Week 1
Payne, B. K., & Cameron, C. D. (2013). Implicit social cognition and mental
representation. Oxford handbook of social cognition, Oxford University Press, New York,
NY, 220-238.
Aim: overview theories of mental representations from the perspective of implicit social cognition
Mental representations
In studies: categories, exemplars, symbols, mental images, memories, grammar, syntax,
narratives, truth values, probabilities, and number lines. Clearly it can be any mental
content or operation that stands for something else in the world.
Implicit representations: lack awareness, are efficient, do not require intent, and escape
control
Distinction between implicit and explicit mental representations matters because it informs
how we think about the control of behaviour. Placing mental representations as implicit or
explicit helps us to figure out if we have desires or beliefs such as racial stereotypes – that
are unconscious or counter to our considered goals and values.
Models of mental representation
Associative network models
Mental representations are built from discrete, interconnected nodes that stand for
concepts, and the links between the nodes for relationship between the concepts. These
links are formed through experiences, based on which concepts tend to be thought about in
conjunction. The strength of links is thought to be determined by the frequency and recency
, of activation. This is a natural explanation of priming effects because activating a concept
with a prime leaves it momentarily higher in activation and ready to be engaged in
subsequent processing. They have a bottom-up approach. Most applications of associative
networks in social cognition have invoked ‘parallel search’ models, in which activation
spreads automatically among connected nodes. Some researchers have invoked ‘serial
search’ versions of associative network theories. The nodes and linages are the same as in
parallel search theories but rather than automatically spreading activation, there is an
intentional search following linked nodes until a concept is retrieved.
Parallel search models suggest that people are not aware of the nodes themselves
or of the spreading of activation along the links.
They become aware of the concept that results from the nodes that have reached
the threshold of consciousness. So this suggests that the use of representations is
implicit until activation reached threshold level.
Implicit representations can become explicit by spreading activation that crosses a
threshold or by intentionally perform a serial search
Schema models
Schema models take a top-down approach: schema’s are broad representations that
structure and make sense of psychological experience. The larger chunks of knowledge
might be thought of as different lenses with which to view the world. Once activated, a
schema brings all of its general knowledge and, as a consequence, it directs attention,
memory, and judgment.
Schemas are not unconscious but can influence behaviour and attitudes
unconscious
Knowledge structures are used implicitly in the processing of new information, but
not that the content of the schemas themselves are unconscious
Content of schemas might be implicit or explicit only temporarily, as attention is
directed toward or away from any given aspect of the knowledge base.
Connectionist models
Are intended to mimic the network structure of human neurons.
Connectionist networks contain multiple processing nodes at varying levels
of activation, which are connected by weighted links allowing for the
transmission of this activation. Most connectionist models do not assume
that specific nodes have semantic meaning. Representations are
distributed as emergent patterns across the entire set of connected nodes.
Representations are not concrete, static because of contextual factors and
slowly learned changes in connection weight. Triggering one pattern may make it easier to
complete similar patterns representing another concept. Connectionist models can account
for schematic processing: triggering one portion of a given representational pattern makes
it easier for the rest of the pattern to complete
Distributed representations are conscious, but not the working of the model
The use of the connectionist model is generally implicit
Representational patterns can be made conscious, but it is uncertain whether the
working of the connectionist model can be made conscious
Multiple format models
Aim: intend to account for how information is represented in general. There are multiple
kinds of representation that are processed in distinct ways: verbal, visual, behavioural, and
affective. The systems are arranged hierarchically, from lower-level representations that
correspond to neural and physiological processes to higher level representations that are
more complex, conscious accessible, and amenable to verbal description.
Different kinds of representations might be implicit to differing degrees. Higher
level representations can all be made temporarily conscious, lower representations
are permanently inaccessible to conscious awareness
, For some systems, the use and the representation are implicit, for others the use is
only implicit
Some representational systems are permanently implicit, other are only temporarily
implicit
Embodied cognition models
Posit a fundamental distinction between ‘amodal’ and ‘modal’ forms of mental
representation. Amodal representations are abstract and disembodied symbols or objects or
events that do not retain the sensory components from the original experiences of those
objects or events. Modal representations draw upon and are constituted by those sensory
experiences. The critical issue is whether or not those sensory details are retained in the
stored mental representation, to call up for future use. In embodied models, details of body
matter for details of mind. Embodied information is not translated into some kind of
abstract currency, but rather is itself the bases of mental representation. Smell, sight, and
taste of coffee are stored in original sensory format, as part of the representation of a cup
of coffee. Embodied cognition models are not limited to a person’s past perceptual
experience.
