TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: Thinking And Deciding .................................................................................................................. 3
CHAPTER 2: What Is Decision Making? ............................................................................................................ 8
CHAPTER 3: A General Framework for Judgement .......................................................................................... 12
Serrano and Feldman (2013), Ch. 2, Sections 1-2 and Section 4 ....................................................................... 16
Perloff (2012), Sections 17.0-2 (pp. 595 – 605) ............................................................................................... 19
CHAPTER 4: The Fundamental Judgment Strategy; Anchoring and Adjustment ................................................ 21
CHAPTER 5: Judging Heuristically .................................................................................................................. 23
CHAPTER 6: Explanation-Based Judgements .................................................................................................. 27
CHAPTER 7: Chance and Cause ...................................................................................................................... 31
CHAPTER 8: Thinking Rationally About Uncertainty ........................................................................................ 33
CHAPTER 9: Evaluating Consequences: Fundamental Preferences ................................................................... 38
CHAPTER 10: From preferences to choices ..................................................................................................... 42
CHAPTER 12: A Descriptive Decision Theory ................................................................................................... 45
Prospect Theory in The Wild .......................................................................................................................... 50
CHAPTER 13: What Is Next? .......................................................................................................................... 55
Debiasing Through Law ................................................................................................................................ 59
P. Zak – Moral Markets ................................................................................................................................. 68
FALK & N. SZECH – MORALS AND MARKETS ................................................................................................... 73
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, Preface
There’s discrepancy between basic principles of rationality and actual behaviour in making decisions. This
discrepancy is due not to random errors or mistakes but to automatic and deliberate thought processes that
influence how decision problems are conceptualized and how future possibilities in life are evaluated
àthinking processes are limited in systematic ways.
The theme of limited cognitive capacity conflicts with our preconceptions about how
smart we are. While many of us accept the idea that our unconscious natures may interfere with our
reasoning, the idea that thinking per se is a fundamentally flawed and limited process is an unpleasant one.
Moreover, many people reject the view that thinking is flawed on the grounds that our dominant-species
status on this planet is related to our cerebral capacity and evidenced by our technologically advanced
civilizations. This common-sense
argument is flawed in several respects:
1. In evolution, successful animals need not be optimal when compared with some criterion of optimality,
but only “one-up” on competing animals and their forebears. If indeed the human cerebral cortex is
responsible for our ascendance over competing species, that does not imply it is the optimal thinking
device, just a slightly better one.
2. Humans’ technological development does not attest to the brilliance of our thinking as individual human
beings. Rather, it is evidence for the human ability to communicate knowledge, within and across
generations. Such borrowing involves recognizing what is useful. In contrast, when faced with an important
decision, we are often “on our own”.
There’s the misconception that decision making is important simply because of the vastness of the choices
with which we as individuals and as a species are faced today in the modern world. But despite the larger
set of options available to us than to our ancestors, our decisions are probably not more difficult than were
theirs. We adapt to whatever decisions must be made and to their consequences. Such adaptation is both a
blessing and a curse.
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, CHAPTER 1: THINKING AND DECIDING
1.1 Decision Making is a Skill
Humans’ ancestors in the past were concerned with finding food and a safe place to live. Their success in
accomplishing these “survival tasks” arose not due to distinctively acute senses or especially powerful
physical capacities. We dominate this planet today because of our distinctive capacity for good decision
making. Human beings have an exceptional ability to choose appropriate means to achieve their ends.
In general, diverse people in very different situations often think about their decision in the same way
àcommon set of cognitive skills that are reflected in similar decision habits, as well as common set of
limitations.
Our decision-making capacities are not simply “wired in,” following some evolutionary design. Choosing
wisely is a learned skill, which can be improved with experience à Ordinary skills can be modified to cope
effectively with the situation by removing a bias.
1.2 Thinking: Automatic and Controlled
What is thinking? It is the creation of mental representations of what is not in the immediate environment.
Sir Frederick Bartlett, whose work 50 years ago helped create much of cognitive psychology, defined thinking
as the skill of “filling gaps in evidence” (1958). Thinking is probably best conceived of as an extension of
perception—an extension that allows us to fill in the gaps in the picture of the environment painted in our
minds by our perceptual systems, and to infer causal relationships and other important “affordances” of
those environments.
There are basically two types of thought processes: automatic and controlled. Pure association is the
simplest type of automatic thinking. Something in the environment “brings an idea to mind,” or one idea
suggests another, or a memory. Much of our thinking is associational. At the other extreme is controlled
thought, in which we deliberately hypothesize a class of objects or experiences and then view our
experiences in terms of these hypothetical possibilities. Controlled thought is “what if” thinking. The French
psychologist Jean Piaget defined such thinking as “formal,” in which “reality is viewed as secondary to
possibility.” Other types of controlled thinking are visual imagination, creation, and scenario building.
