Samenvatting Introduction to European Governance
Lecture 1; introduction to the course
Sir Michael Leigh schreef in ‘Relaunch or disintegration? What Covid-19 means for the future of
Europe’ op 14 December 2020 het volgende:
De COVID-19 pandemie kan leiden tot twee scenario’s. Deze onderscheiden zich door het effect van
de crisis op de integratie van de EU. Is Covid-19 het startpunt voor een relaunch van de EU? Of leidt
de crisis tot een desintegratie? Beide zijn narritives van waaruit we de ontwikkelingen kunnen
bekijken. Het zijn twee verschillende perspectieven op de crisis.
Het eerste perspectief; de relaunch van de EU wordt gebaseerd op onder andere the Monnet
method, functionalism, and the theory of spill-over. Monnet suggereert dat een crisis, zoals
bijvoorbeeld Covid-19, ervoor kan zorgen dat er stappen voorwaarts gemaakt worden die anders niet
voor mogelijk warden gehouden. Deze mogelijkheden ontstaan als een gevolg van de reactie van de
EU op onverwachte gevolgen van eerdere beslissingen. Een voorbeeld van de crisis als relaunch:
“The Commission then launched an entirely new activity, joint European procurement of personal
protective equipment, ending Chinese and Russian “mask diplomacy” and, even more importantly, it
introduced EU procurement of vaccines. The EU’s role in supplying vaccines, even if poorly
understood, has improved the EU’s image in most member countries.”
Het tweede scenario, omtrent disintegratie, heeft een meer ontmoedigende kijk op de reactie van de
EU en haar lidstaten. De lidstaten reageerde chaotisch op de epidemie. Elke lidstaat bepaalde haar
eigen strategie, zonder daarbij de rest van Europa mee in overweging te nemen. Zo waren er in
eerste instantie restricties op de export van mondkapjes. Maar, deze restrictie konden niet lang
standhouden.
Vanuit dit perspectief kan gesteld worden dat drie fundamentele zaken van de EU geschonden
werden. Ten eerste, Schengen. Lidstaten sloten de grenzen, terwijl de EU juist open grenzen betreft
(denk aan de vier vrijheden). Zoals eerder benoemd werd de interne Europese markt bedreigt door
export restricties (gaat in tegen de state aid rules). Ook werd er gehandeld tegen het Stability and
Growth Pact in. Deze reeks afspraken tussen landen van de Economische en Monetaire Unie, die de
waardevastheid van de euro moeten garanderen, werd geschaad.
Al met al is sir Michael Leigh overtuigd van de positieve visie. “Overall, and despite the continuing
public health and economic crisis, the positive account of the EU’s response to Covid-19 is more
convincing. At first it seemed that the epidemic would marginalise the EU, because of predominantly
national responsibility for public health. But many governments now see the EU’s role as
indispensable as they struggle with their own governance problems between regional and central
authorities, and face unemployment, increasing income inequality and rising national debt.”
De crisis heeft volgens Leigh geleid tot een “degree of fiscal solidarity that would have been
unimaginable before the epidemic” en “a higher level of public trust”. Wel maakt hij nog een nuance,
waar hij wijst op een grijs gebied: “This brief informal review of the EU’s response to Covid-19 also
makes clear that the integration versus disintegration debate is based on a false dichotomy. The
dichotomy arises from the now somewhat dated view that any development should be judged by
whether it is a step towards or away from an “ever-closer union.” The dichotomy is expressed in the
classic but now outmoded metaphor of the man on the bicycle who must keep peddling faster or fall
off. As my colleague Erik Jones has put it:
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,The mistake is to believe that European integration − or any integration, for that matter − is either yes
or no, forward or backward, progress or regress. Integration and disintegration can take place at
the same time.
Our two scenarios both contain elements of truth and confirm that integration and disintegration
may occur simultaneously. It is hard to predict which will predominate in the medium-term. Any
complacency about the EU’s performance would be out of place, with many Europeans still suffering,
economic prospects muted, unresolved issues remaining, and Eurosceptics casting around for their
best line of attack. But the evidence suggests that Covid-19 may turn out to be a salutary shock for
the EU, obliging it to set aside certain doubtful and divisive procedures and to focus on those policy
areas that address the urgent needs of the population as well as critical global challenges.”
Part I Setting the scene
Het eerste hoofdstuk van het boek bespreekt de totstandkoming van de EU en begint bij de
oprichting van de ECSC (EGKS). Het idee van een verbond met Duitsland en Frankrijk werd geïnitieerd
door Winston Churchill in 1946. De invulling van dit verbond, met kool en staal als thema, werd
bedacht door Jean Monnet, Commissioner-General of the French National Planning Board. French
Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman nam zijn voorstel aan op 9 mei 1950. Vandaag de dag
wordt dit moment beschouwd als de geboorte van de EU. Aan dit verbond zijn twee opmerkelijke
punten. Allereerst, het supranationale karakter.
“In Schuman’s plan the High Authority was authorized to make decisions that were needed to execute
the agreements laid down in the treaty. And in those cases where member states and the High
Authority disagreed, they would be able to bring their dispute to a court that would be authorized to
issue a binding judgment.”
