Table of Contents
Week 1 ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Reading 1: The mind-body problem ................................................................................................................................................ 3
Substance dualism ...................................................................................................................................................................... 3
The Identity Theory .................................................................................................................................................................... 4
Functionalism ............................................................................................................................................................................. 5
Reading 2: Clark&Chalmers: The Extended Mind ........................................................................................................................... 6
Extended Cognition .................................................................................................................................................................... 6
Week 2 ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Reading 3: Shafer-Landau: Consequentialism. Its Nature and Attractions. .................................................................................... 8
The Nature of Consequentialism ................................................................................................................................................ 9
Utilitarianism .............................................................................................................................................................................. 9
Maximising Goodness .............................................................................................................................................................. 10
Moral Knowledge ..................................................................................................................................................................... 10
Actual vs. Expected Results ...................................................................................................................................................... 10
Assessing Actions and Intentions ............................................................................................................................................. 11
The Attractions of Utilitarianism .............................................................................................................................................. 11
Reading 4: Killing and letting die .................................................................................................................................................. 12
Week 3 ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 12
Reading 5: Empiricism and After................................................................................................................................................... 12
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................................... 12
2. Empiricism Is Not a Natural Kind .......................................................................................................................................... 12
3. Anthropocentrism and Perceptual Ultimacy ........................................................................................................................ 12
4. Epistemic Purity .................................................................................................................................................................... 13
5. Scope Empiricism ................................................................................................................................................................. 14
6. Points of Contact with Reality .............................................................................................................................................. 14
7. Tracking Epistemic Pathways as an Alternative to Received Accounts of Confirmation ....................................................... 15
8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................ 15
Reading 6: Philosophy of Neuroscience ........................................................................................................................................ 17
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................................... 17
2. Looking Inward - Explanation in Neuroscience .................................................................................................................... 17
3. Looking Outward: What Can Philosophy of Neuroscience Tell Us About Science? .............................................................. 18
4. Looking Across: Neuroscientific Approaches to Philosophical Questions ............................................................................ 19
5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................ 21
Week 4: .................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
Reading 7: Nagel (1974) What is it like to be a bat ...................................................................................................................... 21
Reading 8: Do we have free will? .................................................................................................................................................. 22
Week 5 ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 22
Reading 9: What’s so bad about echo chambers? ........................................................................................................................ 22
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................. 22
What are echo chambers? ....................................................................................................................................................... 23
Veritism and right inputs and processes .................................................................................................................................. 23
The structural view ................................................................................................................................................................... 24
Reasons-undermining view ...................................................................................................................................................... 25
Objections and responses ........................................................................................................................................................ 25
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................ 26
Reading 10: Escape the Echo Chamber ......................................................................................................................................... 27
Epistemic Bubbles .................................................................................................................................................................... 27
Echo Chambers ......................................................................................................................................................................... 27
Escaping echo chambers .......................................................................................................................................................... 27
Post-Truth ................................................................................................................................................................................. 28
,Week 6 ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 28
Reading 11: Neurointerventions as Criminal Rehabilitation: An Ethical Review ........................................................................... 28
Part 1: Non Consent-Based Objections to the Neurocorrective Offer ...................................................................................... 28
Part 2: Consent-Based Objections to the Neurocorrective Offer ............................................................................................. 29
Part 3: Denying the Need for Valid Consent ............................................................................................................................. 30
Reading 12: Right to mental integrity ........................................................................................................................................... 30
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................. 30
The appeal to intuition ............................................................................................................................................................. 31
The appeal to the justificatory consistency .............................................................................................................................. 31
The appeal to the technological development ......................................................................................................................... 31
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................ 32
,Week 1
Reading 1: The mind-body problem
Substance dualism
Substance dualism posits that individuals have both a material body and an immaterial soul, with the soul serving as
the seat of mental processes.
- Despite the suggestion of separateness, proponents emphasize a continuous interaction between the soul and
body.
- While commonly associated with religious and paranormal ideas, René Descartes, a key figure in substance
dualism, defined the soul as immaterial and devoid of spatial extension.
- In his view, the essence of the immaterial soul is encapsulated in the term 'thinking,' covering all conscious
processes such as imagining, perceiving, desiring, believing, doubting, hoping, and dreaming.
Descartes' substance dualism originates from his pursuit of foundational scientific knowledge, seeking truths
immune to doubt.
- Through radical skepticism, he considered the possibility of doubting even the existence of the external world
and his own body.
- However, he concluded that the act of doubt itself was undeniable, giving rise to the famous proposition,
"Cogito, ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am).
- While this argument wasn't initially aimed at proving substance dualism, it posits the 'thinking thing' as the core
essence.
- Some find a proof of dualism in this argument using Leibniz's principle, suggesting that the thinking 'me' must be
distinct from the material body and brain because it possesses properties not shared with them.
Descartes' dualism is outlined:
- The first feature is the immaterial soul interacting with the material body.
- The second feature involves the mind as a domain separated from the external world, connected indirectly
through the senses and behavior.
