (direct) intention, which means to desire the outcome as in MOHAN, to
cause GBH to Y, which is really serious (SMITH) or serious harm (SAUNDERS), as in JANJUA and
CHOUDURY, because he (e.g. hit him on the legs with a baseball bat) OR
3. Here X had oblique (indirect) intention to kill Y when he e.g. set fire to the shed, in that death
was a virtual certainty of his actions and X appreciated that, as in WOOLLIN, which is evidence
from which the jury may find intention as in MATTHEWS and ALLEYNE OR
4. Here X had oblique (indirect) intention to cause GBH to Y, as in JANJUA and CHOUDURY, when
he e.g. threw the rock, as really serious (SMITH) or serious harm (SAUNDERS) was a virtual
certainty of his actions and X appreciated that, as in WOOLLIN, which is evidence from which the
jury may find intention as in MATTHEWS and ALLEYNE.]
[APPLY ONLY IF RELEVANT: Here the principle of transferred malice will apply, set out in LATIMER,
MITCHELL so X will be liable where injury to Z was intended but a similar injury was accidentally
inflicted on Y].
[APPLY ONLY IF RELEVANT: Since [e.g. X wanted to kill Y when he stabbed him but Y only died when
he threw him off a cliff thinking he was dead, the principle will apply here that if there is a series of
events then the actus reus and men’s rea must only coincide at one point during the continuing
event, so an earlier men’s rea will be sufficient, as in THABO MELI.
TO CONCLUDE, X will be liable.
Gross Negligence Manslaughter
D may be liable for gross negligence manslaughter if if the rules set out in ADOMAKO are
satisfied
Firstly, D did owe V a DUTY OF CARE, under DONOGHUE v STEVENSON Neighbour Principle and
the three-part test in CAPARO v DICKMAN. In SINGH it was established that this is a decision for
the judge to make.
Some damage to V was reasonably foreseeable, they had a sufficiently proximate relationship,
and it is just fair and reasonable to impose a DOC [ADD IF RELEVANT: D’s duty of care also arises
