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Summary Readings Russian Geopolitics
- Instelling
- Universiteit Van Amsterdam (UvA)
Extensive notes on all the readings of the course Russian Geopolitics.
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Readings Russian GeopoliticsHow to make sense of Russia’s foreign policy?
The construction of ‘geopolitical spaces’ in Russian foreign policy discourse before and after the
Ukraine crisis. David Svarin.
Russia considers itself an important member in each of the three principal ‘’geopolitical spaces’’ in
Russian foreign policy – Eurasia, the Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific – as membership in these
regions is considered in Russia a condition for maintaining its status as a great power in the
international system. Thus, policy discourses are a flexible means of readjusting Russia’s geopolitical
vision in accordance with the general shifts and new tendencies in global affairs.
The author has argued that, while acknowledging given geographical and territorial realities,
regarding foreign policy practice, personal conceptions and interpretations of Russia’s political elite
of these realities play a crucial role. ‘’Geography is dynamic’’ in that the meaning of space,
distance, territory, and borders can change in the perceptions of peoples and foreign policy-making
elites. Global space is incessantly reimagined and rewritten by centres of power and authority and
geopolitical analysis functions as an aide in the conduct of a state’s foreign policy. Foreign policy is
geopolitical but not a stable practise as it continuously reproduces and reformulates state identity in
response to changed perceptions and realities in the global system.
This study is grounded in the tradition of practical geopolitics, which focuses on the political elite,
and thus omits a range of other actors that equally influence Russia’s geopolitical imagination.
During the 1990s and after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself between two different
modern identities – that of the Soviet past and that of the western present – which caused debates
regarding identity, Russia’s nation and its place in the world and a reorientation of foreign policy. The
accession of Vladimir Putin to the presidency in 2000, a strong and capable leader, led to the
implementation of a new approach in Russian foreign policy with the aim to restore Russia’s ‘place’
in global affairs. One of the principal goals of the Russian leadership is to establish their country
among the world’s great powers, according to the status it enjoyed during the Cold War period. Putin
argued that Russia is a country with a history that spans over a thousand years and historically it has
had the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy and Moscow should, thus, also now
conduct an independent foreign policy and be one of the principal actors in global politics. The
Russian foreign policy is aimed to achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community as it
has the ambition to belong the great powers that dominate the international system. Post-Soviet
Russian policy was built on emotions and ideas of status rather than material, military, and
economic power. Having lost its status and hegemonic position in global politics after the dissolution
of the USSR, Russia’s political elite aimed at re-establishing a similar status as soon as it consolidated
Russian power in the 2000s.
Geopolitical spaces in Russian foreign policy discourse:
1. Eurasia. The most contested because there is no clear definition of which territorial area
exactly corresponds to Eurasia BUT Russia defined itself as a Eurasian power mainly because
of (1) Russia’s centrality and (2) Russia’s expansion over the last four centuries which
principally took place across the Eurasian landmass. Russia as the centre and the bridge
between the civilisations of the East and the West. Russian foreign policy is based on the self-
positioning of Russia as the centre of Eurasia and due to historical ties to neighbouring
countries, Russia has a certain legitimacy for pursuing its foreign policy and power interests
in the former Soviet region as these countries are linked by common history, robust
economic, cultural, and civilization bonds. Also, Putin argued considering the expansion of
NATO and revolutions in Eastern Europe the idea of the addition of an institutional
framework to Eurasia, the Eurasian Union, which further consolidates the historical
, community in Eurasia centred on Russia with the aim to consolidate the actors in the
Eurasian region and to position the region as an important link between the Euro-Atlantic
and the Asia-Pacific regions. Russia considers its centrality within Eurasia as a precondition
for its strong role in global politics. Evolution of the use of Eurasia in Russian discourse as
Eurasia moved from being an undefined vast geopolitical region, of which Russia is a
central part, to a region which is dominated by Russia and in which Russia increasingly tries
to institutionalize its dominance through a new regional setting.
2. Euro-Atlantic. The Euro-Atlantic and NATO formerly functioned as a counterpart to Russia
and the Soviet Union but with the breakup of the Soviet Union the space acquired new
meaning with eastern European countries becoming part of NATO and the EU with Russia left
out. BUT, with the leadership of Putin since 2000, the construction of the Euro-Atlantic space
needed to be reformulated and Russia stressed Russia’s belonging to the historical and
geographical European community and Russia’s assumed European identity. However,
Russia is not the centre of the Euro-Atlantic (multiple great powers, including US and EU) and
Russia wanted an understanding between the dominant forces in the region whom each
defend their pragmatic interests (difference with centre of power in Eurasia). Russia’s leaders
promoted their country as one of three poles in the Euro-Atlantic power structure and an
active supplier of public goods. Russia thus reformulated the importance of the Euro-Atlantic
and opted for a new security structure to replace the traditional Euro-Atlantic structures and
organizations such as NATO. Moscow’s discourse continuously evolved in the direction
of forming a new understanding of the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical space which includes and
not excludes Russia as one of the dominant actors.
