Topic 1 - The Origins of European Integration
Background
1945 – war ends
1949 – NATO is born – can be seen as Cold war influenced/protect against communism – treaty agrees any
member is attacked the others will come to its defence – Mutual defence clause
1950 – Shuman Plan – French Foreign Minister Shuman announces plan for France and Germany to pool
coal and steel production, he says Solidarity in production would make war between France and Germany
“not merely unthinkable but materially impossible.” (The rapprochement of France and Germany within a
West European economic and political framework.)
1951 – Treaty of Paris establishes European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – 6 countries sign – France,
Germany, the Benelux States and Italy. Sets up a high authority to manage the coal and steel industries
1952 – European Defence Community proposed by US after Korean War, includes idea that Germany must
rearm – but in 1954 French parliament delays ratification and ultimately rejects idea in 1954
1957 – Treaty of Rome, 6 members of ECSC sign treaty of Rome setting up the EEC – common market
place, free movement of labour and capital and subsidizes farmers to appease France.
- European Atomic Energy Community EURATOM was created for the purpose of developing nuclear
energy for civilian purposes (rather than for nuclear weapons).
- EEC 1958
1960 – EFTA is launched (UK, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland) – like EEC free
trade, but opposes external tariffs
1961 – Britain apply to join EEC – 1963 Charles de Gaulle refuses as he sees it threatening France’s voice In
world affairs
Explanations for integration – Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg
(the six)
Main aim for Governments is to maximize power, rational which led to the two world wars however
European governments have decided to hand away sovereignty/power to instead integrate more, acting in
a united fashion, governments do not usually surrender sovereignty so why did they?
1. WWII and effects on nationalism
Traditional explanation argued by Lipgens (idealist school of interpretation), WWII effected
countries attitude towards nationalism, the run up to and the fighting itself during the war had
discredited the idea of nationalism. Before war experienced hyper-nationalism but due to trauma
of defeat and occupation Europe inoculated against the extremed of nationalism. Main function of
government is to protect its people – 6 countries had failed to do this (maybe apart form UK – not
been occupied). Therefore after war, European states looked at nationalism and power in a
different way – more willing to give it up in order to protect their populations
Resistance movements during the war demonstrated this (in the underground newspapers and
rhetoric of resistance leaders) - they condemned nationalism and discussed how post-war Europe
would have to evolve differently in order to prevent a third world war - Lipgens was able to prove
that there was evidence for the loss of nationalism.
Problems with this explanation
Time gap: shows that it was present in the resistance documents but integration doesn’t actually
happen until at least 1950 - Small time lag
Personnel: Not all resistant leaders take this new attitude on e.g. General De Gaulle was actually
very hostile towards integration. Therefore doesn’t support Lipgens argument.
Rejection of the nation state: if you look at post-war construction all of the countries – main way of
rebuilding themselves was by using their national government. National economic planning,
reconstruction plans, national regeneration programme. If these leaders believed in the nation for
, these programmes, how is it consistent to say they have lost faith in the nation state for foreign
policy
2. Politics and Geopolitics - Argued that each of the participating had very specific reasons for integration
Germany
Integration process as a means of recovering and gaining respect after defeat, conscious of their
tarnished reputation, were held responsible for the war. Was not involved in any of the
multilateral institutions which tried to organise the post-war world e.g. UN and NATO.
Shuman Plan- first major step to integration, offer from the French for Germany to participate in
European affairs is too good an offer for them to refuse. Even better as the French were previously
the most hostile towards Germany as they had attempted to keep Germany weak and divided. This
offer represented an olive branch. Adenauer (German chancellor) wanted greater ties with France
and so no hesitation in accepting proposal, Federal republic equal of France within new
organisation
Rebuilding without threatening its neighbours. Germany was very conscious that its post WWI
revival had been at the expense of its neighbours and created deeply hostile relations. Promise of
integration, a framework of cooperation showed that it would be able to rebuild in a way, which
could reassure its neighbours rather than alarm them. Wanted to regain power without alarming
other European nations. Therefore best to become partners.
Link with the West: important because of the Cold War, Being split into East and West makes it
vulnerable - nightmare for Germany’s first post-war leader is that a deal will be done to reunify
Germany with the threat of Germany becoming a neutral state. Will create a state without allies.
