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Summary Putnam – Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the logic of two-level games
A summary of Putnam's article Diplomacy and Domestic Politics
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Putnam – Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the logic of two-level gamesInterpretations cast in terms either of domestic causes and international effects (second image)
or of international causes and domestic effects (second image reversed) would represent merely
partial equilibrium analysis and would miss an important part of the story; how the domestic
politics of several countries became entangled via an international negotiation. Much of the
existing literature on relations between domestic and international affairs consist either of ad
hoc list of countless domestic influences on foreign policy or of generic observations that
national and international affairs are somehow linked. A second stream of relevant theorizing
began with Deutsch and Haas on regional integration. Has emphasized the impact of parties
and interest groups on the process of European integration and his nation of spillover
recognized the feedback between domestic and international developments. The bureaucratic
school of foreign policy analysis initiated another promising attack on the problem of domestic
international interaction. More recently, the sophisticated work on domestic determinants of
foreign policy has focused on structural factors, particularly, state strength. Some work in the
state centric genre represents a unitary actor model run amok; the central proposition of this
paper is that the state derives its interest from and advocates policies consistent with the
international system at all times and under all circumstances.
The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two level
game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interest by pressuring the
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions
among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their
own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of
foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so
long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign. Each national political leader
appears at both game boards. Any key player at the international table who is dissatisfied with
the outcome may upset the game board, and any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at
the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat.
It is convenient analytically to decompose the process in two stages:
1. Bargaining between the negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement – level I
2. Separate discussion within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the
agreement – level II
Ratification may entail a formal voting procedure at level II but Putnam uses the term
generically to refer to any decision process at level II that is required to endorse or implement a
level I agreement, whether formally or informally. Domestic ratification of international
agreements might seem peculiar to democracies. The only formal constraint on the ratification
process is that since the identical agreement must be ratified by both sides, a preliminary level I
, agreement cannot be amended at level II without reopening the level I negotiations. For two
different reason, the contours of the level II win-sets are very important of understanding level I
agreements (why win-set size is important):
- Larger win-sets make level I agreements more likely
- The relative size of the respective level II win-sets will affect the distribution of the joint
gains from the international bargain
It is important to understand what circumstances affect win-set size. Three sets of factors are
especially important:
1. The size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power, preferences, and possible
coalitions among level II constituents
any testable two level theory of international negotiation must be rooted in a theory of domestic
politics, that is, a theory about the power and preferences of the major actors at level II. The
distinctive nature of homogeneous issues is thrown into sharp relief by contrasting them to
cases in which constituents preferences are more heterogeneous, so that any level I agreement
bears unevenly on them. Thus, an internationally coordinated reflation may encounter domestic
opposition both from those who think it goes too far, and from those who think it does not go
far enough. The problems facing level I negotiators dealing with a homogeneous conflict are
quite different from those facing negotiators dealing with a heterogeneous conflict. The task of a
negotiator is grappling instead with a heterogeneous conflict is more complicated, but
potentially more interesting. The composition of the active level II constituency also varies with
the politicization of the issue. The chief negotiator is faced with tradeoffs across different issues.
One kind of issue linkage is absolutely crucial to understanding how domestic and international
politics can become entangled. If bargaining is limited to level II, that tradeoff is not technically
feasible, but if the chief negotiator can broker an international deal that delivers more jobs, he
can overturn the initial outcome at the domestic table. Issue linkage at level I that alters the
feasible outcomes at level II is synergistic linkage.
2. The size of win-set depends on the level II political institutions
Ratification procedures clearly affect the size of the win set. For example, if a two-thirds vote is
required for ratification, the win-set will almost certainly be smaller than if only a simple
majority is required. The recent discussion of state strength and state autonomy is relevant here.
The greater the autonomy of central decision makers from their level II constituents, the larger
their win set and thus the greater the likelihood of achieving international agreement.
3. The size of the win-set depends on the strategies of level I negotiators
Each level I negotiator has an unequivocal interest in maximizing the other side’s win-set, but
with respect to its own win-set, his motives are mixed. The larger his win-set, the more easily he
can conclude an agreement, but also the weaker his bargaining position vis-avis the other
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