Exam: Global European Governance
Lecture 1 | Introduction
Peace of Westphalia
● Peace treaty (1648) that marked the end of 80-year war (Netherlands-Spain).
● Important because:
○ Marks the birth of the international system as we know it
○ The first time exclusive sovereignty was defined in a treaty.
○ states as the main actors in international politics
Exclusive sovereignty
● internal sovereignty = state is the ultimate authority within the given borders (relationship
state-citizens).
● external sovereignty = other states in the international system recognize the authority of the
state (relationship between states)
What is the state?
4 defining characteristics in international law – montevideo convention
1. permanent population
2. a defined territory
3. government
4. capacity to enter into relations with other states.
→ in reality there are a lot of grey areas.
Characteristics of a modern state (Weber)
1. Monopoly over the legitimate use of violence: the government can reinforce rules through
police forces.
2. Bureaucracy: a state has an administration and is present in a citizen's life (e.g. DigiD, tax
incomes, CBS information gathering).
3. Political competition and contestation: The modern state is an arena for competition in
which a lot of different actors try to get their preferences across (e.g. lobby groups, private
companies, international finance, NGOs).
Origins of the state – 3 explanations (Spruyt, 2002)
Main question: Why did states arise?
Argument: there is a need for micro-level explanations (institutionalism) of state origins to
complement macro-level explanations, because macro-explanations neglect agency, multiplicity of
institutional types, choices of individuals, constraint and opportunities.
1) War effort (Charles Tilly)
a) Causal mechanism: the effects of war / changes in the military environment on state
capacity.
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, b) “War made the state and the state made war” – In order to wage wars, you need
resources (taxation and funds). This required the building of infrastructure and
administration, which led to state formation and structures.
i) War led to mobilisation, which led to state structures / formation
c) States that could not wage modern warfare were simply weeded out.
d) Contract between citizens and state: protection is exchanged for taxes.
2) Economic relations (Marx)
a) Causal mechanism: the growth of trade and production and the rise of capitalism
meant state formation was necessary to modernise economies.
b) Domestic: states emerged to protect the interests of the capitalist class / private
property owners against the working class.
c) International (trade and finance): Trade is a volatile thing, it depends on forces
outside of your territory. The state organisation grew with taxation efforts (getting
surplus resources from society as a means to compensate for lesser trade years).
3) Institutional necessity: solving coordination and cooperation problems.
a) Causal mechanism: states emerged as institutions/ organisational structure to resolve
cooperation and coordination problems.
i) transaction costs, information asymmetries, and principal-agent problems to
explain the choice of particular institutional arrangements.
b) States as solutions for efficient planning: states provide information, reduce
transaction costs, which creates micro-level incentives for individuals to pursue
innovation and profit. Those states that could provide this survived longer.
Spruyt: implication/relevance of discussion on state origins
● As an indicator for current state success (non-european states): from a military explanation
non-european states need a period of high-intensity war and military progression, whereas
from an economic or institutionalist perspective rising states do not need to mimic european
states.
● Future of states: Some debates regarding the origins, role, and future of the state in
contemporary political science confuse changes in the autonomy of the state with changes in
the institutional logic of territorial sovereignty. Whereas the autonomy of the state has
undergone a transformation in some respects, the principle of territorial sovereignty remains
robust.
What are coordination and cooperation problems? (Frieden, Lake & Schultz (2012)
The process of politics
Interests → preferences → preference interact with each other (competition of interests) → outcomes.
● Interests = what actors want to achieve through political action; represent how actors rank
alternative outcomes – 3 categories of interests:
○ Power security (realism): desire for security/power and the ability to dominate others
○ Economic / material welfare (liberalism): desire a higher quality of life
○ Ideological goals (constructivism): desire moral, religious or ideological goals
● Types of actors in international relations
○ Individuals
○ States
■ As composite actor with national interests
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, ■ As shorthand for a set of national representatives with their own interests.
○ Firms, industries or business associations
○ IGOs and NGOs
Interaction = the ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political
outcomes. In strategic interaction the actor involves the anticipated strategy of other actors in its own
strategy.