Sensory representation can be conscious, but this might vary by sensory modality
Bodily representations and their use can be either implicit or explicit
Representations are only temporarily implicit, but this might vary by sensory
modality
Situated cognition models
Mental representations might not be files in a cabinet or a computer, but instead might be
the entire dynamic interaction that takes place between worker, cabinet, and computer on
a daily basis. The brain might only house information on a need-to-know basis and can
delegate much of the support work for adaptive behaviour to features of the environment
that ‘scaffold’ and simplify decision making. Mental representations emerge out of a loose
but adaptive assemblage of neurological, bodily, and environmental conditions, which is
distributed across this dynamic union. Any internal representations will be limited in scope
and heavily guided toward action.
Situated representations can be more or less conscious depending on the situation
Situated representations and the use might be more or less conscious but
distinction collapses if representations involve action
Situated representations are only temporarily implicit but this might vary
contextually
Self-inference model
People cannot perceive their representations directly. Representations are not themselves
conscious but cause a variety of consequences that are consciously perceptible. Two factors
that inference about the representation: strength of the representation and focus of
attention.
Jacoby’s attributional model of memory
Subjective experiences of remembering cannot be explained by the properties of a memory
trace. Traces of past experience can influence current processing, resulting in certain
perceptible cues. Thus, when people recall experiences with vivid details, they often
interpret that they are remembering these experiences
Conclusions
Most theories suggest that when a representation is implicit, it is only temporarily
implicit
Most theories agree that it is the use of representations that can best be described
as implicit or explicit, rather than the presentations itself.
Awareness, efficiency, intent, and control are not qualities that a representation
has; they describe activities that people do
, Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social
behaviour. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 220-247.
Aim: direct attention to the behavioural consequences of the mental mechanisms and provide an
alternative to rational models of human behaviour.
Basic properties and functions
Thesis 1: Social behaviour is the effect of the operation of two distinct systems of information
processing: a reflective system and an impulsive system. The systems can be specified by different
principles of representation and information processing.
In the reflective system, behaviour is elicited as a consequence of a decision process.
Specifically, knowledge about the value and the probability of potential consequences is
weighed and integrated to reach a preference for one behavioural option.
the impulsive system activates behavioural schemata through spreading activation, which
may originate from perceptual input or from reflective processes.
Thesis 2: Parallel operation.
Both systems operate in parallel.
However, there is an
asymmetry such that the
impulsive system is always
engaged in processing (by itself or parallel to operations of the reflective system) whereas the
reflective system may be disengaged.
This model assumes that information entering the perceptual gates will always be
processed in the impulsive system. Depending on its intensity and the attention it receives,
a stimulus may also enter the reflective system.
Thesis 3: Capacity: The reflective system requires a high amount of cognitive capacity. Therefore,
distraction as well as extremely high or low levels of arousal will interfere with its operation. In
contrast, the impulsive system requires little cognitive capacity and may control behaviour under
suboptimal conditions. As a consequence, processes of the reflective system are disturbed more
easily than those of the impulsive system.
The impulsive system is fast, requires no or little cognitive effort, and has a low threshold
for processing incoming information, whereas the opposite holds for reflective operations.
we propose that the reflective system operates most efficiently at intermediate levels of
arousal.
Representation, storage, and processing of information
Thesis 4: Relations between elements. Elements in the two systems are connected by different
types of relations. In the reflective system, elements are connected through semantic relations to
which a truth value is assigned. In the impulsive system, the relations are associative links between
elements and are formed according to the principles of contiguity and similarity.
In the impulsive system, information is represented in patterns of activation in an
associative store. In contrast, the reflective system is capable of forming propositional
