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Summary Ethiek (Shafer-Landau) H20
- Vak
- Ethiek
- Instelling
- Universiteit Leiden (UL)
Summary of 5 pages for the course Ethiek at UL
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Ethics – Metaethics: The Status of Morality – Chapter 20 – Moral NihilismThere are basically three options when it comes to determining the status of morality.
Morality might be objective. Or it might be relativistic. Finally, morality may simply be a
kind of make-believe, a complex set of rules and recommendations that represents
nothing real. This last option is known as moral nihilism. Moral nihilists join with
relativists in opposing ethical objectivism. Morality is wholly a human creation. But nihilist
are no fans of ethical relativism. Nihilists deny that there are any moral qualities. There
are no moral requirements. Nothing is morally good. Nothing merits praise or blame.
According to nihilists, there is a rigid fact-value distinction, which basically says that
there is a sharp difference between facts and values. Facts exists, values don’t. Facts are
real, values aren’t.
There are two important forms of moral nihilism: the error theory and expressivism.
Error theorists claim that our moral judgments are always mistaken. Expressivists deny
this, while also denying that our moral claims can ever offer an accurate take on reality.
Error Theory
The error theory of morality is built upon certain doubts. It is defined by three essential
claims:
1. There are no moral features in this world.
2. No moral judgments are true (because there are no moral facts).
3. Our sincere moral judgments are try, and always fail, to describe the moral
features of things.
It follows that:
4. There is no moral knowledge.
Error theorists are not launching some small-scale attack on morality. Rather, as they see
it, all moral views are equally bankrupt. The error theory is to morality as atheism is to
religion. Atheists can successfully defend their view only if they can convince us that
there is an error at the heart of religious belief. Likewise, moral error theorists can
vindicate their view only if they can show that there is some fatal flaw at the heart of
morality.
All error theorists have agreed that the core mistake that undermines morality is its
assumption that there are objective moral standards that supply each of us with an
excellent reason for obedience, regardless of what we care about. According to error
theorists, just as religion crucially depends on the supernatural, morality essentially
depends on its being objective and providing us with categorical reasons – reasons that
apply to us regardless of whether acting on them will get us what we want. There are two
substantial points that error theorists must convince us of. First, they must show that
buying into morality really does assume a commitment to moral objectivity and
categorical reasons. Suppose that it does, then this reveals the second burden that error
theorists must shoulder: they must show that at least one of these assumptions is false.
Perhaps they can do that. Let us consider some implications of the error theory.
There are actually two lines of criticism at work here, and both are mistaken. The first we
might call the Argument from Disastrous Results:
1. If widespread acceptance of a view would lead to disastrous results, then that view
is false.
2. Widespread acceptance of the error theory would lead to disastrous results.
3. Therefore, the error theory is false.
We won’t consider premise 2, since that is a matter of opinion and since premise 1 is
definitely false. The truth of a theory does not depend on the results of everyone’s
embracing it. To see this, consider a similar argument against atheism. We cannot
undermine the error theory by arguing that its popular acceptance would lead to the
downfall of civilization – even if it would.
,Some have found premise 1 tempting because they have confused it with a close cousin:
a. If widespread practice of a given action will lead to disastrous results, then that
action is immoral.
But this really is a confusion, since premise 1 speaks of theories and their truth, rather
than actions and their moral status. And in any event, 1a is false, as we saw in an earlier
discussion (celibacy).
Others have confused premise 1 with a more specific version:
b. If widespread acceptance of a moral theory would yield disastrous results, then
that theory is false.
Fortunately, we do not have to settle the matter here, because the error theory is not a
moral theory. Then what is it? In fancy terms, it is a metaphysical theory – a theory
about what the world is truly like, and what really exists. The basic problem with the
Argument from Disastrous Results is that metaphysical theories cannot be tested in the
way that its first premise claims.
Another popular problem objection to the error theory is really targeted at error theorists
themselves. The idea here is that those who reject categorical reasons and the objectivity
of morality are bound to be untrustworthy. Since error theorists are so untrustworthy, the
views they put forth are not to be trusted, either. But this way of thinking is mistaken as
well. Error theorists can care deeply about others, and can be strongly opposed to doing
the things that we traditionally regard as morally wrong. Still, one might argue that error
theorists are not guaranteed to have the sorts of goals that we associate with upright
behavior. And that is true. But then again, such a guarantee fails to hold for many people
who reject the error theory.