3. Asia-Pacific. Asia-Pacific in Russian discourse primarily refers to issues like economic
development and security cooperation and not to identity-politics or history. In Russia’s
foreign policy after 2008, it was becoming increasingly important to strengthen Russia’s
presence in the Asia-Pacific region since Russia, according to them, is an integral part of this
fastest-developing geopolitical zone. Russia attempted to diversify its foreign and economic
relations which thus far were mostly oriented toward the Euro-Atlantic region. Also, due to
the perceived power shift in the global world to the East, Russia cannot be absent from the
Asia-Pacific because of its ambition to re-establish the country’s great power status. With the
economic and commercial potentials of Russia’s eastern regions (Siberia), the welfare of
Russia is linked to the dynamics of Asia-Pacific. Russian interest in the Asia-Pacific is of a
pragmatic nature in terms of keeping its position as a great power within the rise of power
to the East.
Foreign policy in the third term of Putin in 2012 was marked by two issues: the Ukraine Crisis (2013)
and annexation of Crimea and the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in which the
author argues that, due to the Ukraine Crisis, the idea of a wider Eurasian integration reached a
new importance (idea of EEU since 2011, reached its importance in 2012, and was signed in 2015)!
The principal causes are to be found in the geopolitical imagination/geopolitics, especially with the
NATO enlargement (possible Ukraine membership and thus threat to Russian security and power)
and the competition between Russia and the EU over diverging views of how Europe should be
organized (also Russia’s control over the territory) as Russia reacted to the enlargement of NATO and
involvement of the EU in the region. NATO enlargement as the condition for a peaceful Europe left
Russia outside but with the new power of Russia since 2000 the clash with NATO was unavoidable.
The EU wanted to include former Soviet countries in its plans for a wider cooperation which were
contrary to Russian plans for European space. Russia, feeling threatened, singlehandedly blamed
the West, and above all the EU, for pushing the limits too far and for engaging in geopolitical
competition, ultimately leading to the crisis in Ukraine. The crisis in Ukraine accentuated Russia’s
perception of the West and the increasingly negative view, also in foreign policy, of the Euro-Atlantic
region with the domination of the US and NATO especially. The competition over Ukraine became
a competition over Russia’s place in Europe and Russia failed to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic space.
,BUT Russia has not yet abandoned the idea of a cooperative relationship with the EU and the idea of
a Greater Europe. Russia still believed that the strategic goal of Russia-EU cooperation should be
gradual development of a common economic and cultural space. HOWEVER uniting Russia and the
EU was impossible due to the Ukraine Crisis and resulting sanctions, propaganda, and competition.
Before the Ukraine crisis, Russia considered itself to be a “full member” of the three geopolitical
spaces Eurasia, Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific. The events in Ukraine, changed Russian political
thinking as it demonstrated that Moscow cannot be part of the Euro-Atlantic space right now and
it shifted its policy towards the East (but no complete rejection from Russia to the West or possible
relations with the EU and the West!).
Putin's Choices: Explaining Russian Foreign Policy and Intervention in Ukraine. Kimberly Marten.
The author argues that Russian policy, led by Vladimir Putin, is unpredictable and it responds in the
moment to the vicissitudes of a changing environment (no clear endgame or strategy in the policy).
Putin’s unexpected choices and surprises in policy are derived from his career history as a KGB
operative (he is trained in the arts of masking and deception and unpredictability) and he has
rewarded old friends and colleagues (KGB, Federal Security Forces etc.) with high-ranking positions in
government and industrial facilities such as oil and nuclear energy. The author argues that his
endgame is only to win and stay on top. Moreover, the very nature of the current Russian system
makes all of Moscow’s moves unpredictable because decisions stem from political networks which
connect to the leader through informal ties and not through institutions – the process of
policymaking in Russia is unclear and decisions are made behind closed doors by individuals.
Authority comes through personal connections, cemented through family, neighbourhood, and prior
school or work experiences (much more in Russia than in Europe or the US and this informal network
was already in place in Russia for decades, also before Putin).
Even though the opaque Russian system produces surprise policy decisions, you can make predictions
about how the system should operate and the foreign policy outcomes, based on the logic of patron-
client politics. First, leaders in patron-client network systems must constantly signal their strength.