Disastrous in both domestic and foreign policy terms - Geopolitical disaster. SPD are committed to
the policy, which binds Germany to closely to the West. Therefore, he tried to make legally binding
agreements, which linked Germany to the Western bloc. If they are a member of a European
agreement it cannot be sold to the Soviet Union. Westbinden (binding with the West)
France - ‘Cure of French impotence’ turns to integration when it realises how it is under threat.
Protection from Germany - Didn’t need to rebuild in this way - Integration was seen as a means of
containing Germany. France afraid of the emergence of a united Germany – feared their stronger
and bigger neighbour - they decided to build a ‘European cage’ to prevent Germany from harming
them and so a revived Germany could be contained. Shuman plan – political gesture confront
Germany in a constructive matter
Power and status – Within Cold War Era, power in the world held by two external powers rather
than Europe. Therefore, integration is seen by France as a way of coming to terms with these affairs
(France is losing empire) - If they are to match the size of these two large superpowers, has to team
up with neighbours which would constitute a large block of European power which could have
authority on the international stage. Multiplier effect on international power. Combining national
powers and by taking charge can regain some of the European influence – perhaps why they reject
Britain’s request to join EEC in 1961
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg: would help tame affairs in Europe where the big powers could
not trample the smaller powers. Post-WWII, they found themselves occupied and taken advantage
of and excluded from international affairs. They would remain very vulnerable without the
multilateral framework, which could be bought about by integration. Institutions of European
integration would have magnified the power of these smaller powers.
Integration process was supported by the US: post war America became the great cheerleader for
integration. Tried to push integration with the Marshall Plan. Political reasons - Cold War, therefore
European divisions between powers such as Germany and Britain/France would make them
vulnerable. Needed strong Europe during the Cold War, to benefit the US’ plight. Enthusiasm and
political funding from the Americans pushed integration.
Italy – attracted by political aspects rather than economic
, Post war Italian diplomacy – succession of disappointments so wanted to redress Italy’s rather
marginal role on the European and Western stage and regain respectability after defeat
Belgium
Politically could not afford to stand aloof from a community which included both France and
Germany but had anxiety about ECSC and how far it would benefit them e.g. Belgian coal mines
launched a campaign to obstruct the ratification of the treaty of Paris
Luxembourg – unhappy with the High authority’s ‘dictatorial’ powers resigned itself into accepting the
ECSC – also didn’t want to be left out
Netherlands
Shared same concerns about high authority’s power – shown by the fact they most supported the
council of ministers which would temper the high authority’s power
Also worried Schuman plan would mean commercial links with Germany and Belgium would
outweigh foreign ties with Britain – therefore said Dutch participation depended on Britain
attending Paris conference but again joined because of political/economic dangers faced if it didn’t
join
3. Economic Self Interest - view of Millward
EEC has been dominant in European integration, argued by Ludlow, Economics central concern over
foreign policy, security concerns
Early institutions - important that these were economic structures e.g. Millward argues France
create Shuman Plan for economic reasons - very specific attempt to control German heavy interest:
France in these years decided that steel had to be at the centre of its post-war recovery. Believed
it was defeated because Germany had a better economic stance. Therefore, they set out to replace
Germany as the dominant producer in heavy industry. By 1945, French vision was in trouble
because Germany was showing every sign of regaining its dominance in industry. By the time you
get to 1945 all limits on industrial production are lifted. The re-emergence of Germany threatened
France’ plan. Three things needed to produce steel: iron ore, steel, coke. In Europe there are only
two places where you can get coke, while France was an occupying power it could help itself to
German’s resources. However, as Germany recovered the French access to these resources was
limited. Now only their rival Germany had access to these resources. Therefore, Schumann plan is a
French attempt to reverse this economic nightmare: new level of European controls which would
help control German industry which will prevent them from becoming too dominant whilst aiding
Frances own recovery.
Treaty of Rome was a product of economic calculation not the political factors before. Dutch
desire: focussed on European protectionism. Dutch are an exporting nation, but there was no
guarantee that these would be able to continue. Dutch are terrified that there is a big recession
round the corner and this would squeeze them out. Therefore, suggesting a European economic
integration they would make a low tariff irreversibly.