All that aside, this kind of criticism does nothing to address the issue of whether the error
theory itself is true. Indeed, it represents a classic kind of fallacy – the ad hominem
attack. When leveling such a critique, one tries to undermine the truth of a position by
criticizing the character of its supporters. The only way to answer it is by doing two
things: first, we need to determine whether error theorists are correct in thinking that
morality really does depend on two assumptions: (i) that it is objective, and (ii) that it
supplies us with reasons to obey it, regardless of our desires. Certainly, subjectivists and
relativists deny these assumptions. And so they will deny the existence of any error, since
they reject the thought that morality depends on claims (i) and (ii).
Expressivism
Expressivism is another family of views that deny the objectivity of morality. Indeed,
Expressivists accept the first two claims that define the error theorist’s point of view:
1. There are no moral features in this world.
2. No moral judgments are true.
Unlike error theorists, however, expressivists think that morality is in pretty good shape.
There is no deep error at the heart of our moral thinking. But how can that be, if 1 and 2
are true?
Simple, expressivists reject the third feature that is essential to error theory:
3. Our sincere moral judgments try (and always fail) to describe the moral feature of
things.
According to expressivists, we are not trying to speak the truth when making moral
judgments. Instead, we are venting our emotions, commanding other to act in certain
ways, or revealing a plan of action.
One of the basic ideas behind expressivism is that moral claims function very differently
from straightforward factual claims. Consider this sentence:
(A) Torture is immoral.
It appears to function just like this sentence:
(B) Water is wet.
, All moral claims seem to assign a moral quality to something or other. But if there aren’t
any such qualities, then aren’t our moral claims always mistaken? Not necessarily. If
expressivism is true, then the similarity between sentences such as (A) and (B) is only
superficial.
The error theorists thinks that our sincere moral claims are always meant to state the
truth, but since there isn’t any moral truth, such claims are all mistaken. The
expressivists, by contrast, thinks that our moral claims are largely all right, since they are
doing what they are intended to do. And what is that? according to expressivists, moral
claims are not in the business of holding up a mirror to the world. Their job is to vent our
feelings, give orders and commands, and express our commitments. Since they manage
to do that just fine, there is no reason to charge them with error. Expressivists want a way
to have confidence in morality while rejecting ethical objectivity. The biggest problem for
relativism and subjectivism is that these vies either generate contradictions or are unable
to explain moral disagreement. Expressivists handle both problems with ease. If
expressivists are right, no moral claim is either true or false. And so moral contradictions
disappear. Expressivists see moral disagreement as a clash of emotions or personal
commitments. Expressivists cannot escape the worry about moral equivalence, however.
There are further worries. Three seem to be especially serious.
How Is It Possible to Argue Logically about Morality?
If, as expressivists say, moral claims cannot be true, then this makes it very difficult to
understand how moral argument is possible. Logical argumentation is truth preserving – a
logically valid argument is defined as one whose conclusion must be true, provided that
its premises are true. If moral claims cannot be true, then how could they possibly be
used to support other claims? To see the worry here, consider this argument:
1. All actions that dehumanize people are immoral.
2. Torture dehumanizes people.
3. Therefore, torture is immoral.
The argument appears to be logically perfect. If you accepted both premises, you would
have to accept the conclusion. This argument has the very same logical structure as a
philosophical classic:
1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
And everyone admits that this argument is logically valid.
These arguments seem to be identical. But expressivists cannot accept this natural
explanation, since they deny that moral claims can be true. Look at the first argument. If
premise 1 really means:
1a. Dehumanizing actions – yecchhh! Or
1b. Don’t dehumanize people!
Then there is no way that this premise can be used to logically support any conclusion.
But is seems clear that it is being used in precisely this way. Indeed, logical moral
argumentation seems like a real possibility – we do it all the time. Expressivism does not
seem able to explain this.
Expressivism and Amoralists
An amoralist is someone who sincerely makes moral claims, but is entirely unmoved by
them. Such people create a serious problem for expressivism. Expressivists warn us not to
be fooled by the superficial similarity between factual claims (water is wet) and moral
ones (torture is immoral). Moral claims merely express our feelings. Indeed, that is how
the expressivists explains why moral judgments so reliably motivate us.
Indeed, expressivism faces the same problem that psychological egoism does. In the face
of evidence that supports the existence of altruism, egoists insist that people must be
either deceiving themselves or lying to us about their motivations. Expressivists have to
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