Lecture 1
Tripsas, M. (2009). Technology, identity, and inertia through the lens of “The Digital Photography Company”. Organization
Science, 20(2), 441-460.
Lyytinen, K., and Newman, M. (2008). Explaining Information Systems Change: A Punctuated Socio-Technical Change
Model, European Journal of Information Systems(17:6), pp. 589-613.
Lecture 2
1. Danneels, E. (2011). Trying to become a different type of company: Dynamic capability at Smith Corona. Strategic
Management Journal, 32(1), 1-31.
2. Taylor, A., & Helfat, C. E. (2009). Organizational linkages for surviving technological change: Complementary assets,
middle management, and ambidexterity. Organization Science, 20(4), 718-739.
3. Lewis, M. W., Andriopoulos, C., & Smith, W. K. (2014). Paradoxical leadership to enable strategic agility. California
Management Review, 56(3), 58-77.
4. Anand, J., Oriani, R., & Vassolo, R. S. (2010). Alliance activity as a dynamic capability in the face of a discontinuous
technological change. Organization Science, 21(6), 1213-1232.
Lecture 3
1a. Gerstner, W. C., König, A., Enders, A., & Hambrick, D. C. (2013). CEO narcissism, audience engagement, and
organizational adoption of technological discontinuities. Administrative Science Quarterly, 58(2), 257-291.
2. Vuori, T. O., & Huy, Q. N. (2022). Regulating top managers’ emotions during strategy making: Nokia’s socially distributed
approach enabling radical change from mobile phones to networks in 2007–2013. Academy of Management Journal, 65(1),
331-361.
3. Maula, M. V., Keil, T., & Zahra, S. A. (2013). Top management’s attention to discontinuous technological change:
Corporate venture capital as an alert mechanism. Organization Science, 24(3), 926-947.
4. Morais, F., Kakabadse, A., & Kakabadse, N. (2020). Leading through discontinuous change: A typology of problems and
leadership approaches in UK boards. Long Range Planning, 53(2), 101870.
Lecture 4
2. Adner, R., & Kapoor, R. (2016). Innovation ecosystems and the pace of substitution: Re ‐examining technology S ‐curves.
Strategic Management Journal, 37(4), 625-648.
3. Benner, Mary. J. (2010). Securities analysts and incumbent response to radical technological change: Evidence from
digital photography and internet telephony. Organization Science, 21(1), 42-62.
4. Maslach, D. (2016). Change and persistence with failed technological innovation. Strategic Management Journal, 37(4),
714-723.
Lecture 5
1. Ahuja, M. K., & Thatcher, J. B. (2005). Moving beyond intentions and toward the theory of trying: Effects of work
environment and gender on post-adoption information technology use. MIS Quarterly, 427-459.
2. Lapointe, L., & Rivard, S. (2005). A Multilevel Model of Resistance to Information Technology Implementation. MIS
Quarterly (29:3), pp. 461-491.
3. Bagayogo, F. F., Lapointe, L., & Bassellier G. 2014. “Enhanced use of IT: A new perspective on Post-Adoption. Journal of
the Association for Information Systems, 15(7): 361-387
4. Zhu, K., & Kraemer, K. L. (2005). Post-adoption variations in usage and value of e-business by organizations: cross-country
evidence from the retail industry. Information Systems Research, 16(1), 61-84.
1
, Week 1
Tripsas, M. (2009). Technology, identity, and inertia through the lens of “The Digital Photography
Company”. Organization Science, 20(2), 441-460.
Organizations often experience difficulty when pursuing new technology. Yet, despite the potential
importance of organizational identity as it relates to technological transitions, the terrain is relatively
unexplored.
Organizational identity represents both how organizational insiders and outside constituents
perceive an organization.
Internal identity represents a shared understanding by organizational members regarding
what is central, distinctive, and enduring about an organization. It helps insiders to answer questions
such as “Who are we? What kind of business are we in?” and guides key strategic decisions such as
whether to make an acquisition, enter a new market, or divest a division.
External identity, on the other hand, captures how outside audiences such as institutional
actors, customers, suppliers, or complementary producers view the organization. Having categorized
an organization in a particular way, outsiders associate specific characteristics with it and form
certain expectations or codes about how the organization should act. An organization’s external
identity can provide legitimacy if it abides by the rules of a clearly defined category or trigger
confusion if it deviates too far.
Research questions: (1) How does an organization’s identity affect its filtering of technological
opportunities and its ability to respond to identity-challenging technologies? (2) When an
organization’s pursuit of an identity-challenging technology results in a shift in identity, how does the
change process unfold?
- Inductive
- Field-based case study , company called Linco (digital photography) -> The firm was chosen
as a setting specifically because of the importance of technology and identity in its evolution,
so in that sense it is an “extreme case,” where the theoretical issues of interest were more
“transparently observable” than might typically be the case.
