International Political Economy notes
Reading 1
Gilpin, Chapter one ‘’The nature of political economy’’.
The interaction of state and market in the modern world create ‘’political economy’’. Neither state
nor market is primary; the causal relationships are interactive and indeed cyclical. Contrasting modes
of organizing human activities and of decision making affect one another and. Students of
international political economy, therefore, must attempt to understand how these thereby
determine social outcomes.
Markets certainly constitute a means to achieve and exercise power, and the state can be and is used
to obtain wealth. State and market interact to influence the distribution of power and wealth in
international relations.
The logic of the market is to locate economic activities where they are most productive and
profitable; the logic of the state is to capture and control the process of economic growth and
capital accumulation (Heilbroner, r 98 5, pp. 94-95).
Although the connection between the market exchange system and the capitalist mode of
production is close, these terms are not the same-even though they will sometimes be used
interchangeably in this book. Capitalism is too ambiguous, open to more than one interpretation, a
label to be used as an analytical category. There are in fact many varieties of capitalism that function
differently.
Although a market is an abstract concept, a market economy can be defined as one in which goods
and services are exchanged on the basis of relative prices; it is where transactions are negotiated and
prices are determined. lts essence, as one economist has put it, is "the making of a price by higgling
between buyers and sellers"
Localized exchange > command economies > long distance trade in high valued goods.
Three characteristics of a market economy are responsible for its dynamic nature: (1) the critical role
of relative prices in the exchange of goods and services, (2) the centrality of competition as a
determinant of individual and institutional behaviour, and (3) the importance of efficiency in
determining the survivability of economic actors.
States attempt to guide market forces to benefit their own citizens, resulting, at least in the short
run, in the unequal distribution of wealth and power among the participants in the market and the
stratification of societies in the international political economy (Haw- trey, 19 5 2).
CONCLUSION
The central concerns of this book, then, are the impact of the world market economy on the
relations of states and the ways in which states seek to influence market forces for their own
advantage. Embedded in this relationship of state and market are three closely related issues of
importance to the student of politics.
The first is the way in which market interdependence affects and is affected by
international politics and in particular by the presence or absence of political leadership.
, The second is the interaction of economic and political change that gives rise to an intense
competition among states over the global location of economic activities, especially the so-
called commanding heights of modern industry.
The third is the effect of the world market on economic development and the consequent
effort of states to control or at least to be in a position to influence the rules or regimes
governing trade, foreign investment, and the international monetary system as well as
other aspects of the international political economy.
Behind seemingly technical issues of trade or international money lurk significant political issues
that profoundly influence the power, independence, and well-being of individual states. Thus,
although trade may well be of mutual benefit, every state wants its own gains to be
disproportionately to its advantage; it wants to move up the technological ladder to reap the
highest value-added return from its own contribution to the international division of labour.
Similarly, every state wants to have its say in decision making about the rules of the
international monetary system. In every area of international economic affairs, economic and
political issues are deeply entwined. Scholars and other individuals differ, however, on the nature
of the relationship between economic and political affairs. Although many positions can be
identified, almost everyone tends to fall into one of three contrasting perspectives, ideologies, or
schools of thought. They are liberalism, nationalism, and Marxism, and the next chapter will
evaluate their strengths and limitations. In particular, the fundamental challenge raised by
nationalism and especially Marxism with respect to the prospects for the continuation of the
post-war liberal international economy will be considered.
State, market, and global political economy: genealogy of an (inter-?) discipline - Underhill
2000
This article will argue that this diversity of origin and of analytical approach militates strongly
towards interpreting IPE not as an offshoot of traditional International Relations, but as rooted in
the broad tradition of political economy which emerged in the European enlightenment. Hard
to distinguish beginning, but long time ago.
The article argues that most IPE scholars, despite their protestations, still see the state and the
market as separate and indeed antagonistic dynamics, the dynamics of state versus market.
Scholars need to take a final a decisive step in accepting that, in empirical and conceptual terms,
the state and the market are part of the same, integrated system of governance: a state-
market condominium. This state-market condominium operates simultaneously through the
competitive pressures of the market and the political processes which shape the boundaries
and structures within which that competition (or lack thereof) takes place.