Why did Britain not integrate? – didn’t initially need economic aid, more about respect/political reasons
1. WWII and effects on nationalism
British case proved this wrong. They were most reluctant in post-war Europe to give up their power. Didn’t
actually want to participate, which seems to prove Lipgens’ argument as they hadn’t actually been
occupied. Also Perception of Europe as a source of war, disorder and undemocratic politics – sense of
distrust towards Europe, stand aside from Europe can maintain position as a global power more easily
2.Economic and political
- After war Britain has its own post war recovery in mind, commonwealth markets, colonial resources – did
not want to give up sovereignty and also didn’t need to join in European integration
Couldn’t accept involvement with coal and steel industry due to pronounced differences in economic and
political circumstances between Britain and the Six at the start of 1950’s
Economically – Britain close to Commonwealth and American markets whereas in mainland Europe
countries more entwined economically, therefore UK immune to economic pressures which played an
important part in low countries decision to join ECSC. E.g. after war the six constituted less than 10% of
, British exports whereas the commonwealth made up more than 50% (this relationship changed over time,
by 1973 more exports to the 6 than commonwealth)
Politically – Britain prey to none of the foreign policy dissatisfaction, which characterised France, Germany
and Italy. With the creation of NATO Britain had got a Europe protected and stabilised by an American
guarantee so saw no need for European experiments, especially if they involved giving up sovereignty
Other factors
- Also at start unsure of whether Britain did not join the ECSC but would be involved in other types of
integration. Ludlow argues had it been clear that division would go on so long unlikely Dutch would
have accepted Britain not joining the ECSC.
- Decision by France to make the acceptance of supranationality a precondition of participation in
ECSC negotiations prevented the British attending Paris conference, Schuman did not allow British
scepticism to weaken proposed structure, defied critic and proceeded with plans
- American endorsement of the plan compensated for British absence so no need for Britain – so not
targeted; America actively supported integration even without Britain. Also Britain had a special
relationship with America that acted as a psychological reason for not joining – US saw them as
dominant and able to aid US if they needed – would not have the same relationship if Britain joined
in integration
- British attempts at WEU failed – they didn’t try to accommodate what each of the 6 wanted e.g. it
solved the problem of German rearmament but not Italian or German desire to re-establish a role
on the international stage
Only as Britain’s situation change did they need integration e.g. after the sterling crisis of 1966
Cold war, US/USSR influence – Cold war and Integration separate but intertwined especially during late
40’s and early 50’s, both influenced each other but end of one did not cause the end of the other but
detailed analysis of either must include both, success of integration helped bring Cold War to an end
Became central to both sides from 1947-89, but not key to members of ECSC who chose to focus on
economic agenda of community but international system into which integration was born was profoundly
influenced by east west conflict also evidence suggesting integration played a role in the evolution of the
Cold War, especially in the way the East-West struggle came to an end
American Priority - UNITY
American support vital in creating integration – Western Europe had to be united to withstand
threat of communism, needed economic prosperity and political stability – rivalries existing in
interwar period could not fester e.g. Franco-German relations so US got involved to try to stop this
Marshall Plan first major US initiative failed to bring unity it hoped, US tried to use Marshall aid in a
way where states of Western Europe felt obliged to co-operate more but this failed, States had
different economic needs
o British and French obstruct plans e.g. OEEC remained weak and intergovernmental, cant
impose joint European policies
o Not unifying as US hoped though the states enthusiastic over US financial aid and American
aim of transferring secrets of economic growth to Europe was partially successful
o US realized acting as external sponsor of Western Europe’s own French led efforts was more
effective – Schuman Plan was successful but also required backing provided by US,
American policy makers also closely involved in the plan, US enthusiasm also important to
Schuman and Monnet – wanted to rebut domestic misgivings and criticism from British
o Less involved in Treaties of Rome (1957) and the EEC establishment – US initially more
interested in Euratom – thought it could prevent dangerous nuclear proliferation but after
US supported EEC properly it benefitted greatly from this support
Rehabilitating Germany