Data covering the entire lifespan of Linco were gathered from four sources: (1) semi-structured
interviews conducted from the spring of 2000 through the springof 2001, (2) participant observation
from April 2003 through June 2006 (see Figure 1 for the timing of field-work relative to Linco’s life
stages), (3) internal archival materials such as presentations from offsite meetings and strategic
plans, and (4) publicly available archival materials.
-
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,This paper contributes to the field of technology management, it enhances the understanding of why
the pursuit of new technological opportunities can be so problematic.
Second, this study contributes to the organizational identity literature by explicating, through
unique, detailed, longitudinal empirical data, the process by which internal and external
organizational identity and the environment dynamically interact and change.
Third, this study highlights the importance of strategic renewal in small, young
organizations in contrast to the emphasis of most existing work on large, established organizations.
Sources of Inertia; technological change and identity
The organizational reasons fall into two broad categories: routines/capabilities and cognition.
Seemingly minor architectural innovations can be traumatic given the inertia surrounding
organizational information filters and communication patterns. Some routines, such as total quality
management, that are meant to improve a firm’s efficiency in a core business crowd out more
exploratory initiatives, limiting the firm’s ability to take advantage of novel opportunities. Thus, in
aggregate, core competencies can turn into “core rigidities” or “competency traps” that constrain the
development of new capabilities.
Even if a firm engages in exploration, cognitive elements can be problematic. Interpretation of a new
technology as a threat can result in high investment of resources in a rigid manner that preserves
existing routines. For instance, newspapers that viewed the Internet as a threat offered fewer novel
features on their websites, perceiving the Internet as primarily another vehicle for distributing the
newspaper.
In particular, research has focused on how organizations respond to identity threats—inconsistencies
between internal identity and internal perceptions of external identity. When organizational
members discern such a threat, they engage in a variety of strategies to restore consistency. In some
cases organizations reframe the threat so that the inconsistency is alleviated without having to
change internal identity. In other situations, when confronted with an identity threat, managers
undertake persuasive communications and actions with the goal of improving external views.
The reason total quality management was so difficult for firms to implement was that it required not
only a change in organizational behaviors but a fundamental transformation in how an organization
viewed itself.
A model of identify change in response to Technological opportunities.
The model of identity change in response to technological opportunities that emerged from Linco’s
experience comprises three phases: (1) a self-reinforcing dynamic supporting the original identity, (2)
a period of identity ambiguity triggered by pursuit of identity-challenging technological
opportunities, and (3) convergence on a new identity with a new self-reinforcing dynamic.
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, In phase one, the identity is created and then reinforced through a feedback process among the
original identity, organizational action, technology, and industry. Organizational action in the form of
both management communications about the identity and strategic actions consistent with the
identity help to establish coherent, shared beliefs among insiders and outsiders regarding what the
organization represents (arrow a). Those beliefs in turn influence action, providing heuristics that
guide decision-making routines (arrow b). Organizational actions also influence the industry’s growth
and shape aspects of its development (arrow c). In particular, organizational action directs
technological progress in the industry such that it builds on the firm’s strengths (arrow d ). Input from
the industry and technological environment are then noticed and filtered through the lens of the
firm’s identity, resulting in ongoing management action that reinforces the identity (arrow e). The
first source of inertia in this model is therefore the cognitive screen that identity places on
environmental stimuli, resulting in noticing and interpreting events—in particular, technological
change—in a manner consistent with the existing identity.
The second source of inertia comes from the positive feedback loop that reinforces consistent
elements of the system. Breaking this cycle and shifting identity is difficult, as illustrated by Stage 2 of
the model. Triggered by a decision to take advantage of an identity-challenging technological change,
management communication and strategic actions distance the organization from the previous
identity (arrow f). However, without a clear alternative identity articulated, the organization enters a
period of identity ambiguity, where both internal and external constituents are unclear as to what
the organization is. The ambiguous identity provides unclear signals to the members of the
organization, and new heuristics are therefore slow to develop, resulting in a broader, exploratory
set of strategic moves (arrow g). Similarly, signals from the industry and technological environment
are no longer focused by the identity, resulting in a broader range of actions (arrow h). The ability to
shape the industry and the technological context is diminished given this unclear commitment.
Eventually, in Stage 3, internal and external audiences converge on a new identity, led by a
movement in external identity with final closure on internal identity triggered by an external
imperative to focus. The consistency in identity leads to another self-reinforcing dynamic like that of
phase 1.
Toepassing of case;
Dit model is ook zo toegepast bij Linco; zo is in fase 1 gekeken naar ;
1. Choosing the Digital photography company identity ( nieuwe CEO had hier bijdrage in).
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