Een relatief beknopte samenvatting van alle relevante informatie van het vak 'Political Attitudes and Behaviour in Context', afkomstig van zowel de literatuur die gelezen behoorde te worden voor dit vak als wel de colleges die zijn gegeven.
1.1 Hadjar & Beck (2010)
Individual level:
Cohort: different values/political behaviours that develop/increase during lifelong socialisation
process.
Education: cognitive abilities understand political issues easier access to politics more
participation. Higher educated vote.
Gender: women expected to be non-voters more often than men.
Political efficacy: lack of efficacy non-voter.
o Internal efficacy: individual competences, skills & resources to deal with politics.
o External efficacy: individual perception that political institutions are responsive to one’s
attempt to exert political influence.
Political interest: Interest involvement political activities more likely to vote.
Trust: part of evaluation of political system on whether political objects are performing in accordance
with normative expectations of public. Trust political system responding to voting behaviour
vote.
Satisfaction with political institutions & politicians: highly satisfied with government & political
system voting as ‘civic duty’ less likely non-voter.
Context:
Compulsory voting: increases voter turnout by enforcement or internalisation.
Disproportionality factor: disproportionate votes not same impact. Party that wins gets all votes.
Influences vote impact & internal political efficacy.
Maturity of democracy: democratic experience stimulation of political learning process more
internal political efficacy voting.
Direct democracy: amount of direct influence citizens have in political field civic engagement,
political trust & political mobilisation.
Mechanisms:
Sanctions: when you do not vote sanctions forces people to vote less non-voters.
Internalisation/internal efficacy: internalisation of idea that voting is normal thing to do. Less internal
efficacy not internalised to voting is effective less inclined to vote. Faith that people understand
political field voting.
Vote impact: impact of vote stimulating. Less impact less inclined to vote.
Civic engagement: educative effect more voting.
Political trust: involved in politics better understanding more trust more voting.
Political mobilisation: more active participants in political field more voting.
PAB: Non-voting.
1.2 Van der Meer & Hakhverdian (2017)
Context:
Corruption (process regime): undermines efficiency & effectiveness of national politics lack of
accountability/responsiveness less trust.
Economic performances (performance incumbents): Democratic process accounts go beyond
discontent with decisions/outcomes, tap more deep-rooted perceptions about how democracy works.
Trust evaluation higher trust in context of institutional quality.
Mechanisms:
Government does well: subjective evaluation of relationship between subject & object determines
whether citizens develop political trust. Diffuse vs. specific support trust in regime, scepticism in
governing institutions/actors. Trust evaluative good performance in terms of substantive policy
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, outcomes higher trust. Based on subjective evaluations of economy rather than objective
performances.
Political efficacy
o Effect of corruption depends on salience of norm that public sector should be clean of
corruption. Education has norm-inducing function: higher educated more likely to be morally
troubled by lacking institutional quality than lower educated. Corruption larger impact on
political trust of higher educated than lower educated.
o Cognitive accounts of trust emphasis on informed assessment. Education as precondition
to evaluate politics cognitively accuracy-inducing function. Higher educated necessary
skills to judge political institutions on specific, objective criteria (e.g. performance/process)
rather than on general images.
PAB: Political trust.
1.3 Van der Meer, Van Deth & Scheepers (2009)
Context:
Consensualism vs. Majoritarian
Majoritarian: ruled by majority without countervailing powers. Emphasis on accountability power
in hands of one executive power know who to blame incentive political action. Consensualism:
based on coalition governments, division of power & minority vetoes. Emphasis on voice.
Compulsory voting: making it mandatory to vote.
Mechanisms:
Voice: external political efficacy shared political power between authorities possibilities to all
citizens to get opinions heard stimulates participation. Linked to civic voluntarism model all
voices valuable & shared resources to all citizens.
Compromise vs. accountability: accountability (majority) power disproportionality in hands of one
executive power people know who is responsible/who to blame raising voice more impact
winner takes all more incentives to participate. Finding a compromise (consensualism) voice will
not fully be heard since it will be compromised with other ideas less incentives to participate.
