Samenvatting
Summary Parties and Governments in Global Times - Literature
- Instelling
- Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (EUR)
Een samenvatting van alle literatuur van het vak 'Parties and Governments in Global Times'.
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Summary Literature – Parties andGovernments in Global Times
1.1 Hellwig, T., & Samuels, D. (2007). Voting in open economies
the electoral consequences of globalisation. Comparative
Political Studies, 40(3), pp. 283-306.
Economic globalisation increase global trade & capital flows consequences for political & social
life. Belief that governments cannot control globalisation voter scepticism. Others believe that
policy makers have relevance, also in globalisation era. Differences in perceived accountability.
This article: examine how economic globalisation affects electoral impact/consequences &
whether and to what extent people hold their governments accountable.
Economic Globalisation and Electoral Accountability
Convergence hypothesis: economic globalisation states compete for capital investment
national policies converge spending cuts/lower taxes/balanced budgets/weakening of
redistributive capacity uncertain future for independent national policies.
Divergence hypothesis: due to variety of domestic factors (history institutions/partisanship)
national policy makers maintain room to manoeuvre in global economy.
The Responsibility Consequences of Economic Globalisation:
Hypotheses
Retrospective voting: voters use information about national economic performance to evaluate
incumbent governments. Voters believe that politicians’ actions can affect their wellbeing. State
broad responsibility in macroeconomic policy responsibility for economic growth & distribution
voters hold governments accountable for economic performance.
Economic openness may impact on voters’ perception of politicians’ competence as economic
managers & on their propensity to hold these politicians accountable for national economic
performance. Voters respond to signals of increased national interdependence by adjusting their
beliefs about politicians’ ability to influence the economy. If citizens believe that globalisation
reduces policy maker’s influence over economy less likely to reward/punish politicians for
economic performance.
Strategic behaviour of elites may also influence voters’ scepticism. Politicians seek to claim credit for
success & avoid blame for failure. Closed economy difficult to escape blame. Globalisation/open
economies provides tool to blame poor economic performance on factors beyond their control
more incentives to shift blame voters greater incentives to believe them perceptions that
governments are less competent to shape economic outcomes.
Government constraint hypothesis: voters’ beliefs that globalisation constraints politicians. Greater
exposure to the world economy reduces electoral accountability in the world’s democracies.
However: 1) continued relevance of autonomous national policy making even under globalisation
governments range of tools for pursuing partisan strategies for growth no difference between
open/closed economies, 2) sophisticated voters able to separate share of economic performance of
external forces from performance attributable to national governments.
,Government competence hypothesis: continued government capacity to influence policy under
globalisation. Greater exposure to the world economy either has no effect on or enhances electoral
accountability in the world’s democracies.
1.2 Marshall, J., & Fisher, S. D. (2015). Compensation or
Constraint? How different dimensions of economic globalisation
affect government spending and electoral turnout. British
Journal of Political Science, 45(2), pp. 353-389.
Economic globalisation industrialised democracies increasingly economically interdependent
country less able to control economic conditions matters less who controls government
declining political participation lower voter turnout.
1) Constraint hypothesis:
Globalisation of ownership: direct & portfolio investment reduces turnout by constraining
domestic policy.
Globalisation of trade: policy constraints less sensitive because trade flows are less mobile &
sensitive to government policy & less consequential for domestic economy.
2) Compensation hypothesis: governments have recognised social costs of globalisation & have
compensated globalisation’s losers by increasing spending on social programmes. Economic
globalisation rise in government social spending importance of distributive politics
encourage higher turnout.
This article: focus on variation in turnout within countries.
Theory and Previous Research
Economic globalisation: process of integration into global markets that is facilitated by reductions in
transaction costs. Constitutes threat of economic competition & dependence on foreign markets.
Two mechanisms through which economic globalisation could affect turnout:
1. Constraint hypothesis: globalisation decreases turnout by reducing perceptions of
government efficacy or polarisation in the party system.
2. Compensation hypothesis: governments compensate globalisation’s losers for the social
costs of globalisation in the form of public spending raises turnout by increasing role of
government & importance attached to voting.
Could operate simultaneously, but: article constraint mechanism dominant (particularly in
case of foreign ownership of capital).
Economic Globalisation as a Constraint
Macroeconomic pressures
Economic integration restricted range of viable options in certain domestic policy due to
enhanced influence of market on domestic economy. Foreign corporations/investors not accountable
to domestic government & its objectives. Domestic equivalents less hindered by government
decisions as operations can be focussed abroad.
Governments emphasise macroeconomic outcomes (voters care & seeking future election)
constraint theory: economic globalisation restricts economic policy-making options, engendering
race to the bottom convergence across states competing for fixed supply of internationally mobile
capital.
, Expectation that government will not interfere with market cycle perpetuated. Pressure on
left-wing parties forces parties to give up ground as party system converges.