The dispute has yet to be settled: are we studying the ways in which economic and political
factors in the international system affect each other in a continuing fashion, or are we seeking to
explain the ways in which underlying social structures and relationships, among a range of actors
and institutions, generate the patterns of institutionalized and other aspects of political authority
in a transnational world? As Strange might have put it, 'politics of international economic
relations', or 'transnational political economy'?
A number of IPE specialists had always recognized the need to anchor generalizations about
world order in specific sectoral and indeed country case.
,Radical contributions to IPE can be split a number of ways but one must surely start with Marx
himself, who had always recognised that the market and industrial capitalism was a global
system.
To summarize the previous section, the more the state-market relationship was explored, the
more traditional analytical assumptions of orthodox economics and political
science/international relations could be questioned. The empirical examination of social and
economic interdependence across political boundaries threw into question the levels of analysis
assumptions of comparative politics and international relations. What is the respective role of
international versus domestic constraints, and how are they linked, as the world becomes more
transnational in nature? What role is there for structure versus agency in this process of
transformation?
In other words, the emergence of IPE was a reawakening and relinking of the study of 'things
international' with the broad tradition of social science scholarship from the French Physiocrats
onwards, via Smith, Marx, Keynes, Polanyi and the pioneers of the contemporary period. IPE
found its way by exploring its roots and in building (often difficult and tenuous) bridges with
other social science disciplines. And the process of building the field was a shared enterprise.
Scholars have assumed or merely invoked the interrelationship of political authority and markets.
But not adequately conceptualised it.
Tug-of-war (touwtrekken) between market forces and state attempts to control or direct them.
The claim is that the political economy is something greater than the sum of the state-market
parts
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that, in addition to flourishing, IPE has come of
age. Its emergence in the contemporary context was an answer to questions that
forms of academic specialization, IR and economics, were failing to address, let
alone answer. Its emergence was more a revival of older traditions than a new
development, but was no less welcome for that. That the discipline emerged in
a context of intense scholarly debate, incoherence, and with considerable input
from other social science fields is to be welcomed.
Yet IPE does need to be serious about theorizing the state-market relation-
ship. The pioneers failed to grapple successfully with this conceptual puzzle.
The article went on to argue for a conceptual leap which would generate a
genuine political economy approach: abandonment of the interdependent-yet-
dichotomous state-market conceptualization, and the adoption of the state-
market condominium model. We are all political and economic agents at one
and the same time, whatever the historical context. This argument is important
because it re-establishes the role of agency, the capacity to make normatively
informed policy choices concerning the nature and direction of the current
global transformation. We need to focus on who the political constituencies are
that need to be challenged in order to correct the balance of costs and benefits
of aspects of global economic integration, particularly the problem of inequality
and poverty.
The state-market condominium model therefore operationalizes political
economy and infuses the global economic development process with agency.
There is room for discretionary policy and action, even for the relatively vulnerable. We can, at
, least to a limited degree, affect the norms and values that underpin global order. As long as we
see only a tug-of-war between the state and the market, then the benefits of one will be
overshadowed by the costs of the other. The point is that we cannot have one without the
other. They exist in symbiosis. The argument also demonstrates the real importance of Strange's
insistence that we should focus not on states and markets as such, but on the
interaction of political authority and the market. Political authority is not just
vested in the formal institutions of states and their offshoots of governance such
as regimes, but is also present in the agents of the market as part of the state-
market condominium. The market is governance, even as it appears to work in
mysterious, private ways.
Lecture one
What is IPE?
State
- Allocating resources
Market
- Market forces
- Price mechanisms
Interaction between the state and the market.
Different definitions of IPE
1. Adam Smith Science of economies
2. Application of the methodology of formal economies
3. Specific economic theory (Collective action, Marxist theories).
Marginal utility always increases (in case of more money).
No irrational actors.
But the definition has evolved.
1. Interaction of state <-> market
2. Production and distribution of wealth
3. Distribution of power and welfare
4. Neither state or market is primary
Positive, facts.
Normative, should be.
Marx was mainly positive. We assume otherwise.
Lenin more normative.
Hagel Philosophy or right
v
State and society
Lindblom Exchange and authority
Blau Exchange of coercion
Andlesesa Power and money