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Summary all articles Comparative Corporate Governance
Summary of all the articles of Comparative Corporate Governance (CCG) 22-23
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Complete summary articlesComparative Corporate Governance
Lecture 1: Comparative Corporate Governance: an introduction.
Aguilera R.V., & Jackson G. (2003). The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: dimensions
and determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28/3, 447-465
Lecture 2: Corporate investors and investor protection
La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., & Shleifer A. (1999). Corporate Ownership around the World. Journal
of Finance, 54/2, 471-517. (only pages 471-498, you can skip the rest).
Aguilera R.V.,Crespi-Cladera, R. (2016). Global Corporate governance: on the relevance of
firms’ownership structure, Journal of World Business, 51, pp.50-57.
Aguilera, R.V., J.Capapé, and J.Santiso (2016) Sovereign Wealth Funds: a strategic governance view,
Academy of Management Perspectives, Vol.30.No.1, pp.5-23.
Lecture 3: Diffusion of Corporate Governance practices
Cuomo, F. C.Mallin & A.Zattoni (2016) Corporate Governance Codes: a review and a research agenda,
Corporate Governance: an International Review, 24(3), 222-241.
Witt, M.A., Fairnshmidt, S. Aguilera, R.V., (2022) Our board, our rules: Nonconformity to Global
Corporate Governance Norms, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.67(1), pp.131-166. (you can leave
out pp.142-148).
The Dutch Corporate Governance Code (2022), issued by the Dutch Corporate Governance Monitoring
Committee, pp.1-13 (flip through the rest) (see Brightspace for the link to the relevant pdf).
Lecture 4: Diversity in upper echelons: causes and consequences
van Veen K., & Elbertsen J. (2008). Governance Regimes and Nationality Diversity in Corporate Boards:
A Comparative Study of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 16/5, 386-399.
Veltrop, D. B., Hermes, N., Postma, T. J. B. M. and de Haan, J. (2015), A Tale of Two Factions: Why
and When Factional Demographic Faultlines Hurt Board Performance. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 23: 145–160. doi: 10.1111/corg.12098.DOI: 10.1111/corg.12092
Veltrop, D. B., Molleman, E., Hooghiemstra, R. B. H. & van Ees, H. (2017) Who's the Boss at the Top? A
Micro-Level Analysis of Director Expertise, Status and Conformity Within Boards, Journal of
Management Studies. 54(7), p.1079-1110.
Lecture 5: Networks and board dynamics
K.van Veen & E.M. Heemskerk, (2018) Interlocking Directorate Networks, Springer Encyclopedia for
Social Networks and Mining. DOI: https://doiorg.proxy-ub.rug.nl/10.1007/978-1-4614-7163-9_274-1*
Heemskerk, E., Fennema, M., Carroll, W.K. (2016) The global corporate elite after the financial crisis:
evidence from the transnational network of interlocking directorates, Global Networks, Volume16, Issue
1, 68-88.
Boivie,S. Bednar, M.K., Aguilera, R.V. & Andrus, J.L. (2016) Are Boards Designed to Fail? The
Implausibility of Effective Board Monitoring, The Academy of Management Annals, DOI:
10.1080/19416520.2016.1120957
Lecture 6: Executive compensation
Frydman, C. and D.Jenter (2010). CEO compensation, Annual Review of Financial Economics, 2: 75-
102. DOI:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958
Van Veen, K. and R.P.M Wittek,(2016). Relational signaling and the rise of CEO compensation: … it is
not just about money, but about what the money says, Long Range Planning,
doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2015.12.009
Lecture 7: Overview of emerging new themes
Aguilera, R.V., Alberto Aragón-Correa, J., Marano, V. (2022) Rethinking corporate power to tackle grand
Challenges: Lessons from Political Philosophy, Academy of Management Review, Vol.47. No.4, pp.637-
645.
Mayer, C. (2021) The Future of the Corporation and the Economics of Purpose, Journal of Management
Studies, v.58 n.3 (May 2021). pp.887-901.
,Aguilera R.V., & Jackson G. (2003). The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: dimensions and
determinants
This article examines the various dimensions of corporate governance, such as board structure, executive
compensation, ownership structure, and legal and regulatory frameworks. The authors identify determinants of
cross-national diversity in corporate governance, including economic, legal, political, and cultural factors.
Corporate governance varies significantly across countries: Corporate governance practices vary significantly
across countries, with different systems of corporate governance prevailing in different regions of the world.
Three dimensions of corporate governance: The authors identify three dimensions of corporate governance -
ownership structure, board structure, and capital market orientation. Ownership structure refers to the
concentration of ownership and the presence of blockholders, while board structure refers to the size,
independence, and role of the board of directors. Capital market orientation refers to the level of reliance on the
stock market as a source of capital.
