CEE Week 1
Lecture Notes:
ELECTIONS/PARTIES/GOVERNMENTS
In CEE, unlike Britain/France (democracies for centuries), democracy a relatively recent
phenomenon (began in 1989 with fall of communism)
Challenge of developing an effective party system
Lipset and Rokkan (1967)- party systems a product of two revolutions (also in lecture 1)
National revolution(s)- first in France (triggered in 1789- French Revolution) then across continent;
creation of unified nation-states; produced centre/periphery cleavage- regional/ethnic/religious
parties and state/church cleavage - liberal secular parties w secular systems of education and
welfare, Christian democratic parties
Industrial revolution (originating in Britain in late 18th and early 19th centuries, development of a
capitalist industrial economy)- rural/urban cleavage -agrarian parties and owner/worker cleavage -
structural conflict between owners of capital and working class, those who benefit
disproportionately from the ownership of capital v those who do badly from the capitalist market
economy) Libero
Developed democracies- most party competition structured on left-right socioeconomic cleavage
that has evolved from the Owner-Worker cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan found that this cleavage
became the most important in at least half the countries they investigated)
Key question on CEE political parties since 1989 is whether we can observe CEE party systems
structured on a similar socioeconomic cleavage (as the more mature West European democracies)
Institutional approach to party formation- parties as a product of institutions, Duverger's law,
majoritarian electoral system --> two party system
Reasons for choosing one over other:
PR criticism: relatively short lived, might make passing legislation difficult as unlikely to produce
single-party governments, inefficient
Majoritarian criticism: often exclude significant minority groups from representation in parliament
and the government, particularly harmful for ethnic or religious parties
In CEE, decision of which electoral system to adopt was made in 1989
Round table- all participants equal
In 1989 opposition parties and communist parties met around a round table and discussed electoral
systems, their choice dictated by calculations of which system would serve their interests best
Opposition parties favoured PR because they were relatively new, had more geographically spread
support (and in most CEE countries got their way, most CEE countries have PR)
PR with threshold:
Romania (3% threshold), Poland (5%), Czech Republic (5%), Slovakia (5%), Bulgaria (after 1990)(4%),
Albania (after 2008)(3%)
Mixed majoritarian/PR:
Albania (1991-2008)(2.5% threshold), Bulgaria (1990 only)(4%), Hungary (5% threshold). Hungary
changed its electoral systems in 2012, increasing the proportion of MPs elected in single member
districts from 45.6% to 53.3% of total seats.
Impact of threshold:
Poland 1991 (no threshold; turnout 43.2%)
,29 parties represented (Beer Lovers), reduced to 18 by consolidation. No party had more than 13%
of the vote, 10 parties had between 3.2% and 12.3%
Poland 1993 (5% threshold, turnout 52%)
6 parties represented: Democratic Left Alliance (former Communists) 20% of the vote; Polish Peasant
Party 15%, Democratic Union 11% etc. A coalition of Democratic Left Alliance and Polish Peasant
Party had a majority of seats.
