Aline Hunink
5066360
a.d.c.hunink@students.uu.nl
Assignment 1, Contemporary History
4 December 2020
From the democratic Weimar Republic to
the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler
“Both dictatorship and democracy were essentially new concepts of political rule in
Germany after World War I.”1 With these words, Thomas Mergel introduced the chapter
called Dictatorship and Democracy 1918-1939 in the book ‘The Oxford Handbook of
Modern German History’. The chapter discusses the transformation from the democratic
Weimar Republic into the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler. The following essay discusses the
reason why many European countries degenerated from democracy into dictatorship during
the interwar period. The document will focus on the Weimar Republic as case study and will
examine the extent to which the Treaty of Versailles contributed to the transformation. On the
basis of Mergel’s arguments, academic publications and a primary source, an answer to this
transformation will be provided.
In 1918, the First World War ended after four years of total war. The consequences were not
only the dissolution of empires, but also international and domestic instability. Another result
of the First World War was the Paris Peace Conference in which separate treaties were made
with each of the five defeated states.2 The most infamous one being the Treaty of Versailles.3
The Treaty is also known as the ‘Peace treaty that the Allies in World War I imposed on a
defeated Germany in 1919’.4 Even though the Treaty aimed to bring peace to Europe,5 it also
imposed severe consequences for Germany, including Article 231. The article stated that
Germany had started the First World War and therefore was to blame for it. Moreover, the
Weimar Republic was required to pay unrealistic war reparations.6
It was no surprise that a lot of Germans felt betrayed, angry and most of all humiliated
when their democratic government decided to sign the Peace treaty. Here, one should keep in
mind what Mergel mentioned, “in many countries resentment towards democracy was,
among other reasons, due to the fact that it came from outside. It was a widespread view,
fostered by authoritarian regimes, that democracy did not match the unique character of the
nation in question.”7 Above all, the German army reported that in battle it was not defeated
but stabbed in the back by “perennial home-front scapegoats, the pacifists, Jews, socialists”
1
Thomas Mergel, “Dictatorship and Democracy, 1918-1939,” in The Oxford Handbook of Modern German
History, ed. Helmut W. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1-31.
2
Thomas Noble et al., Western Civilization: Beyond Boundaries. (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning,
2014), 732.
3
Beatrice de Graaf, “Strong leaders, strong states,” Contemporary History 2 (class lecture, Utrecht University,
Utrecht, November 16, 2020).
4
Noble. “World Without Civilization,” 732.
5
Catherine Lu. "’Justice and Moral Regeneration’: Lessons from the Treaty of Versailles." International Studies
Review 4, no. 3 (2002): 3-25
6
Noble. “World Without Civilization,”732.
7
Mergel, “Dictatorship and Democracy, 1918-1939,” 1-31.
1
, and the democratic government.8 This occurrence eventually led to the stab-in-the-back myth
and to the democratic government being portrayed as the “November Criminals”, because
they were the ones who initiated the armistice that marked Germany’s defeat.9
Adolf Hitler made use of these humiliated feelings of the German people. As Hew Strachan
stated: “One reason why Adolf Hitler could appeal to the German people in 1933 was
precisely because many genuinely convinced themselves that they had been wronged in
1919”.10 Mergel labels this factor as ‘opportunism’ and he stated that it absolutely played a
crucial role in winning over the masses to join and support the Nazis.11 An example of such
“opportunism” is that Hitler promised the German people to overcome the ‘humiliation of
Versailles’. In addition, Hitler also promised to restore the German ‘people’.
After he was released from prison, Hitler decided on a different approach to gain
power at the national level. Instead of challenging the existing political system, he would
exploit it.12 In order to achieve his goal, he knew he had to start with mobilizing the masses
which he could only achieve with a lot of support.13 Hitler gained influence by focusing on
matters of tactics instead of policy.14 He called upon nationalism and the events that reflected
negatively on the Weimar Republic. Therefore, it is no surprise that he involved the stab-in-
the-back myth and the “November criminals” many times in his speeches. All the ‘mistakes’
that led to Germany’s defeat Hitler called the “colossal crime”.15 However, Hitler criticized
the people who were responsible for the German defeat as well as Imperial Germany for its
choices before the First World War.16
One of the ways in which Hitler tried to gain support was through propaganda. Once
again, he would call upon nationalism and show that the Nazis were the solution for a united,
strong Germany. Although Mergel does not put a lot of emphasis on the Stock Market Crash
of 1929, it must certainly not be overlooked. After the crash, people longed even more for
stability and security they thought Hitler could provide. Eventually, this led to the “security
paradox” which Professor de Graaf mentioned in her article.17 In this Nazi Election Flyer of
1932, one can read how the German people were manipulated: “[…] Do you believe that
Russia will help? Would it not be better to help ourselves!? For the German proletariat to
help itself? We Nazis help each other. […]” Although the mentioned flyer targets the
communist audience, it provides a thorough perspective of Hitler’s strategy to make use of
nationalism. Moreover, Mergel elaborates on the importance of Hitler’s propaganda in his
article. He states that the propaganda “consisted of a form of political advertisement that told
whomever it addressed what they wanted to hear.” 18
Mergel argues that the Weimar case shows that it takes more than only good laws to make a
democracy work. A certain willingness is necessary in order to apply those laws in a
8
Sally Marks. "Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918–1921." The Journal of
Modern History 85, no. 3 (2013): 632-59.
9
Eberhard Kolb. The Weimar Republic (UK: Penguin Books, 2015, 36.
10
Hew Strachan. The First World War. (UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), 320.
11
Mergel, “Dictatorship and Democracy, 1918-1939,” 1-31.
12
Noble. “Word Without Civilization,” 781.
13
Kolb. “The Weimar Republic,”103.
14
Kolb. “The Weimar Republic, ”104.
15
Klaus Schawbe. "World War I and the Rise of Hitler." Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 79-864.
16
Schwabe. “World War I and the Rise of Hitler,” 876
17
Beatrice de Graaf and Cornel Zwierlein. “Historicizing Security - Entering the Conspiracy Dispositive.”
Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, vol. 38, no. 1 (143), 2013, pp. 46–64.
18
Mergel, “Dictatorship and Democracy, 1918-1939,” 1-31.
2