Different models of corporate governance: Based on the three dimensions, the authors identify four different
models of corporate governance - the shareholder-oriented model, the stakeholder-oriented model, the family-
oriented model, and the state-oriented model. These models reflect the dominant ownership structure, board
structure, and capital market orientation in a particular country or region.
Determinants of corporate governance: The authors identify several determinants of corporate governance,
including legal systems, financial systems, political systems, cultural values, and economic development. These
determinants can shape ownership structure, board structure, and capital market orientation, and ultimately
influence corporate governance practices.
The Anglo-American model: The authors focus on the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, which is
characterized by dispersed ownership, a two-tier board structure, and a high reliance on capital markets. This
model is prevalent in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom.
The continental European model: The authors also discuss the continental European model of corporate
governance, which is characterized by concentrated ownership, a one-tier board structure, and a low reliance on
capital markets. This model is prevalent in countries such as Germany and France.
The Asian model: The authors highlight the Asian model of corporate governance, which is characterized by
family ownership, a one-tier board structure, and a moderate reliance on capital markets. This model is prevalent
in countries such as Japan and South Korea.
The Latin American model: The authors also discuss the Latin American model of corporate governance, which is
characterized by family ownership, a one-tier board structure, and a low reliance on capital markets. This model is
prevalent in countries such as Brazil and Mexico.
Convergence and divergence: The authors note that there is a trend towards convergence in corporate
governance practices, particularly in terms of board independence and transparency. However, they also highlight
the persistence of divergent ownership structures and capital market orientations across countries.
Implications for multinational corporations: The authors suggest that multinational corporations need to be aware
of the different models of corporate governance and the determinants of corporate governance in different
countries. This can help them to navigate the regulatory and institutional environment in each country, and to
develop effective governance structures that are tailored to local conditions.
Key points and takeaways:
Corporate governance is shaped by a range of factors including institutional, economic, cultural, legal,
and political influences.
The authors identify several key dimensions of corporate governance, including board structure,
executive compensation, and ownership structure.
There is considerable variation in corporate governance practices across countries, reflecting differences
in national institutions, cultures, and legal frameworks.
Corporate governance codes and guidelines can play an important role in promoting good governance
practices, but their effectiveness depends on their implementation and enforcement.
Overall, the article highlights the significant variation in corporate governance practices across countries, and the
importance of understanding the different models of corporate governance and the determinants of corporate
governance in each country. This can help multinational corporations to navigate the regulatory and institutional
environment in each country, and to develop effective governance structures that are tailored to local conditions.
, La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., & Shleifer A. (1999). Corporate Ownership around the World. (pages 471-498)
Legal systems and culture shape corporate ownership structures: Countries with common law legal systems and
a strong protection of minority shareholder rights tend to have dispersed ownership structures with widely held
shares. Civil law countries, on the other hand, have more concentrated ownership with large blockholders. In
addition, countries with high levels of corruption and low levels of trust tend to have more concentrated
ownership.
Ownership concentration is highest in emerging markets: Ownership concentration is significantly higher in
emerging markets compared to developed markets, which can result in lower firm performance and higher agency
costs.
Family ownership is common in many countries: Family-owned firms are prevalent in many countries, especially
in Latin America and Asia. Family control may lead to lower firm value and weaker corporate governance
practices, but may also provide long-term stability and commitment to the firm.
State ownership is prevalent in some countries: State-owned enterprises are common in many countries,
especially in developing countries. State ownership may lead to inefficiencies, lack of accountability, and
politicization of business decisions.
Institutional investors have a significant ownership role in developed countries: In developed countries,
institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds, play a significant role in corporate ownership.
This can result in a more dispersed ownership structure and better corporate governance practices.
Banks play a significant ownership role in some countries: In countries such as Germany and Japan, banks play a
significant role in corporate ownership through their shareholdings and involvement in corporate governance.
Ownership structures affect firm performance: Ownership structures have a significant impact on firm
performance. Concentrated ownership structures may result in lower firm performance, higher agency costs, and
lower firm value. On the other hand, dispersed ownership structures may result in better firm performance, higher
firm value, and better corporate governance practices.
Ownership structures affect corporate governance: Ownership structures have a significant impact on corporate
governance practices. Dispersed ownership structures tend to have better corporate governance practices, while
concentrated ownership structures may result in weaker corporate governance practices.
Legal protection of minority shareholders is important: Legal protection of minority shareholders is an important
factor in shaping ownership structures and corporate governance practices. Countries with strong legal protection
of minority shareholders tend to have better corporate governance practices and more dispersed ownership
structures.
Shareholder activism is rare in many countries: Shareholder activism, which can improve corporate governance
and firm performance, is relatively rare in many countries due to legal, cultural, and economic factors.
Overall, the article highlights the importance of ownership structures and corporate governance practices in
shaping firm performance and providing protection to minority shareholders. Legal systems, culture, and
economic factors play a significant role in determining ownership structures across countries.
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