Stronger therefore is the response that verification principle itself is non-cognitive as whether it
can be verified is thus not useful.
The stronger argument that religious language fails to be cognitive is from Flew who, despite
Mitchell’s claims that falsification can be achieved, successfully shows that it can actually never
be achieved, making it stronger as this also thus overcomes Hick’s eschatological argument -
can’t even be achieved eschatologically (conceivable and verifiable if true but unfalsifiable and
non-cognitive if false) . Outline Flew parable.
Mitchell attempts to offer a weak response to falsification however is undermined by Flew as
his analogy is weak.
Outline Mitchell and parable of stranger.
Flew however responds that Mithcell’s argument is weak because of a flawed analogy - will
inevitably commit the unavoidable act of requalification.
Conclusion: non-cognitive.
Is religious language meaningful?:
Yes
Weaker is Ayer who argues it needs to be verified however is refuted by Hick who argues that it
can be verified.
Stronger is Flew’s argument against religious language as even if it can be eschatologically
verified, it cannot however be falsified and thus still isn’t meaningful.
A weak response to this is made from Mitchell, who claims that religious claims are actually
falsifiable however doesn’t recognise that since such irrefutable evidence exists against God,
requalification is inevitable. (the response from Flew, unavoiding act)
The stronger response to falsification from Hare who accepts that religious claims cannot be
falsified however argues that they are meaningful regardless of if they are truth-apt,
undermining the usefulness of the falsification entirely.
Conclusion: Is meaningful
3.4 Metaphysics of mind
3.4.1 What do we mean by ‘mind’?
Features of mental states:
All or at least some mental states have phenomenal properties:
Some, but not all, philosophes use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to these properties, where
‘qualia’ are defined as ‘intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are
introspectively accessible’:
Qualia = intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible.
The existence of qualia implies a subjective nature of experience, with an intermediary from
object to mind in the experiencer having their unique personal experience. ‘It is useless to base
the defence of materialism on an analysis of mental phenomena that fail to deal explicitly with
their subjective nature’ - Nagel. You cannot explain qualia through reductive analyses of the
physical.
[According to Chalmers, the ‘central mystery of consciousness’ is the explanatory gap between
what’s physiologically occurring and why that gives rise to a certain experience. ]
All or at least some mental states have intentional properties (ie intentionality):
Intentionality means that consciousness is always directed upon something.
‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional and a consciousness that ceases to
be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’ - Jean-Paul Satre
‘Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself. We can, therefore, define
mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object
intentionally within themselves’ - Brentano
,You can have reflective thought on both an external sensation or an internal thought. Your
intentional consciousness would be directed towards either the redness of a ball or a thought
about the redness of a ball.
_____
Monism = mind and body are one kind of substance, substance being something that exists on
its own, properties depending on this substance. That substance could be spiritual (idealism) or
physical (physicalism).
Dualism = two things make up a human being, spiritual/mental (mind) and physical (body).
Mind cannot be reduced to physical, it’s a distinct non-physical phenomenon.
3.4.2 Dualist theories:
Substance dualism: mental and physical are two different substances
Mind exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies:
The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descates):
All physical things are divisible (because i can conceive of them being divided)
All minds/ mental states are not divisible (because i cannot conceive of them being divided)
Therefore minds/ mental states are not identical to bodies or parts of bodies.
Descartes appeals to Leibniz’ Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, which states that if two
things share all the same qualities, they must in fact be the same thing. However, as the mind
is indivisible, and the physical body is divisible, they can’t be the same thing and must thus be
two separate substances. So, Descartes argues, substance dualism must be true.
Responses, including:
The mental is divisible in some sense:
However, Descartes’ argument can be undermined by the notion that the mind can actually be
divided into parts, which renders his conclusion that the mind and body are different
substances not sound.
This can be demonstrated using callosal syndrome, a type of disconnection syndrome when
the corpus callosum connecting the two hemispheres of the brain is severed to some degree.
With the left and right brain separated, each hemisphere will have its own separate perception,
concepts, and impulses to act.
This shows that the mind can actually be divided into parts, as one person can have two
different minds operating independently once their brain is divided.
Descartes' second premise that ‘all minds are not divisible’ is therefore untrue.
Since a conclusion is only sound if the premises are true, and Descartes first premise is not
true, Descartes conclusion isn’t sound. His attempt to prove that the mind and body are
different substances thus fails as it was on the incorrect basis that the mind and body have
different properties - the body divisible whilst the mind indivisible - that his argument is valid.
The body and mind can, contrary to Descartes’ argument, be of the same substance, as
Descartes hasn’t shown that their properties are different.
(Poorly expressed)
Not everything thought of as physical is divisible:
However, Descartes’ argument can be undermined by the notion that not everything physical is
divisible, which renders his conclusion that the mind and body are different substances not
, sound.
This can be demonstrated using quarks and gluons, physical particles which make up protons
which scientists currently understand as being indivisible.
This shows that not all physical things are divisible, thus undermining Descartes first premise
that ‘all physical things are divisible’.
Since a conclusion is only sound if the premises are true, and Descartes first premise is not
true, his conclusion isn’t sound. Descartes’ conclusion that the mind and body are different
substances relies upon the notion that physical things must be divisible as this would render the
indivisible mind non-physical, however, since the mind being indivisible doesn’t necessarily
mean it’s non-physical, Descartes fails to show that the mind and body cannot be of the same
substance.
(poorly expressed)
The conceivability argument for substance dualism (expressed with no reference to
God, Descartes):
Anything that I can conceive of is logically possible.
If it is logically possible that X (the mind) exists without Y (the body), then X is not identical to Y.
I conceive that I, a thinking thing, can exist without my extended (i.e physical) body existing.
Therefore, I, a thinking thing, am not identical with my extended body.
Because we can conceive of ourselves as existing without having a body, Descartes thinks we
must not be identical to our body. Since we are not identical to our body, he claims our minds
and our bodies must be 2 completely different conceivable sorts of things, different substances.
Responses including:
Mind without body is not conceivable:
Could use behaviourism as an example:
Behaviourism says that to have mental states is to have behavioural dispositions
To have behavioural dispositions is to be disposed to move your body in certain ways
It is inconceivable to be disposed to move your body in certain ways if you don’t have a body.
So, it is inconceivable to have mental states if you don’t have a body.
So, a mind without a body is inconceivable.
Thus the mind and body must be of the same substance.
What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible: [Use this or Kripke H 2O]
However, this can be undermined by the notion that what is conceivable may not be
metaphysically possible, as this would mean that Descartes hasn’t proven that the mind is
separate from the body.
This idea can be illustrated using Hesperus the evening star and Phosphorus the morning star.
The two were thought to be distinct from each other, although we now know that they are in fact
that same object. Frege claimed the the following are both true:
(1) Hesperus is Hesperus
(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus
(1) and (2) differ in their meaning, in what Frege called ‘cognitive value’. (1) is a truth of analytic
logic that can be known a priori, whereas (2) records an empirical truth that was discovered by
astronomers. Hesperus therefore has identical properties to Phosphorus, but the original sense
of Hesperus differed from the sense of Phosphorus, despite the fact that the object they