Internalisation (spill over): internalisation of thought that voting is normal thing to do.
PAB: Political participation.
General incentives theory: citizens motivated by benefits of outcomes & process of participation.
Extremists (left & right): stronger incentives to defend/change status quo more likely to participate.
Left: change society more incentives more likely to participate. Also: postmaterialist intrinsic
motivation to vote expected satisfaction derived from participation (process incentives).
Ideological distance citizen vs. government: lack of congruence people less satisfied with
government incentive to participate think that their vote can make a difference no political
apathy (exit) but political action (voice).
Civic voluntarism theory: explain political action via social & economic resources.
Conventional modes: within system of representational government (voting, campaigns).
Unconventional modes: outside representational system (protests, boycotts). Left-wing desire to
change system more likely to participate politically in unconventional modes.
Equity fairness theory: relative deprivation as source of political action.
Relative deprivation (bigger gap between expectation & outcome) frustration/stronger incentive
aggressive political action. Deprived citizens more likely to participate unconventionally. More
important whether one perceives oneself as winner or loser.
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, 1.4 Vráblíková (2013)
Context:
Territorial & horizontal decentralisation of state institutions: decentralisation enhances individual
non-electoral participation (NEP) more access points to influence politics & increases opportunities
for citizens to have impact on decision making.
1. Territorial decentralisation: institutional dispersion of responsibilities & power among local,
regional, national authorities)
2. Horizontal separation of power among national institutions: independent state institutions
like legislature, president, judiciary can veto each other.
Decentralisation independent power sources acting as mutual monitors represent
different constituencies/agendas conflict/competition among political actors compete
to secure best outcome provides incentives for citizens to become engaged in non-
electoral politics.
Central: refuse to contemplate change from outside & de-central: do not have capacity to
enforce extensive policy change, but still some input in policy making process political
battles never definitely won or lost decisions may be reversed.
Internal decentralisation (number of parties): should increase citizen activism reflects degree of
separation with horizontal institutions (power sharing mechanism). Causal mechanism based on
inclusiveness & cooperation rather than competition. Need to form coalition governments results in
interdependence among parties & shared responsibilities.
Mechanisms:
Access points: Decentralised multiple power centres more weaknesses & increases number of
access point for participation greater chance that at least one player will react positively to citizens
activists’ demands.
Higher chance of successful influence (motivation): Decentralised multiple power centres
decision-making less decisive/slower, more weaknesses & increases number of access point for
participation more veto-players greater chance that at least one player will react positively to
citizens activists’ demands participants hope to be successful with demands (veto player
mechanism) signal to citizens 1) they have more options & access points for influencing politics, 2)
they have higher chance of being successful if they decide to participate necessary incentives for
mobilising actors to undertake mobilisation & recruitment through social networks.
Shared responsibility/cooperation/consensus among political actors: inclusiveness & cooperation
need to form coalition governments multiple views will be considered.
PAB: Non-Electoral Participation (NEP).
Political Opportunity Structure (POS): formal & informal features of state & politics that shape individual
incentives for increased activism beyond elections. Open POS citizen activism increase. Closed POS
decrease activism.
Open POS characterised by power decentralisation impact citizen activism. Open POS more
access points to decision making prospects of exercising influence key actors motivated to
mobilise citizens to engage in NEP.
Type of POS also indirectly determines level of citizen mobilisation for NEP. Level of NEP determined
by mobilising activities of key actors with political interest. Open POS & decentralised key actors
employ social networks to mobilise individual participants use POS to their advantage.
Social network: membership of voluntary groups & political discussions both important channels for
political mobilisation. Citizens in network more likely to obtain political information & receive requests for
participation decrease costs of participation. For mobilising actors: citizens in social networks more
available/easily targetable. Mobilising activities of social groups as bridge linking political context & individual
behaviour. Mobilisation includes number of strategies: from spreading awareness about reasons for activism to
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