The prototype of automatic thinking is the thinking involved when we drive a car. Our thought processes are
so automatic that we are usually unaware of them. When automatic thinking occurs in less mundane areas,
it is often termed intuition.
In contrast, a prototype of controlled thought is scientific reasoning. While the original ideas may arise
intuitively, they are subjected to rigorous investigation by consideration of alternative explanations of the
phenomena the ideas seem to explain. Plausible explanations are considered, and most of them are
systematically eliminated by observation, logical reasoning, or experimentation.
Occasionally, the degree to which thinking is automatic rather than controlled is not clear until the process
is examined carefully. The situation is made more complicated by the fact that any significant intellectual
achievement is a mixture of both automatic and controlled thought processes.
è we often think in automatic ways when making judgments and choices. These automatic thinking
processes can be described by certain psychological rules, and they can systematically lead us to make
poorer judgments and choices than we would by thinking in a more controlled manner about our decisions.
However, deliberate, controlled thought is not always better than intuitive thought.
1.3 The Computational Model of the Mind
A new field has emerged, named cognitive science, with a new conceptual paradigm for theorizing about
human thought and behavior. The computational model of the mind is based on the assumption that the
essence of thinking can be captured by describing what the brain does as manipulating symbols.
The computational model is obviously inspired by an analogy between the computing machine and the
computing brain. The two devices, brains and computers, perform similar functions, relating input
information to output information (or actions) in a flexible manner, but their internal structures are quite
different.
The central concept in the notion of a computational model is the manipulation of symbolic information: for
example, with an arithmetic operation, information goes into your brain through the eyes (or another sense
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, organ); it is converted to some kind of internal, symbolic code, that retains the essential information from
the digits; and then we perform mental operations to compare, manipulate, and transform that information,
including combining the information from the external problem with our knowledge of arithmetic facts and
algorithms. When we believe we have achieved the goal, we respond to report the answer. The “flexibility”
of thought processes is illustrated by the differences in the many possible sequences of thought, which solve
the same problem and produce the same final response.
The “cognitive revolution” in psychology really got under way (in the 1960s) when the first computer
programming languages were applied to the task of summarizing and mimicking the mental operations of
people performing intellectual tasks. Many aspects of human thinking, including judgment and decision
making, can be captured with computational models. The essential parts of these models are symbols (like
a theoretical representation of the idea of “yellow,” or “11”) and operations that compare, combine, and
record (in memory) the symbols. One of the fundamental and ongoing research projects in cognitive science
is to conduct an analysis of the contents of these representations, to describe the natural “mentalese” in
which we think and to relate it to the biological substrate in which it must be implemented.
The other half of the cognitive theory is a description of the elementary information processes that operate
on the representations to store them, compare them, and transform them in productive thought. Most of
these operations are unconscious. Although we are aware of some aspects of cognitive processing, most of
the cognitive system is unconscious.
à The first insight from cognitive science is that we can think of intellectual achievements, like judging and
deciding, as computation and that computation can be broken down into symbolic representations and
operations on those representations. In addition, both automatic and controlled modes of thinking can be
modelled as computations in this sense.
à Another insight from cognitive science concerns the nature of the
mechanism (the brain) that performs the computations. Since 1970, there
has been increasing consensus on the nature of the “cognitive architecture”
of the human mind. The early outlines of the cognitive system included three
kinds of memory stores: sensory input buffers that hold and transform
incoming sensory information over a span of a few seconds; a limited short-
term working memory where most of conscious thinking occurs; and a
capacious long-term memory where we store concepts, etc. These models
were limited in their ability to describe more complex inference, judgment,
and decision behaviors. Modern conceptions distinguish between several
more processing modules and memory buffers, all linked to a central working
memory.
In the multi-module model, there are input and output modules, which
encode information from each sensory system (relying on one or more memory buffers) and generate motor
responses. A Working Memory is the central hub of the system, and it comprises a central executive
processor, a goal stack that organizes processing, and at least two short-term memory buffers that hold
visual and verbal information that is currently in use. The other major part of the system is a Long-Term
Memory that contains all information including procedures for thinking and deciding. The details of this
particular modular division of labor are justified by both behavioral results and studies of brain functions.
Two properties of the memory stores will play major roles in the explanation for judgment and decision-
making phenomena.
1) The limited capacity of Working Memory will be used to explain some departures from optimal, rational
performance. March and Simon (1958) introduced the concept of bounded rationality in decision making,
by which they meant approximately optimal behavior, where the primary explanation for departures
from optimal is that we simply don’t have the capacity to compute the optimal solutions because our
working memory imposes limits on how much information we can use.
2) Many facts and procedures have been learned and stored in long-term memory à they play a role in
decision making and judging.
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