Supranational organizations: Organizations in which countries pool their sovereignty on certain
matters to allow joint decision-making.
Intergovernmental organizations: Organizations in which member states work together on policies
of common concern but retain their full sovereignty.
Ten tweede, het beperkte bereik van het verdrag (limited scope). Het betreft voor nu nog enkel de
totstandkoming van een gemeenschappelijke kolen- en staalmarkt. In 1950 waren er enkele
voorstanders voor een United Stated of Europe, maar voor veel burgers en overheden was dit echt
nog een brug te ver.
Naast Frankrijk en Duitsland onderschreven nog 4 landen het verdrag. De Benelux, deze landen
waren en zijn immers behoorlijk economisch afhankelijk van Frankrijk en Duitsland. Italië nam deel
vanwege politieke en economische redenen. Evenals Duitsland wilde Italië respect terugwinnen na
de tweede wereldoorlog. Daarnaast verwachtte Italië ook financiële voordelen van een
gemeenschappelijke markt voor de industrie.
Op 18 April 1951 werd het Verdrag van Parijs ondertekend en kwam de ECSC formeel officieel tot
stand. De ECSC had destijds 4 hoofdinstituties:
• A Council of Ministers, representing the member state governments, to co-decide on
policies not provided for in the Treaty.
• A High Authority, consisting of independent appointees, acting as a daily executive making
decisions on the basis of the Treaty provisions.
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, • A Court of Justice, consisting of independent judges, to interpret the Treaty and adjudicate
conflicts between member states and the High Authority
• A Common Assembly, drawn from members of national parliaments, to monitor the
activities of the High Authority.
Lelieveldt en Princen noemen 3 vragen om in acht te nemen bij het volgen van de ontwikkelingen van
de EU.
• In which areas did member states decide to cooperate? This question looks at the policies
that member states agreed upon. The first way to chart the history of integration is by
tracing the incorporation of new policy areas over time.
• How did the member states organize their cooperative efforts? This second question looks at
the institutional framework they put in place to make these policies. It examines the
institutions that were set up, their powers and the way they arrive at decisions.
• Which countries became members? This question looks at the developments in the
organization’s membership. The process of enlargement charts this third element of
European integration.
1. The historical development of the EU
The 1950s: from one to three Communities
In de jaren ’50 probeerde de ECSC steeds meer vorm te krijgen op diverse (beleids)terreinen.
“West German troops would be brought under a supranational command. In April 1952 the member
states agreed on a European Defence Community (EDC) that would establish such a structure. Soon
thereafter another treaty – European Political Community (EPC) – was drafted in order to provide for
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, a common foreign policy: if there were to be a common defence, then it made sense to also provide
for an organization that would give political guidance to the activities of the EDC.”
Echter, er was te weinig draagvlak waardoor de plannen van de EDC en EPC mislukten. Maar ondanks
dat falen ontstonden in de late jaren ’50 nieuwe (supranationale) samenwerkingsverbanden omtrent
minder gevoelige thema’s.
“Monnet pressed for broadening cooperation in the field of energy by proposing a European Atomic
Energy Community. Around the same time Dutch Foreign Minister Beyen came up with proposals for
a common market that would cover all types of economic activity.”
“In the end the governments agreed on the establishment of two new Communities that were laid
down in the Treaties of Rome. The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) would strive for
the development of nuclear energy, whilst the European Economic Community (EEC) would focus on
establishing the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital between the member states”
“The institutional set-up of Euratom and the EEC was roughly similar to that of the ECSC, with one
exception. The powers of the supranational executive in the EEC and Euratom – called the
Commission – were significantly less than those in the ECSC. The Commission was granted the right to
make legislative proposals for what came to be known as Community legislation, but all these
proposals needed to be approved by the Council of Ministers.”
The 1960s: progress and setbacks
In a preferential trade agreement countries agree on lowering the tariffs they charge for importing
goods.
Ratification: Procedure through which a member state formally commits itself to a treaty, in most
countries via a majority vote by its parliament.
Direct effect: a major legal principle in EU law holding that individuals can directly invoke EU
legislation in cases before national courts.
Supremacy: a major legal principle in EU law holding that if national legislation is in conflict with EU
law, EU law overrides national legislation.
Judicial activism: Constellation when courts in their rulings go beyond a mere passive interpretation
of existing laws and in addition base their rulings on what the judges believe has been the intention
of the lawgiver.
“The early 1960s also were marked by two key rulings of the Court of Justice (CJ) that made a lasting
imprint on the legal order of the Community. In its rulings the Court argued that the new legal
framework of the Community amounted to more than an ordinary international treaty and formed an
integral part of the legal order of the member states. As a result individuals could invoke European
legislation directly (direct effect) and European legislation assumed precedence over national
legislation (supremacy) (see briefing 1.2). Several member states and their national courts initially
objected to the Court’s interpretation of the status of European law. The Court’s rulings were seen by
many as part of a deliberate strategy to increase its own powers through judicial activism. The
decades to come would witness numerous other rulings of the Court that fostered integrative steps.
Member states nevertheless accepted the Court’s ruling, albeit reluctantly.”
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