BOOK CHAPTERS SUMMARY
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Characteristics of social dilemmas
Apply to wide range of real world problems;
Exist within dyads, small groups and society;
Deal with issues relevant to a large number of disciplines;
Definition social dilemma: A situation in which:
Each decision maker has a dominant strategy dictating non-cooperation.
If all choose this dominant strategy, all end up worse off than if all had
cooperated (deficient equilibrium).
Other characteristics:
Conflict between self-interest and collective interest.
Temporal dimension:
o Immediate / short term.
o Delayed / long term.
Social traps -> resource dilemmas
Social fences -> public goods dilemmas
Types:
Prisoners dilemma = situation in which each person has the dominant
strategy to defect, but when both defect the suboptimal equilibrium is
achieved. When both cooperate, the best outcome is achieved.
Chicken dilemma = each person is tempted to behave non-cooperatively (by
driving straight toward one’s “opponent” in an effort to win the game), but if
neither player cooperates (swerves), both parties experience the worst.
Assurance (trust) dilemma = lacks a dominating strategy, and is unique in
that the highest collective and individual outcomes occur when both partners
choose to cooperate.
o Dilemma: if one party considers beating the other party to be more
important than obtaining high outcomes for the self and others, or is
convinced the other will behave competitively, the best course of action
is to not cooperate.
,Similarities between types of dilemmas:
Collective rationality = cooperative behavior by both individuals yields
greater outcomes than does noncooperative behavior by both individuals.
Temporal dimension = consequences for the self can be immediate or
delayed such as consequences for the collective.
o Social traps: emphasize on consuming or taking -> take some
dilemmas / resource dilemma.
o Social fences: emphasize on giving -> give some dilemmas / public
goods dilemmas
Social dilemmas = situations in which a non-cooperative course of action is (at
times) tempting for each individual in that it yields superior (often short-term)
outcomes for self, and if all pursue this non-cooperative course of action, all are
(often in the longer term) worse off than if all had cooperated.
First order dilemma = the initial dilemma. -> elementary cooperation.
Second order dilemmas = the dilemma one faces when deciding to
contribute to a costly system that might promote cooperation in the first order
dilemma. -> instrumental cooperation.
Why use of games?
Parsimony (simplicity in terms of structure): The PD’s original form, involving
two people who simultaneously make only once choice, the structure of game
is very simple, but not simple in terms of rationality.
Wealth of motives, cognitions and emotions involved:
o Self-regard: greed or fear.
o Concerns around outcome:
Concern with outcomes for self and the other -> collectivism.
Concern primarily the other -> altruism.
Concern with equality or fairness.
o Cognitions and reasoning:
Before dilemma:
Predicting others behavior.
Making sense of situation.
Decide what to decide (norms and identity).
After dilemma:
Sense making.
Learn for future situations.
Ability to address broad questions about human cooperation:
1. What is the logical, rational solution to the PD?
2. What promotes a cooperative choice?
3. Do people learn and adapt to develop stable patterns of cooperative
interactions?
Ability to help address and illuminate critical societal issues: Scientists and
practitioners wanted to get grip on major issues (such as economic crisis,
second world war, etc.).
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, CHAPTER 2: HISTORY, METHODS, PARADIGMS
Mixed motive = states (1) the desire to do well for oneself, (2) the fact that one’s
outcomes are partially influences by the actions of others as their outcomes are
partially effected by our actions and (3) that doing wrong by others leaves one open
to possible retaliation, if the interaction is ongoing.
Outcome maximization:
Classical ideas:
o Pyrrho -> Skepticism: maximizing immediate outcomes, because
there is no way to know whether actions now will affect outcomes later.
One should live for the moment and engage in activities that produce
immediate reward because the future is unknown.
o Epicurus -> Epicureanism: maximizing outcomes in the long run,
even if this means incurring short term loss.
People ought to be driven by long-term goals, and perform actions now
that would produce pleasure in the long run. Short-term pain is tolerable
when motive to realize long-term pleasure.
o Zeno -> Stoicism: strive for acceptable outcomes rather than maximal
outcomes, because phenomena that produce maximum gain also have
the potential to produce maximum loss.
Actions should be motivated by reason, virtue, and logic rather than
pleasure seeking or pain avoidance, with a goal of stability in the
intensity of emotional reactions to daily experiences.
Moral indifference = situations always cause opposite
emotions.
Modern ideas:
o Bentham -> Notion of utilitarianism: maximize pleasurable outcomes
and minimize painful ones.
o Stuart Mill:
People develop associations between actions and outcomes.
People make qualitative distinctions among pleasurable
outcomes; the more satisfying higher order pleasures result form
first experiencing lower-order pleasures.
Interdependence:
Aristotle -> Eudaimonia: Happiness was achieved not only by living up to
one’s abilities, but also by surrounding oneself with valuable “external goods”,
a key one being friends (being virtuous because you can express virtuosity
towards someone).
Hume -> Confined generosity: We are concerned with our own well-being
but we also maintain some degree of concern for the wellbeing of others (as a
result of civilization).
o Artificial virtue = we cooperate with some people of whom we don’t
actually care, since we are part of society.
Smith -> Theory of moral sentiments: A moral person has an innate desire
to be approved by others and therefore we want to please others and avoid
