Bestuurskunde (Public Administration)/MISOC: Summary of reading material and
lectures 3.4 - Global & European Governance
Reader’s note: the stuff we need to know for the exam is extremely diffused in this course,
being split up into readings, lectures, video’s, et cetera. Where possible, I have combined
these. So the summary of a specific chapter may also contain the contents of a related
lecture or video, if these do not have their own headings for any specific module. Rest
assured that it’s all here!
Part 1: Introductions and States
1) Video 1: Intro
The international system of states1 as we know it started with 1648’s Peace of Westphalia,
after the end of the Thirty Years War (better known in the Netherlands as the Eighty Years
War against Spain), after which states agreed not to meddle in each other's internal affairs,
essentially leading to geographically bound exclusive sovereignty: both on the internal (the
state decides what happens within its borders) and the external level (no one interferes in
another’s borders, except if rulers permit this). States persisted over time, becoming more
ingrained in the lives of their citizens. These states survived over empires or leagues, as the
latter lacked proper written codes, rules and laws, fixed borders or internal hierarchies. This
contributed to a lack of predictability: a necessity for healthy trade. In the traditional view of
internal politics, we see states as single actors in world politics.
As states are the highest decision-makers on the international level, anarchy represents not
a complete lack of order, but the lack of a true higher authority above the states. Because of
this, anarchy forms the basic assumption of the study of international governance: on the
international level, there is no higher authority above the states-as-actors, and there is no
police-like figure obligated with saving a state when it is in danger. This is referred to as the
911-problem: in world politics, states cannot ‘call 911’ (a higher authority) to seek protection
or mitigate risks.
2) Video 2: Game Theory in international relations
When talking about game theory, we are talking about situations with two or more rational
and informed actors, choosing from a selection of strategies based on their (existing and
transitive2) preferences towards a solution. Only two-player two-strategies games are
discussed. In game theory, players seek the best response: the strategy that maximizes an
actor’s payoff, given their belief about rival strategies. Then, a Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a
set of strategies such that no player can get a higher payoff by choosing a different strategy.
NE may or may not be Pareto-Optimum (PO), referring to a situation where no player can
get a higher payoff without making another worse off. In a two-player interaction, you can
find the NE by following two steps:
1
Based on the Montevideo convention, states in this course are defined as having a permanent
population, defined territories/government and a capacity for having relations with other states.
2
If you prefer A over B and B over C, you prefer A over C.
, 1. Determine each player’s best response for any possible strategy by the other player.
Sometimes there is a dominant strategy, which is the best possible choice against
any possible opposing strategy.3
2. A NE is a pair of strategies (a cell) that are the best responses for both players.
In the above prisoner’s dilemma - a cooperation game - dominant strategies exist for both
players, and therefore the non-PO NE is found in the cell (P, P). For both players, P is the
preferable strategy, regardless of whether their opponent would play P or NP. One PO can
be found at (NP, NP). Because the PO differs from the NE, in repeated interactions players
in a prisoner's dilemma become less likely to choose the NE. In international relations, this is
referred to as the shadow of the future: states behave differently when repeated
interactions are expected in anticipation of punishment following perceived misconduct.
What the prisoner’s dilemma tells us about international politics is that states may be
motivated to defect from their agreements if they can gain unilateral benefit from it in relation
to possible punishments following defection (sanctions, lack of trust, etc). Cooperation risks
cheating, as benefits from cheating are higher than the benefits for cooperating. An example
of this in internal relations is the security dilemma: a situation where one party heightening
security measures can lead to an escalation or conflict with one or more other parties,
producing an outcome which no party truly desires. Each party keeps heightening security
due to the fear of being exploited, without being able to seek protection from a higher
authority (due to anarchy). After all, it may be difficult to interpret the actions of other states
(dilemma of interpretation), but also how to decide how to react to these actions (dilemma of
response.
A second type of game is the coordination game (with the above example being referred to
as the battle of the sexes), in which a player earns a higher payoff when they select the
same strategy as the other player, leading to two NE’s at (Prize Fight, Prize Fight) and
(Ballet, Ballet). As such, the problem in this game is not the risk of defection, but the process
3
If both players have a dominant strategy, then that set of strategies is always a Nash Equilibrium.
,of communicating to find the mutual best decision. It may be difficult to find a common
course, but parties should have no difficulties sticking to a decision. Cooperation may be
induced, for example, through threats, bribes, package deals or pre-emptive action.
