3.1.1 What is knowledge?
The distinction between acquaintance knowledge, ability knowledge, and propositional
knowledge:
Ability/ practical knowledge is knowing how to do something, it doesn’t require explicit
understanding of what something entails and tends to involve a skill that cannot be verbalised.
Some argue that all knowledge can be reduced to ability knowledge as facts are verified
through experiments you know how to perform.
Acquaintance knowledge is knowing of something, and involves having direct experience of
something, independent of your ability to communicate it e.g. the taste of an orange.
Empiricists would call this acquaintance knowledge the foundation of knowledge as we
developed our understanding of the world via direct experience with it, starting tabula rasa.
Propositional knowledge is knowing that something is the case. This knowledge involves
making true propositions about the world that can be communicated through language.
The nature of definition (including Zagzebski) and how propositional knowledge may be
analysed/ defined:
Zagzebski claims that it is ambiguous as to whether knowledge can have a real definition.
There are different reasons for seeking a definition: a practical purpose to recognise instances
of knowledge and learn more, and a theoretical purpose to understand the concept of
knowledge.
To try and define something in terms of understanding what makes it what it is tends to assume
it has a ‘nature’ that is objective and goes beyond human constructs.
It is generally accepted that we should identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for
knowledge.
Zagzebski argues we should try to find a definition via this method to try and establish the true
nature of knowledge. She is sceptical that knowledge has a real essence but still supports
attempting a definition, with guidance that a definition of knowledge should not be:
- Circular, the definition must not include the term already being defined
- Obscure, the terms should not be more obscure than what is being defined
- Negated, defined by what it is not
- Ad hoc, created just to satisfy particular circumstances.
Her definition of propositional knowledge is a ‘belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue’.
Such virtues motivate us to discover the truth and give us the ability to be reliable in forming
true beliefs.
She also says that ‘knowledge is the epistemically conscientious attainment of truth’. The
epistemically conscientious person monitors their cognitive activity, reflecting when they are
aware of cues that call into question either their basic self trust, their trust in others, or their
trust in the environment.
The tripartite view
Propositional knowledge is defined as justified true belief: S knows that p if and only if:
1. S is justified in believing that p,
2. P is true and
3. S believes that p (individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions)
,Issues with the tripartite view including:
The conditions are not individually necessary:
A strength of the tripartite definition is that the justification is necessary as shown in the Road to
Larissa example. A man is asked which road to take to get to Larissa and judges correctly
despite having never been there or truly knowing if he is correct. Plato argues that although his
advice is just as useful in spite of a lack of justification, the man doesn’t have knowledge. This
is because a true belief isn’t tethered to anything unlike knowledge which is tied down by the
justification. The justification is thus necessary for knowledge as without it a true belief isn’t
secure.
Argument to show that justification isn’t necessary: road to larissa, say that with no justification
the answer is still useful, but then undermine that it isn't tethered to anything
It could be argued that the truth condition isn’t necessary as if an entire society believes
something then it is true for them. We can use Kuhn’s example of a paradigm shift wherein ‘a
fundamental change in approach or underlying assumptions’ occurs, for example the earth was
previously believed to be the centre of the universe, so the proposition ‘the earth is the centre
of the universe’ would previously have been true and thus considered knowledge. The truth
clause thus isn’t necessary for a proposition to function as knowledge as despite the earth not
being flat, within the context of their society it is true for them and so functions as knowledge.
However it still isn’t true…
It could be argued that the belief condition isn’t necessary. This is shown by the idea of Albert,
who is getting quizzed on history. He is asked questions that he doesn’t believe he knows the
answers to , but he gets them right too often for it to be luck: therefore it is suggested that
Albert has knowledge without belief.
However this is a weak critique as Albert cannot justify his answers - in Plato’s words there is
nothing ‘tethering’ his answers so they truly must be lucky guesses and not knowledge.
