A summary of the book: This is philosophy of mind.
I made this while following the course Philosophy of mind for my pre-master. But you could definitly use it for other courses that use this book.
I passed this course with a 9 while using this summary
Chapter 2 – substance dualism
Mind and brain are two distinct things.
Three kinds of arguments for substance dualism:
1: Leibniz’s law arguments
The principle that if x and y are one of the same, then x and y must have all of their properties in
common.
5 alleged differences between minds and bodies
1) Physical bodies are spatial and minds are not (Descartes)
2) Minds are thinking things and psychical objects are not
3) Only non-physical things possess a property called ‘’aboutness’’ or intentionality we think
about things and physical things cannot
4) Only mental substances can bear properties that are phenomenal there is something it is
like to be a conscious human biting into a lemon.
5) Physical bodies seem to be known by the senses you may be deceived. But you think that
you are thinking, so your mind must exist. We are not sure if physical bodies exist.
The mind must be distinct from every physical body
Criticism of Leibniz’s law argument = intensional fallacy
Intensional fallacy = involving a confusion between on the one hand, properties that something really
has and on the other hand , properties it has only under some description. What we think about
something may be really different from the truth
2: Explanatory gap arguments
They identify some aspects of the mind that cannot be explained in terms of physical substances and
then conclude that this aspect of the mind must be due to the mind’s being a nonphysical, wholly
mental substance.
- For example; the use of language there is an explanatory gap between physical
substances and the use of language.
- Substantial gap = there is a distinction between two distinct things.
Criticism of explanatory gap arguments:
- Every explanatory gap argument predicts something else they can be called into doubt,
because we are not able to be absolutely certain about something in the future
- In the past they made predictions about the future that were not right.
3: Modal arguments
- Hinges on the notion of possibility
- Possibility and necessity are modalities and are studied by modal logic
- Premise: the possibility of a mind existing without any body show that it is a real
possibility by starting with a premise about what can be conceived or imagined , or what
one can have a clear and distinct idea of. (examples of these premises are in the book at page
23)
Criticism of the modal arguments: Does conceivability really entail possibility?
Maybe I am merely mistaken in my conceptions?
, - In mathematics conceivability isn’t the guide to possibility.
- Defence of the critique: if the conceiving is done by a ideal conceiver, it must really be
possible for it to happen
- But then: what is an ideal conceiver? And couldn’t they make mistakes?
Mind-body interaction as a problem for substance dualism
Descartes: mind and body are two separate kinds of substance but they are able to interact. The
location of the interface between them is the pineal gland (because everyone has only 1 of them).
Princess Elizbeth’s objection
Is about the causal interaction between mind and body.
Only material substances can be spatial This is where the problem starts for the substance dualist.
How can something that is non-spatial (mind) have an effect on something that is spatial (body)? And
vice versa. Physical causation looks to depend on spatial locations only.
The dualistic alternatives to Cartesian interactionism
- Deny mind-body interaction, but not in line with common sense
- But they don’t deny that it is a mere coincidence that certain mental happenings are
synchronized with certain physical happenings (occasionalism and parallelism bring god into
the picture for this)
- Occasionalism: God is hypothesized to intervene at each step in a version of continual
creation you form an intention to raise your hand, then god steps in and raises your hand.
(What about bad crimes?)
- Leibniz’s parallelism: God sets up two parallel streams of events from the beginning of the
universe, a physical and a mental stream. (Then we don’t have free will anymore?)
, Chapter 3 – Property dualism
Focus now, not on things, but on properties or qualities of things. The relationship between a
person’s mental and physical properties.
Property dualism: mental properties are a distinct kind of property, a kind of property not identical or
reducible to any kind of physical property.
Two key ideas in philosophy of mind:
1. Mental properties known collectively as qualia
2. All properties are physical properties (mental properties are a special kind of brain property)
but how to explain qualia then?
Two thought experiments for the motivation of property dualism
1. The inverted spectrum: two people see colours in very different ways, x in the normal way
and y in the opposite. So there is a subjective difference in the way the colours appear, but
they have the same colour-related behaviour, including verbal. They both say the tomato is
red, because they learned that. Also, they both are similar with respect to all of the
properties that can be observed by a third person. They both have the same brain structures
when they say green, but despite of that they have still different qualia.
- If this is indeed possible, then it is possible for people to be the same with respect to their
physical properties yet different with respect to their qualia.
- Then qualia cannot be identical to physical properties, so qualia must be a non-physical
property.
- Modal argument example with premises, see book page 32.
2. Attack of the zombie: zombie has no qualia but is in all other ways similar to a normal person.
So person x has qualia and person y, the zombie, has not and they behave the same and have
the same internal physical properties.
- If this is possible then qualia aren’t physical properties
- See the modal arguments for property dualism with the premises in the book
In favour of property dualism: The knowledge argument
A thought experiment: Mary knows everything there is to know about what is involved in colour
perception. Mary herself only can see things in black, white and grey because she lives in a black-
white room and something is injected so that she sees herself in those colours. She has all the
information about the world, but what she lacks is for example ‘’what is like to see red’’.
An argument against physicalism and in favour of property dualism is the knowledge argument:
Premise 1: if physicalism is true, that is, if all properties are physical properties, then, Mary knows
everything there is to know about colour vision.
Premise 2: Mary does not know everything there is to know about colour vision (she does not know
what it is like to see red)
Conclusion: physicalism is false. Not all properties are physical properties. There is at least one
nonphysical property (a red quale).
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