Many who reject an immaterial soul still maintain the second feature, proposing a brain-body dualism. Thus, while
the immateriality of the soul is a hallmark of Cartesianism, the separation of the mind from the external world can
persist independently.
Descartes argued for substance dualism, asserting that material entities, including the body and brain, cannot
possess language, reasoning, or conscious experiences.
However, contemporary perspectives challenge this, given the existence of reasoning computers.
- Descartes' primary argument, rooted in doubt, contends that we can doubt the existence of the body but not the
thinking entity, suggesting they are not identical. This argument faces criticism.
- The counter-argument emphasizes that what one can think about an object (doubting its existence) isn't an
intrinsic property of the object, highlighting the distinction between ontology (what exists) and epistemology
(what we know).
- The doubt-based argument fails as it erroneously draws ontological conclusions from epistemological
differences.
The interaction problem challenges substance dualism, questioning how an immaterial soul can influence a material
body and vice versa. Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia raised this problem in correspondence with Descartes,
- "questioning the interaction between the two distinct realms of reality that material substances and immaterial
souls supposedly belong to"
- Descartes initially suggested the pineal gland as the point of interaction but admitted a lack of clarity.
- He likened it to the mystery of magnetism, asserting that lack of understanding doesn't negate the existence of
interaction.
- However, this defense is now considered weak, as contemporary knowledge has provided comprehensive
theories about phenomena like magnetism, undermining Descartes' analogy and highlighting the persistent
challenge of explaining mind-body interaction in substance dualism.
, The Identity Theory
In the 1950s, the 'identity theory' emerged, rejecting substance dualism by proposing that consciousness is identical
to brain processes. The identity theory became an alternative to substance dualism, providing a scientifically
defensible position regarding the nature of consciousness.
Ullin Place aimed to explain the claim that consciousness is a brain process. Unlike using 'is' to characterize or ascribe
a property, the identity theory employs 'is' to indicate identity, similar to saying "George Orwell is Eric Blair." In this
sense, consciousness is the very same process as a specific brain process, implying that consciousness is constituted
by a brain process. The identity theory does not define consciousness as a brain process but asserts their identity,
suggesting that, while it is logically possible for the mind to be immaterial, empirical evidence supports its material
nature.
J.J.C. Smart, influenced by Ullin Place's identity theory, extends its application to the entire mind, asserting that
scientific research supports the idea that the mind is the brain.
- Smart compares this discovery to identifying water as H₂O, emphasizing that while alternative possibilities exist,
empirical evidence points to the mind being the brain.
- Smart introduces the concept of "topic-neutral" mentalistic language, arguing that expressions about thoughts
and feelings do not commit to the nature of the mind, whether material or immaterial.
- This neutrality allows for a worldview that avoids unnecessary complications with unexplainable immaterial
entities.
The identity theory is divided into two forms: type-identity theory and token-identity theory.
- Type-identity theory, advocated by J.J.C. Smart, posits that each mental state of a specific type is identical to a
brain state of a corresponding type.
o For example, believing that Amsterdam is the capital of The Netherlands is identical to a particular brain-
state type.
- This theory suggests that individuals sharing the same mental state type also share a specific neural structure.
- If true, it implies the possibility of deciphering people's thoughts and feelings by examining their brains, as each
thought type corresponds to a distinct brain-state type.
The type-identity theory asserts that a specific mental state type, like pain, is identical to a very specific brain state
type.
- However, the challenge of multiple realization arises when animals with different brains appear capable of
experiencing the same mental state.
- For instance, humans and cows both seem to feel pain, yet their brains are significantly different. If type-identity
is accurate, they should share identical brain-state types for pain, which raises counterintuitive conclusions.
- One proposed solution is acknowledging various kinds of pain, suggesting that a cow's pain may differ somewhat
from human pain. However, this solution becomes problematic when considering experiences like visual
perception, where different animals likely perceive the same object despite having different brain types.
- Another instance of multiple realization is neural plasticity, where certain brain functions can be performed by
different parts of the brain after damage, challenging the strict requirements of the type-identity theory.
Token-identity theory emerged as a response to the challenge of multiple realization faced by type-identity theory.
- In token-identity theory, each token (instance) of a mental state type is considered identical to a token of a brain
state type. However, this doesn't necessitate type-identity, meaning not all tokens of a mental state type must
be identical to tokens of the same type of brain state.
- Token-identity theory allows for multiple realizations, acknowledging that various brain states can give rise to
the same mental state.
- Unlike type-identity theory, token-identity theory doesn't specify which mental states correspond to which brain
states. It recognizes the possibility of different brain configurations producing the same mental state, addressing
the issue of multiple realization and providing a more adaptable framework for understanding the relationship
between mental and brain states.
The identity theory, whether in its type or token form, faces a significant challenge in terms of explanatory power.
While it asserts that complex brain activity is identical to mental phenomena, such as thoughts and sensations, it
struggles to provide a satisfactory explanation for why this identity exists. Unlike identifying water as H₂O, where