The conditions are not sufficient - cases of lucky true beliefs (Gettier’s original two
counterexamples):
Gettier argues that the conditions in JTB are not sufficient for knowledge. He uses the example
of Jones and Smith who are both applying for the same job. Smith believes the conjunctive
proposition (d) Jones will get the job and Jones has 18 coins in his pocket. His justification is
that he counted the coins 10 minutes ago and that the president of the company assured him
that Jones would get the job. (d) also entions proposition (e) the man who will get the job has
10 coins in his pocket. Smith believes this and is justified through (d).
However, it turns out that Smith will actually get the job and he also unknowingly has 10 coins
in his pocket. (e) is therefore true, justified and believed however isn’t knowledge. This is
because (e) as true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith’s pocket that Smith was unaware
of and what makes (e) true is therefore not related to what justified it. Smith instead had ‘lucky
knowledge’ and not real knowledge, meaning that a justified true belief is not sufficient for
knowledge as the three criteria can be obtained without having knowledge.
Responses: alternative post-Gettier analysis/ definitions of knowledge including:
Strengthen the justification condition (ie infallibilism):
A stronger theory is therefore infallibilism as it details what it means for a belief to be justified
and thus changes the conditions of jtb to avoid Gettier’s critique.
, Infallibilism claims that knowledge is certain and undoubtable and the proof the knowledge
should be indubitable is as follows:
1. No one can know what is false
2. Therefore, if I am justified in believing that p I can't be mistaken about p.
3. Therefore, for justification to secure knowledge justification must guarantee truth.
4. Therefore, if I am justified in believing p I cannot possibly be mistaken about p.
5. Therefore, if it is possible I am mistaken that p I am not justified in believing p.
6. Therefore, infallibilism is true.
This undermines Gettier’s scenario as it was possible Smith was mistaken that Jones would get
the job and so infallibilism prevents ‘lucky knowledge’ from forming as the criteria for
infallibilism isn’t met.
Thus infallibilism is stronger than the tripartite view in using undoubtable justification to ensure
that it is sufficient for knowledge whereas the tripartite view fails to require justification that
guarantees truth.
Learn one of the following two critiques:
However, infallibilism can be undermined via a logical error. Premise 2 can have two meanings
depending on the understanding of ‘can’t’. It could mean:
a) I am not mistaken that p
b) I cannot possibly be mistaken that p
From the argument for infallibilism, we can agree with a) because it is inferred from premise 1.
(No one can know what is false.) However, b) is what infallibilism assumes in moving from
premise 2 through premise 3 to 4. This is an error since the two claims are distinct - a) is a
claim about whether I *am* mistaken whereas b) is a claim about whether I *could* be
mistaken. Infallibilism therefore commits a fallacy of equivocation, confusing one claim for the
other, and the argument thus fails as to accept it we need some other independent reason to
believe b).
Infallibilism therefore doesn’t prove itself as stronger to a justified true belief as it doesn’t make
sense. A more successful theory of knowledge is thus one which leads to more certainty about
b) without being infallible, and I will argue that this is reliabilism.
However infallibilism is arguably not stronger than jtb as it requires too strong a justification that
leads to local and global scepticism, meaning jtb may still stand as infallible knowledge thus
shouldn’t be a requirement.
It is rare that our evidence rules out the possibility of error and so infallibilism entails that we
have very little knowledge. Infallibilism brings everything into question by demanding only
undoubtable beliefs, and so unless we can build our understanding of the world based on only
infallible beliefs, it leads to scepticism rather than secure knowledge. (Explain why scepticism is
bad?). A definition of knowledge that allows for more knowledge can therefore be seen as
stronger, and jtb allows for this in only requiring some level of justification.
Add a ‘no false lemmas’ conditions (J+T+B+N):
Adding a ‘no false lemmas’ condition seeks to strengthen the justification condition so as to
avoid Gettier-type cases and be sufficient for knowledge. A lemma is an intermediary
proposition or belief in an argument, from which another proposition is inferred. Nfl states that
we must not infer our conclusion from any lemma or belief which is false. P is thus known if and
only if p is justified, true, believed, that is not inferred from anything false.