2 types of interaction:
● Cooperation = an interaction in which two or more actors adopt policies that make at least
one actor better off relative to the status quo without making others worse off (at least one
side wins, no sides lose).
2 types of cooperative interaction:
○ Coordination = a type of cooperative interaction in which actors benefit from all
making the same choices and subsequently have no incentive to not comply.
○ Collaboration = a type of cooperative interaction in which actors gain from working
together but nonetheless have incentives to not comply with any agreement.
● Bargaining = an interaction in which actors must choose outcomes that make one better off
at the expense of another. Bargaining is redistributive: it involves allocating a fixed sum of
value between different actors (one side wins at the expense of the other)
Obstacles to cooperation
● Lack of information: you don’t know the interests, priorities, transparency, intentions for the
future of another party.
● Lack of trust: Even if information is shared, it can be unclear if the other party is truthful.
Trust is thus essential.
● Free riding = someone fails to contribute to a public good while benefiting from other’s
contributions.
● Individual interests: lead actors to ‘defect’, or in other words, to adopt an uncooperative
strategy that undermines the collective goal.
Game theory: prisoners dilemma & battle of the sexes (a non-technical introduction)
General assumptions of game theory:
Players are…
● Rational: players aim to maximise their pay-off
● Informed
● Preferential: they have preferences
● Strategic: players have responses to anticipated actions of others
● Aimed at finding a solution/ equilibrium
3 main problems in cooperation (Frieden, Lake & Schultz, 2012)
1. Problem of collective action (public goods)
2. Problem of collaboration (prisoner’s dilemma)
3. Problem of coordination (battle of the sexes)
(1) Problems of collective action
= obstacles to cooperation that occur when actors have incentives to collaborate but each acts in
anticipation that others will pay the costs of cooperation.
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, ● Public goods = individually and socially desirable goods that are nonexcludable and nonrival
in consumption (e.g. bridge, roads, health).
○ Nonexcludable = if the service is provided to one person, others cannot be excluded
○ nonrival in consumption = if one person consumes/benefits from the public good,
this does not diminish the quantity available to others.
● These problems mean that public goods are nearly always provided by governments, which
have sovereignty and the power to make citizens comply.
(2) Problems of collaboration – Prisoner’s dilemma
= a type of cooperative interaction in which actors gain from working together but nonetheless have
incentives to not comply with any agreement.
● actors have a unilateral incentive to defect instead of cooperate, because by not defecting the
other player gets an advantage and the pay-off is much worse → represents being exploited.
● Exemplifies the security dilemma.
○ Example: soviet-US strategic nuclear arms proliferation (Cold war): the cost of not
building weapons is so high, both sides are forced to compete (defect).
● Nash-equilibrium = no player can increase their pay-off by switching strategy (both
prisoners defect – get 5 years instead of 1).
● In the prisoner's dilemma: cooperation becomes impossible, because of the fear of defection
(of the other) and the lack of a central authority.
(3) Problems of coordination – Battle of the Sexes
= a type of cooperative interaction in which actors benefit from all making the same choices and
subsequently have no incentive to not comply.
● In the battle of the sexes: Jack and Jane want to plan an activity together, Jane wants to
watch Football and Jack wants to watch the Opera. Both value being together more than being
alone in their respective activities. → creates multiple nash-equilibriums.
● Example: cars driving on the same side of the road
Real world – game theory
● Collaboration game (prisoners dilemma)
○ In cooperation there is always the risk of someone cheating.
○ Benefits from cheating are higher than benefits from sticking to cooperation.
● Coordination problem (battle of the sexes)
○ Difficult to find a common course
○ But not difficult to stick to it
→ states solve these cooperation problems domestically by making / enforcing laws (means of
violence and sovereignty).
But: How are these problems solved in international politics where a central authority is lacking?
Anarchy in international politics
Anarchy = lack of a higher authority in international relations.
● International politics takes place in an arena that has no overarching central authority
○ Anarchy ≠ lack of order or lawlessness
○ Anarchy ≠ chaos
● Anarchy is the main organisational assumption of global governance.
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