Hungary- mixed system made even more majoritarian (only country in CEE that has a majoritarian
element in its electoral system, has ended up with a two-party system)
Bulgaria- experimented with mixed and shifted to pure PR
Poland- 29 parties in parliament (even beer lovers party with 16 seats! But coalition very unstable,
after 1991 had very unstable governments, number of parties ended up being cut from 29 to 6)
So institutional approach does predict the shape of party system in CEE, but usefulness limited (can
tell us how many parties but not what those parties stand for)
Sociological approach- cleavages
Problems with approach:
-Society highly homogenised under communism (most of economy nationalised- centrally planned,
no capitalists nor classic working class, income differentials kept very narrow)
-Instability of economic interests after 1989. Don't know whether or not you will benefit
disproportionately from the capitalist economy, don't know what your economic interests are, only
will know when transition to capitalist market economy had been established, took many years
-Electorate tended to be very volatile after 1989, plus cynicism and indifference of electorate (low
turnout)
-MPs also volatile (MPs were elected by one party but once they got to parliament, joined another
party)(party volatility except former Communist parties)
-More of a personality contest (of leaders) than ideological contests, difficult for left or right wing
ideology to develop (personalised, populist leadership)
-Lack of funds for party work. Found it difficult to develop a transparent system of party financing
^^ Obstacles before left and right wing parties could develop
Initial stage of party formation- 1989-early 90s- dominated by umbrella movements (c.f. political
parties normally try and represent the interests of one part of society), went for inclusive names like
"solidarity" or "new forum"
Poland: "solidarity"
Hungary: no unified opposition movement; a number of opposition parties came into existence, the
strongest being the Hungarian Democratic Forum
Czechoslovakia: Civic Forum (Czech Republic), Public Against Violence (Slovakia)
East Germany: New forum
Bulgaria: Union of Democratic Forces
Romania: National Salvation Front
Albania: Democratic Party
Second stage of party formation- parties representing one section of society
Cleavages and issues:
-Social class
-Libertarianism/authoritarianism
-Country and town (urban-rural)
-Ethnicity
(Few parties based on state/church cleavage, became subsumed in left-right cleavage, right wing
parties tended to be Catholic, left wing parties have tended to be secular)
In CEE, libertarian/authoritarian cleavage has tended to be subsumed by left-right cleavage, left
wing parties have tended to be libertarian
, Revival of pre-1939 parties generally not successful: changed social structure undermines the basis
of e.g. peasant parties in Hungary and Romania
3 possible routes of whether left-right dimension has become dominant: (Evans and Whitefield
1993)
-No, it will not (missing middle)- homogenisation of communism makes it difficult for left-right
parties to emerge
-Yes (modernisation)- communism did succeed in modernising societies of CEE, functionally
differentiated (those who ran things and subordinates, could become a class differentiation,
capitalist/working class, become owners of the enterprises they managed under communism i.e.
differentiation strengthened by transition to a market economy). Left-right systems similar to those
of Western Europe can therefore be expected to emerge (Kitschelt). But difficulty of identifying
"left" and "right" in Eastern Europe
-Maybe (comparative approach)- two distinct groups of countries in CEE
First e.g. Poland/Czech Republic/Hungary- modernisation approach applies, successful transition to
capitalist market economy, also monoethnic- no space for ethnic parties that might undercut
left/right; pro-democratic, pro-Western culture: parties based on the left-right socioeconomic
cleavage likely to emerge
Second e.g. Slovakia/Bulgaria/Romania/Albania- missing middle applicable, problematic transition
to capitalism, also have significant ethnic minorities, may be dominated by nationalist parties; weak
democratic culture, populism: nationalist/populist/authoritarian parties are likely to emerge
^ written in 1993, since then, what is the evidence?
Rohrschneider and Whitefield- 2009 (20 years after communism, party systems had become
consolidated), did comparative studies to see which of the 3 answers applied best. Empirical
evidence suggested the most significant was left-right socioeconomic issues (pro-welfare, anti-
welfare, distribution of resources). Dominant in CEE countries across the region (not just the
countries in which Evans and Whitefield expected to develop parties based on socioeconomic
cleavage
Rohrschneider and Whitefield conclude that "just as in Western Europe, where social class is a
common denominator whereas religious, regional, and ethnic conflicts introduce diversity across
nations, economic issues constitute the common basis for party competition in the region (CEE) and
other conflicts add a country-specific flavour" (these country-specific issues include: democracy in
Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia; ethnicity in Latvia; nationalism in Hungary; religiosity in Poland;
urban-rural dimension in Lithuania)
But since 2009, crisis in development of parties- rise of populist parties e.g. Fidesz in Hungary and
Law and Justice party in Poland
Muddle 2004 and Batory 2016- populism defined by two elements
Society separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups 'pure people' v 'corrupt elite';-
Manichean view of society
Politics should be expression of general will of the people
So not left-right, more people-elite
Case study: Hungary (Batory 2016)
Fidesz transforms itself from a centre-right party to a populist party following its defeat in the 2002
elections. Develops a narrative of the oppression of the 'people' by the corrupt elite, including
socialist governments, the EU and foreign capitalists. Represents its victory in the 2010 election, in
which it gained 52% of the vote and 68% of the seats (thanks partly to the effects of the electoral
system) as the liberation of 'the people' from their oppressors. Fidesz goes on to win the elections in
2014 (45% of the vote and 67% of the seats) and 2018 (49% of the vote and 67% of the seats)