Literature IP
Lecture 1:
● Ansell, C., & Torfing, J. (2022). Introduction to the Handbook on Theories of
Governance. Handbook on Theories of Governance, Edward Elgar Publishing: 1-16 [15 p] on
Brightspace and online https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800371972
Doorgelezen; geen aantekeningen
● Alford, John, and Brian W. Head. "Wicked and less wicked problems: a
typology and a contingency framework." Policy and society 36.3 (2017): 397-413. [16 p]
https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2017.1361634
Paper about the wickedness of the problem and how a problem can be defined as ‘wicked’.
The literature offers a variety of alternative strategies for tackling wicked problems. Roberts
(2000), identified three possible types of intervention: authoritative, competitive and
collaborative besides traditional professional management.
Authoritative strategies entail strong leaders with clear directive authority. Their
strength is based on their ability or experience in making things happen.
Competitive strategy is sponsoring or fostering competition between societal actors to
come up with understandings of the problem and potential advances in dealing with
it. The competitive dynamics of this approach have the potential to intensify the
search for new ideas about tackling the problems.
The last strategy is collaborative like public consultation or participation in decision-
making. Many heads are better than one.
If our general attention is on unearthing problems and their solutions, then logically there are
three feasible possibilities (see Figure with the alternative types of complex problems):
1. Both the nature of the problem and the solution may be clear to the decision-makers
in question. This can encompass even issues that seem at first sight to be quite
complicated, such as the technical and planning challenges underpinning the
construction of the Channel Tunnel between France and England. This project
certainly encountered many difficulties that required enormous expertise. However,
the relevant skills and resources for designing and building the tunnel were known or
knowable, and were driven by two government sponsors who were committed to its
success. In other words, the relevant knowledge was ‘out there’; but it required large
effort to find, develop and apply it.
2. The nature and causes of the problem may be known, but the solution is not – and
indeed, it is difficult to find a sound solution owing to analytical or political
complexities.
3. Neither the problem itself nor the possible effective solutions are clearly known to the
decision-makers in question. The war on drugs seems to be a candidate for this
classification, as discussed below.
Assembling these elements, three major alternatives are conceivable:
1. The most tractable possibility is where neither knowledge nor interests are
fragmented between the managers and the stakeholders, and neither has a relative
power advantage. In this situation, it will be less difficult for the managers to access
relevant knowledge and to reach agreements with external parties about appropriate
actions for tackling wicked problems.
2. A moderately intractable situation arises where knowledge is fragmented among
various parties, and therefore takes time and effort to access, but the stakeholders
, are broadly in consensus or at least indifferent about the nature of the problem and
the possible solutions.
3. The least tractable alternative is where both knowledge and interests are fractured
among the various actors. In this situation, not only is the relevant knowledge about
the problem spread across multiple actors, each with a different part of that
knowledge, but also, their interests are such that they are reluctant to share
understandings with others who may be perceived as rivals
● Steurer, R (2013). Disentangling governance: A synoptic view of regulation by
government, business, and
civil society, Policy Science 46: 387-410: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2643330 or google the title. [24 p]
The present article has disentangled contemporary governance into seven basic types of
regulation, several interactions and hybridisations between them, and it added the concept of
meta-governance. Although the article emphasizes that actor constellations are important for
making sense of governance, it highlights that steering businesses today takes place in a
complex, poly-centered and multi-actor governance system that eroded the boundaries
between societal domains (e.g. by means of co-regulation). Of course, the typology
developed here portrays ideal-types that simplify the reality of everyday governance routines.
Two of the many complexities more or less ignored here stand out. First, although actors are
a useful criterion for differentiating types of regulation, the three societal domains are, of
course, no homogenous entities:
In the governmental domain, different levels of government have different
(complementary or competing) competencies that often result in diverging intentions
(in particular in federal states), and at each level, different ministries/departments (or
even different units within the same department) often have conflicting interests;
Although businesses all aim at making profits, the values, cultures and management
practices standing behind this common purpose (in particular the management of
CSR and stakeholder relations) vary widely: while some businesses accept societal
responsibilities (and even advocated for stricter public policies), others remain
defensive (for environmental protection, see Rowlands 2000; Gunningham et al.
2003);
Civil society is perhaps the vaguest of the three domains, consisting of very different
“function systems” such as religion, art, education, science and special interest CSOs
(Esmark 2009). In particular the latter pursue a variety of objectives, compete for
resources and struggle with tradeoffs between social and environmental concerns.
Despite these heterogeneities, the typology developed here shows adequately that all actors
of a particular societal domain have a limited number of steering approaches at hand that are
determined by their domain-specific resources.
Complexity increases further if we look closer at all the secondary characteristics of steering
that I mentioned at the beginning of section 3, among them the bindingness of rules and the
geographical scopes of steering. Regarding the latter, very similar (sometimes even
identical) forms of new governance can be found at and between several levels of
government. As the case of Shell in Nigeria illustrates, civil regulation often starts as a local
movement that first gains national and eventually international momentum (Wheeler et al.
2002). While differences between international and national regulation still exist in the
governmental domain, it seems that all other types of regulation blur not only the boundaries
between the public and the private (see section 2) but also those of geographical scopes.
Regarding the bindingness of rules, each type and subtype of regulation described above
can be broken down into several governance mechanisms and tools (such as voluntary
agreements or partnerships), and most of them (also voluntary ones) can be designed to be
more or less stringent, e.g. with regard to monitoring, reporting and sanctioning (see e.g.
McDermott et al. 2008). Consequently, similar governance tools from the same type of