Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Harm
Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Harm
Type of harm is central to determination of liability in negligence.
Causation: was the psychiatric illness caused by the defendant’s negligence?
Remoteness: is the defendant liable for this type of harm?
Duty: in what circumstances ought a defendant who causes harm of this type be held
responsible?
Definition of Psychiatric Harm
Mental distress alone isn’t actionable in negligence.
Lynch v Knight (1861) 9 HL Cas 577.
Mr Lynch told Mr Knight that his wife was a liar, who took pleasure in causing
disturbances, had been involved in immoral conduct before marriage and warned Mr
Knight that his wife should not be introduced to society. Mrs Knight was
consequently forced to move out of her husband’s house.
Mrs Knight brought an action against Mr Lynch for slander (her husband was joined
as claimant for conformity).
The Court held that a wife can bring an action the slanderous third person if the third
person’s words resulted in her losing the consortium of her husband. However, she
can only do so if the words were such that the loss of consortium naturally and
reasonably followed from them. In this case, the alleged special damage – namely,
Mrs Knight being forced out of her marital home – was not shown to be a natural
and reasonable consequence of the slander.
On the other hand, if the wife lost her maintenance by her husband as a result of the
third person’s slander, that lost maintenance may be treated as special damages
warranting monetary compensation. However, such loss could not have been
presumed, it should have been separately and distinctly claimed in order to become
applicable.
‘Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when
the unlawful act complained of causes that alone’.
, Reilly v Merseyside AHA (1995) 6 Med LR 246.
The claimants, Mr & Mrs Reilly, were visiting the defendant’s maternity hospital to
see their new born grandson. Unfortunately, they got trapped in the overcrowded
lift for one hour and 20 minutes.
At the time of the incident Mr Riley was 61 and had a pre-existing condition of
angina, Mrs Riley was 68 and had a pre-existing condition of claustrophobia. In the
lift, both suffered symptoms of claustrophobia becoming hot and sweaty, difficulty in
breathing and dizziness.
Both were in a state of collapse when they were released. They both had difficulty in
sleeping and suffered nightmares for a few days after the incident.
The trial judge having heard medical evidence held that although their conditions fell
short of post-traumatic stress disorder or chronic anxiety, were of sufficient severity
to entitle them to recover.
The Health Authority appealed on the grounds that in the absence of a recognisable
illness there is no compensatable damage. Claustrophobia and fear are normal
emotions as oppose to injuries.
The appeal was allowed. There must be a recognised psychiatric condition to give
rise to damages. Physical symptoms of fear and panic such as sweating and
breathing difficulties was not sufficient.
Mann LJ – ‘there must be an identifiable psychiatric condition. The sound policy of
the law is that the excitement of a normal human emotion, together with its normal
physical consequence, is not compensatable. Here there was no recognisable
psychiatric injury, but only normal emotion in the face of a most unpleasant
experience’.
Johnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd (2007) UKHL 39.
Mental distress or psychiatric illness consequent upon physical injury is actionable.
Anxiety, stress or grief suffered as a result of harm to a loved one isn’t usually
compensated – exception is a fixed sum award under the FAA 1976.
Alcock and Others v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police (1991) 4 All ER 907.
A joined action was brought by Alcock (C) and several other claimants against the
head of the South Yorkshire Police. C and the other claimants all had relatives who
were caught up in the Hillsborough Stadium disaster, in which 95 fans of Liverpool FC
died in a crush due, it was later established, to the negligence of the police in
permitting too many supporters to crowd in one part of the stadium.
The disaster was broadcast on live television, where several claimants alleged they
had witnessed friends and relatives die. Others were present in the stadium or had
heard about the events in other ways.
All claimed damages for the psychiatric harm they suffered as a result.
, The House of Lords, in finding for D, held that, in cases of purely psychiatric damage
caused by negligence, a distinction must be drawn between ‘primary’ and
‘secondary’ victims. A primary victim was one who was present at the event as a
participant, and would thus be owed a duty-of-care by D, subject to harm caused
being foreseeable, of course. A secondary victim, by contrast, would only succeed if
they fell within certain criteria. Such persons must establish:
A close tie of love and affection to a primary victim
Appreciation of the event with their own unaided senses
Proximity to the event or its immediate aftermath
The psychiatric harm must be caused by a sufficiently shocking event.
Neither C nor the other claimants could meet these conditions, therefore the appeal
was dismissed.
Lord Oliver – ‘grief, sorrow, deprivation and the necessity for caring for loved ones
who have suffered injury or misfortune must, I think, be considered as ordinary and
inevitable incidents of life which, regardless of individual susceptibilities, must be
sustained without compensation.
First Question – Has the Claimant Sustained a Recognised Psychiatric Illness
Attia v British Gas (1988) QB 304.
C engaged British Gas (D) to install a new central heating system in her home but
returned to find that her loft had caught fire. The house and its contents suffered
extensive damage, which C witnessed first-hand.
The property claim against D was settled, as their breach of duty had plainly caused
the damage C’s house, however C also sued to recover damages for nervous shock,
incurred as a result of witnessing her belongings.
This claim as dismissed at first instance and C brought an appeal.
The Court of Appeal found in favour of C, holding that, as a matter of principle, there
was no doctrinal or policy reason to limit the recovery of damages to psychiatric
harm arising as a result of damage to property. To limit such cases to personal injury
would not be ‘fair or convenient’ ([1988] QB 304, per Bingham LJ), nor was such a
limitation justifiable as a matter of policy; the only substantive policy reason to reject
liability in such circumstances was the fear of opening the ‘floodgates’ to a raft of
unmeritorious claims, which the Court dismissed as unfounded.
The case was thus remitted to trial for determination of the foreseeability question.
‘All relevant forms of mental illness, neurosis and personality change’.