3) Frieden, Lake & Schultz (2012): Understanding interests and interactions
We study international relations to gain insight into why states make certain choices leading
to certain outcomes. To help in this, this chapter takes a closer look at interests and
interactions, two core concepts in thinking analytically about world politics.
Interests are what actors want to achieve through political action (or the preferences of
actors over possible outcomes of their political choices), and therefore are the fundamental
building blocks of politics. Interests may be individual or collective, and can be related to
power and security, economical and material welfare or ideological goals. Explanations of
international political events begin by specifying the relevant actors and their interests. In
the states-as-actor view of world politics, these actors are often states and governments,
and it is often assumed that these operate based on national interests, such as the
accumulation of power and national security. Of course, there is no fixed set of actors in
international relations, and the concept of actor at its core is analytical: the actions of
president Bush in the Iraq War can be seen as choices made by the USA’s head of state
seeking increase of national security, but also as the actions of a president seeking
reelection through the support of oil companies. This shows how there are more actors than
just states, with examples being:
● Politicians pursuing reelection/retention of office and goals relating to ideology or
policy.
● Businesses and industries pursuing profit and wealth.
● Bureaucracies (departments and ministries) pursuing budget maximization, influence
and policy goals.
● International organizations, similar to domestic bureaucracies and reflecting the
interests of member states according to voting power.
● NGO’s pursuing goals related to (e.g.) norms, ideology, policy, human rights, religion
or the environment.
Political outcomes depend on (strategic) interactions: the ways in which the choices of two
or more actors combine. In interactions, actors have to anticipate the choices of others, and
take these into account in their own strategy. In studies of these interactions, we assume
actors try to follow a best response strategy, behaving in order to produce a desired result
and adopting strategies to do so, based on their beliefs on the interests and likely actions of
other actors. Interactions often occur through cooperation: a type of interaction involving
actors working together to achieve a preferred outcome in such a way that at least one actor
is better off without making others worse off.4 Many factors influence the success or failure of
such (cooperative) interactions:
● Individual interests may cause actors to defect from the collective goal. This may
occur in cases of collaboration such as the prisoner’s dilemma: cooperative
4
In game theory, the range of strategies that lead to such situations is referred to as the Parerto
frontier.
, interactions in which actors gain from working together, but have incentives not to
comply with some or any agreements.
○ In the provision of public goods, collective action problems such as the
free-rider syndrome may occur. On the global scale, such problems can occur
as no international authority can mandate a state's contribution towards public
goods.
● A lack of coordination: cooperative interactions in which actors may benefit from
making the same choices. The battle of the sexes outlines problems which can occur
in this form of interaction.
● It is easier for a smaller group of actors to cooperate. The relative size of actors plays
a role as well.
● Repeated interactions and issue linkage (where cooperation on one issue causes
interactions on another) cause more trust between actors, leading to easier
cooperation. After all, deviant behavior may be punished or sanctioned in later
interactions.
● The availability of information, while the lack thereof leads to uncertainty and
misperceptions.
Whereas cooperation indicates the possibility of mutual gain, bargaining is a type of
interaction involving the distribution of fixed value. If one actor gets more, the other gets less.
In such zero-sum games (wars are a good practical example), outcomes depend on what
happens if the reversion outcome is reached: the situation where no agreement is reached.
Actors derive power from making the consequences of the reversion outcome less attractive
for the other side. The more powerful side in bargaining, then, is the side that can better
endure or is more content with a possible reversion outcome. Strategies for actors to
exercise power in bargaining are:
● Coercion: the threat or imposition on costs on actors to reduce the attractiveness of
the reversion outcome and thus change their behavior, for example through military
force, economic sanctions or embargoes.
● Making sure they have (more or equally attractive) alternatives, or outside options
to the actor being bargained with. Being able to walk away from the table adds to
one’s power.
● Having agenda-setting power allows an actor to make the first move, a huge
advantage in securing a favorable bargain. The first move sets the choices available
to others.
4) Spruyt (2002): The origins, development and possible decline of the modern state
Some modern states became subject to dynamics that brought them together in larger
regional associations, such as the European Union, whereas others, such as the Soviet
Union, fell prey to forces that pulled them apart. At the same time, what Spruyt calls
quasi-states exist as international legal entities with recognized domestic sovereignty, yet
lack the means modern states have to provide welfare and security to their citizens.
Premodern states were created once leaders gained the ability to govern over people who
were not part of their own family or tribe, forming capstone governments of elites dispersed
throughout their territory. Such states ran wide but not deep, with society remaining relatively
untouched. As institutional capacities and local forms of security grew, modern nation-states