Putin photographed while shirtless on horseback, shooting tranquilizer dart guns at tigers, or
discovering ancient Greek vases while deep-sea diving. These stunts are part of a concerted effort to
send a strong signal to both the public and his network associates that he is a fit, vigorous, take-
charge strongman who does not fall under pressure by the West. Putin and Russia want to feel like a
great power again and that is also why it seems politically impossible (article written 2015) for Putin
to compromise in Ukraine in the face of Western economic sanctions or other pressures. Second, all
interactions with foreign leaders will be heavily personalized since Russian leaders think of politics
in personalistic—not organizational or institutional—terms. Third, leaders who must focus on
providing patronage and protection to their clients should avoid taking actions that risk major
losses, especially losses to the core economic interests of their personal networks. We might have
expected Putin to speak and act with an aggressive swagger to demonstrate his power, but to avoid
rash behaviour that risked damage to his personal image and stature as well as his network’s well-
being. Putin perhaps believed that he was taking low-risk actions in Ukraine as the takeover of the
Crimea was almost bloodless.
Patron-client systems can be very stable over long periods of time and it does not have to crack
under Western pressure of sanctions for example. The act of transferring group loyalty from one
leader to another requires overcoming a difficult collective action problem. Members of various (and
potentially competing) sub-networks must agree that not only is it time to switch their allegiance
away from their former chief patron but must also agree on the new replacement patron. This
requires sending and receiving clear signals about who that stronger and more capable individual
might be, at a time when the declining patron is applying all possible mechanisms to try to remain in
power – this is a risk. Also, the security services and Putin (patron) can fabricate false information
, and evidence to lock the rival up which makes it a dangerous game. The logic of patron-client
systems means that no one should count on the collapse of Putin’s regime anytime soon. The
incentive structure does not favour it unless the Russian economy tanks so badly over the long term
that risky action becomes profitable (such as take overs and popular revolts).
Conclusion about Russian actions towards Ukraine crisis and effects of measures of US and the West
on those actions: (1) Putin is highly unlikely to give up anything he and his supporters have already
achieved. (2) The West should not assume that more pressure on Putin will convince him even to
stop his forward movement in Ukraine. (3) As long as hope remains in Russia that Western pressure
is temporary regime change is highly unlikely.
The revenge of the Caucasus: Chechenization and the dual state in Russia. Richard Sakwa. (EXTRA)
The dual state refers to a state in which the constitutional order is balanced by the consolidation of
an arbitrary prerogative state. This horizontal dualism has taken root in Russia’s regions; and this is
accompanied by the establishment of a form of vertical dualism in relations between the regions and
the centre. Attempts to overcome this form of segmented regionalism under President Vladimir
Putin have been undermined by the development of Chechenization, which devolved prerogative
powers to a powerful president. Though Putin had ‘’won’’ the Chechen conflicts of the 1990s,
Chechenization formalized a type of independence without secession while strengthening the
arbitrary powers of the administrative system. This blowback threatened to destabilize the fragile
balance between the constitutional and prerogative states in Moscow and represented the real
revenge of the Caucasus.
In a dual state, two parallel systems of law operate, where the “normative state” operate according
to sanctioned principles of rationality and impartial legal norms (open public politics: elections,
formation of parties): while the “prerogative state” exercises power arbitrarily and without
constraints, unrestrained by law (informal groups, factions). A dualist tradition in the USSR carried
over into the post-communist era where the hesitant establishment of the rule of law and
accountability was undermined by the formation of a dominant power system that stood outside the
development of constitutionalism: power, also in Chechnya, was exercised in an unjust manner
outside the legal norms of the constitution. The author has argued that Russia remains trapped in
the grey area (middle ground) between a prerogative and a genuine constitutional state.
Dualism at the regional level entailed the political aggrandisement of local executive authorities,
subverting the separation of powers on both the horizontal and vertical axes. Russia’s retention of
the principle of federalism reflects the aspirations within the framework of the normative state to
achieve genuine two-level governance according to the law and constitution. The development of
segmented regionalism (especially in Chechnya!), however, revealed the degree to which the
arbitrary practices of the prerogative state reached down into the regions and tempered relations
between the centre and the provinces. The tension between federal principles and segmented
regional practices is a graphic illustration of the dual state at work. Attempts by Putin (second
Chechen war) to overcome segmented regionalism failed as his attempts reinforced the
predominance of the administrative prerogative state at the regional level (horizontal dualism).
Expressions of autonomy and separatism remained in several Russian subjects (Chechnya included).
Despite the recentralization drive under Putin, territorial segmentation would remain as long as
dualism was not overcome.
Chechenization represented a retraditionalization of Chechen politics within the framework of
national allegiances, rejecting what were considered alien forms of Islam while incorporating a new
spirit of militancy AND it also entailed an exacerbation of the flaws in the Russian constitutional
process by revealing duality at its starkest as the emergence of an autonomous power system in
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