International markets pervade domestic economy anti-market government intervention
costlier as economic success increasingly depends on non-withdrawal of foreign capital & trade
relations that sustain macroeconomic performance & domestic consumption patterns narrower
set of policy options through loss of de facto government efficacy.
Several policy domains particularly constrained by economic globalisation:
1. Pressure to remain competitive by reducing tax burden on mobile firms, avoid high taxation.
2. Pressure on industrial, product market, labour market & trade regulations that affect costs of
conducting business.
3. Constraints on (fiscal & monetary) economic policy. International capital markets can
constrain such policies by threat of capital flight.
4. Constraints on social policy options. Many types of governments spending downward
pressure to minimise crowding out of private investment.
Deciding to turn out
Effect of globalisation on turnout:
1) Individual’s utility from voting is function of probability that one can influence outcome of
election. Expected utility gained from successfully influencing election & selective incentives (costs &
sense of duty) derived from voting. Benefits > costs. If government’s perceived efficacy (scope for
decision making & control of economy) falls less benefits less likely to vote (ceteris paribus).
Thus: aggregate turnout should decline as expected benefits of voting decline as economic
globalisation constraints governments.
2) Policy differences become smaller actors allocate fewer resources to election campaigns
lower turnout. Globalisation reduces perceived benefits to group leaders of providing selective
incentives for members to turn out & decrease importance of election & level of disagreement.
3) Globalisation reduces differences between groups that arise from different policies & reduces
discussion within groups as politics becomes less salient reduces turnout in social network models
that emphasise social approval.
Constraint theory assumes that citizens feel domestic elections are useless as means of
influencing development of globalisation or choose not to use vote in this way or have not
considered relationship between globalisation & government policy.
Evidence for the mechanisms underpinning the constraint hypothesis
Constraints on government might affect turnout economic globalisation reduces turnout:
1. Indirectly by constraining parties & what they offer voters. Benefits from voting depending
on extent to which economic outcomes constrain party policy preferences once it attains
office. More economic globalisation country less polarised. Voters sensitive to differences
between parties tend to prefer parties ideologically close. Voters who see little difference
between parties less likely to vote.
2. Directly through citizens’ own perceptions of their government’s room to manoeuvre.
Globalisation affects citizens’ economic interests and governments’ room to manoeuvre.
Attitudes toward globalisation sensitive to individual consumption/skills/income. Citizens
aware of globalisation, believe it has consequences for them & think that economic
outcomes in their country depend on global economy. Economic globalisation voters feel
that governments have less power to influence economic outcomes objective/subjective
economic performance weak predictor of support for incumbent government in more
, globalised countries. Also: will not hold government accountable for economic outcomes.
Voting based on non-economic issues.
Globalisation reduces clarity of government responsibility for outcomes.
The Compensation Hypothesis
Compensation hypothesis: governments respond to public demand for insurance & institute policies
that corrects negatives associated with globalisation – principally include job insecurity in threatened
sectors, greater economic volatility & rises in income inequality. Negative effects concentrated in
unskilled labour in industrialised countries. Compensation in variety of policy domains – e.g. welfare
spending. Government spending increases elections more salient more competition among
voters/group leaders with different preferences over compensation distributional conflict could
stimulate turnout among winners or loser from increased spending.
Thus: Economic globalisation increase government spending increase electoral turnout.
Dimensions of Globalisation: Ownership and Trade
Different dimensions of economic globalisation may not work equally through constraint &
compensation mechanisms.
This article: consider how two dimensions of economic globalisation differentially affect
economic/ political actors & voters.
1. Globalisation of ownership / foreign ownership of capital.
2. Globalisation of trade / increasing trade dependence.
Differing flexibility of transactions
Economic flows vary in potential mobility & sensitivity to changing political & economic contexts.
Capital more mobile/sensitive to changes in government policy than international trade more
powerful constraint on politicians. Market quick responds to economies, trading patterns change
slowly.
Capital responds more quickly to changes in government policy than international trade
voters/ government more concerned/constrained by risks/threats of capital mobility.
Differing economic and political impacts
Implications different dimensions of globalisation for macroeconomic performance. Foreign capital
additional investment & technological transfer economic growth. Withdrawal of foreign capital
entails considerable economic costs, increases with dependence on foreign capital. Swift capital flight
can significantly harm voters.
Economies open to trade grow faster. Long-run effects uncertain. Threat of losing trade less likely
to constrain governments than foreign capital. However: compensatory policies can mitigate
negative voter responses to trade negative consequences of trade can become political issues
incentives for voters to turnout.
Voters sensitive to constraints on government & economic policy polarisation declined
measures of globalisation of ownership stronger negative effects on turnout than international trade.
Most flexible forms of ownership most powerful constraints on government reduce turnout the
most.
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