“THE VIETNAM WAR WAS A ‘NOBLE CAUSE.’” (RONALD REAGAN). DISCUSS.
America supported South Vietnam’s economy, military, and gave advice to the Diem
government during the Vietnam war for an array of political reasons. Many of America’s
reasons for escalating the conflict reflected American politicians’ interests in involvement
but did not emphasise enough whether entering the conflict was best for the Vietnamese.
This would have made the conflict a noble or higher cause for Vietnam because it would
have given an opportunity for the Vietnamese to progress and develop their ideas of what
values in their society they wanted to promote or change and examine their political
ideology and civil rights. However, America made these decisions on their behalf without
their true interests in mind, and so the war was not a noble cause because it was selfishly
fought by the Americans. Reagan in this quote tried to blame North Vietnam for the war
because of its aggressions but America was the aggressive nation because it became
involved in a civil war conflict abroad when it was not necessary for America to do so.
Domino theory corrupted America’s intentions in the Vietnam war. Historians
prescribe different degrees of importance to domino theory and fears about global
Communist expansion. Orthodox historians treated domino theory sceptically and with
harsh criticism, generally positing that the Americans should have had better insight into the
Communists’ general indifference towards expansion. Heading the Orthodox debate in “A
Time for War”, Schulzinger argued that the domino theory was of vital importance to the
Americans in dictating their attitude to the war. He argued that it “remained the dominant
interpretation of events in Indochina.”1 Both the American public and politicians
understood the war primarily through their skewed understanding of Communism as
hegemonic and expansionist. On the other hand, revisionist historians critiqued domino
theory but found that it did pose some level of threat, especially in Asia. 2 Michael Lind
recently found that domino theory was convincing to the Americans and that they had some
reason to believe that there was a global communist conspiracy beginning in Vietnam 3; in
other words, that America’s aggressive response to the Communist threat posed by Vietnam
was responsible.
America as an economically strong nation had a moral responsibility to defend the
Eastern people from a Communist takeover, and a responsibility to keep the people in the
West safe from Communist expansion. This is less convincing because Lind failed to properly
examine his underlying assumption that there was a global Communist plot. Soviet,
Chinese, and Vietnamese Communism, although linked somewhat by ideology, differed.
Crucially, historians overwhelmingly agree that Ho Chi Minh was probably a nationalist first
and then a Communist. On balance, the orthodox view Schulzinger put forward seems the
most convincing because the Americans felt that they had a moral obligation to protect the
rest of the rest of the world and themselves from Communists.
1
Robert Schulzinger, A Time for Peace: The Legacy of the Vietnam War (2006).
2
Richard Melanson and Mayers, Re-evaluating Eisenhower (1987).
3
Michael Lind, Vietnam: The Necessary War.
, Indeed, Eisenhower in the President’s press conference established the domino
theory that countries would fall one after the other to Communism. This source
underpinned the key assumption in American politics towards Vietnam. Eisenhower
painted a terrible vision of “disintegration that would have the most profound influences” if
countries fell to Communism one after the other, in the context of the aftermath of the
Korean War.4 Eisenhower approached the situation with the view that if Vietnam fell, the
rest of the Far East, then Australasia and then perhaps Japan, America’s ally, would also fall
to Communism. In this way, Communism could reach American soil and reduce America’s
allies in the world. This is a hugely paternalistic approach because it assumes America’s
responsibility for guiding developing countries. It does not ground the expansive outlook on
Communism in evidence from either the Soviets or the Chinese.
This assumption exaggerated the importance of Vietnam as a key strategic point to
the West when Vietnam was in truth a small country and far away from America. Presidents
had paid greater attention to the situation in Laos over Vietnam. Furthermore, when the
French had been suffering heavy defeats at Dien Bien Phu, the Americans refrained from
becoming embroiled in a Communist-led civil war against French colonialism. It seems that
presidents exaggerated the effects of Vietnam falling to Communism to justify war effort in
Vietnam so they could wage war for other reasons. This reason therefore is not a noble one
for American involvement. It paints the Vietnam war as important because of global
repercussions and to maintain America’s reputation as a strong nation standing up against
Communism. It is not virtuous to become involved in a war financially or militarily to
maintain political reputation or to prevent a potential future political situation which would
oppose American political ideology.
The Vietnam war was not a noble cause because reality was far from the proposed
promoted principles. The Americans at face value seemed to take part in a moral war by
the virtue of upholding democracy against danger from barbaric Communist rebels.
Revisionist historians have refuted that the war was morally repulsive, as Lewy did in his
pioneering and longstanding argument in America in Vietnam which used Pentagon
documents to emphasise the need to contain Communism.5 Later revisionists added that
the war was morally justified because America tried to rescue locals from the violence of the
North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front.6
On the other hand, orthodox historians critique America for effectively driving local
villagers into the arms of Communism.7 Particularly, Marilyn Young’s work in Vietnam Wars
highlighted this and critiqued America for effectively reducing the South Vietnamese
government to a puppet government. Young wrote that American policy makers, conscious
of the support they gave to the South’s government needed “to avoid looking like a new
colonial power.”8 America seemed like it was an aggressor entering an unnecessary war and
4
Dwight D. Eisenhower: “The President’s News Conference” April 7, 1954
<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-361>.
5
Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam.
6
Richard Melanson and Mayers, Re-evaluating Eisenhower (1987).
7
Gareth Porter, Myth of the Bloodbath, Mark Bradley Vietnam at War.
8
Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars (1991) pp. 114.
