Includes the following articles
o Badness, madness, and the brain – the late 19th century controversy on
immoral persons and the malfunctioning brains
o risk-need-responsivity model for offender assessment and rehabilitation
o The good lives model and conceptual issues in offender rehabilitation
o Biosocial studies of antisocial and violent behavior in children and adults:
a review
o The evidence for a neurobiological model of childhood antisocial
behavior
o Adolescence-limited and life-course-persistent antisocial behavior: a
developmental taxonomy
o Male antisocial behavior in adolescence and beyond
o Developmental origins of disruptive behavior problems: the ‘original sin’
hypothesis, epigenetics and their consequences for prevention
o A fundamental attribution error? Rethinking cognitive distortions
o the moral judgement of juvenile delinquents: a meta-analysis
o Human aggression
o Similarities and difference in impulsive / premeditated and reactive /
proactive bimodal classifications of aggression
o Sex differences in aggression between heterosexual partners: a meta-
analytic review
o A typology of men who are violent toward their female partners: making
sense of the heterogeneity in husband violence
o Triarchic conceptualization of psychopathy: developmental origins of
disinhibition, boldness, and meanness
o Is criminal behavior a central component of psychopathy? Conceptual
directions for resolving the debate
o Sexual preference for 14-year-olds as a mental disorder: you can’t be
serious!
o An integrated theory of sexual offending
Does not include but required reading:
o The response Modulation Hypothesis of psychopathy: a meta-analytic and
narrative analysis
o Characterizing the value of actuarial violence risk assessment
, Badness, madness, and the brain – the late 19th century
controversy on immoral persons and their malfunctioning brains
– Schirmann
William Bigg
Described as killer of animals, torturer of his siblings, and molester of girls. He has been
diagnosed with moral insanity or congenital defect of the moral sense. This diagnosis linked
immorality and neurobiology. In this period of time, medically trained experts used
neurobiological models of mental disorders. Immoral and insane were due a disordered brain.
Bad brains, bad persons: historical background
At the beginning of the 19th century, a reconceptualization of mental disorders took place. The
range of insanity was broadened. The notion of insanity no longer only applied to intellectual
defect, but also to affective disturbances. Immortality was transformed from sin to an effect of
insanity medical model of vice as pathology.
From the middle of the 19th century onwards, heredity came to be seen as an important cause
for mental illness. The concept has different, context-dependent meanings.
o Psychiatry: heredity signified the idea that psychological attributes or tendencies were
inherited from a person’s ancestors. Immoral persons were deemed to be result of
immoral ancestry.
Within the materialistic climate in psychiatry, experts linked mental disorders of
morality (moral insanity) to brain dysfunction; disrupted neural functioning could lead
to disturbed moral functioning.
o Criminal anthropologists: argued for the hereditary transmission of criminal
tendencies. Lombroso’s idea of the born criminal and the alleged visibility of
immorality were considered to be legitimate to people back then. A closely related
theory is the theory of degeneration. According to this theory, mental disorder and
criminality were inherited, and on top of that they worsen with each generation; it was
progressive. Darwin’s theory of evolution argues that morality had evolved through
the history of humankind, and therefore a sign of high and complex development;
immorality was a reversion.
Exemplary cases of immoral persons
William Bigg (continuation) - 1843
Bigg had been a hazard from an early age. After he had on multiple occasions tortured his
siblings, the family kept him from being alone with his younger siblings and locked him up
during the night. He was later arrested multiple times (he was released and escaped multiple
times). He was diagnosed with moral insanity. Moral insanity was introduced by Prichard in
1835 and initially referred to emotional insanity. It did not necessarily imply unethical
behavior. The term later attained an ethical connotation and related to Bigg’s diagnosis. Tuke,
who diagnosed Bigg, argued that a ‘physical cause’ (according to him hereditary) for a
person’s immoral behavior was the basis for distinguishing the morally insane from mere
sinners. He argued that in the case of Bigg, the older and more barbaric lower functions of the
brain were left uncontrolled and elicited wicked behavior; such a man as this is a reversion to
an old savage type, and is born by accident in the wrong century’.
Charles J. Guiteau – 1841-1882
After a life of villainy and disappointed aspirations, Guiteau shot President Garfield. The
ensuing trial revolved around the question whether or not he was insane. He eventually was
,declared sane and therefore guilty by the judge. However, experts disagreed on fundamental
issues. The diagnosis, the etiology of mental disorder and the validity of brain evidence were
highly controversial.
Jane Toppan – 1857-1938
Toppan had poisoned several of her employers. After the homicides, she took loving care of
some of her victims’ children and expressed intimate condolences to the bereaved. She
reported to not feel sorry or grief. The person assessing her for trial (Stedman) described her
as clear-headed, yet manipulative and adept at lying. She was found not guilty by reason of
insanity. Stedman based his conclusion on Toppan’s lack of remorse and self-control, her
indifference regarding her situation, and her insusceptibility to punishment. In his view, a
detrimental hereditary influence was the cause for her insanity; Stedman pointing to her
corrupted ancestry served as evidence for her insanity within the hereditary model of
explanation.
Patient E. – 1865-1893
A central question in continental disputes was whether morality could be compromised in
isolation leaving the intellect intact. Bleuler spurred the debate by describing the genre-
defining case of patient E. He was the offspring of a well-respected and mentally healthy
pastor’s family (no evidence for hereditary burden). He was institutionalized from his late
teens. He was diagnosed with a moral deficiency without delusions due to defective brain
organization. However, his brain state remains a mystery to this day.
Christiana Edmunds – 1828-1907
At age 43, Edmunds was accused of having murdered a boy. Her intellect was thought to be
(above-) average, but it was said that ‘she would have poisoned a whole city full of people
without hesitation, computation, or remorse’. She was diagnosed with moral insanity.
According to Maudsley’s interpretation of Edmunds’ condition, she never had a choice and a
moral life was not an option with her neurobiological endowment. Maudsley described her,
and comparable immoral beings, as being ‘as insensible to the moral relations of life as a
color-blind person is to certain colors’.
Bad brains, bad persons: late 19th century controversies
Brain-based explanations for immorality: at the end of the 19 th century, various biological
explanatory models for immorality coexisted: heredity, degeneration, evolutionary reversion
and brain-based models. These were not mutually exclusive.
Evidence for immoral brains: in all the above-mentioned cases, brain disorder was assumed
rather than observed.
Immorality versus criminality: in some cases, the brain intrudes in penal decision-making
processes. However, this caused some controversy because if immorality and criminality were
neurological diseases then all criminals could claim to suffer from some kinds of brain injury
to avoid punishment. Discriminating between immoral lunatics and mere criminals was
problematic. Tuke argued that for attesting moral insanity, careful consideration of the
individual circumstances was crucial.
Rethinking immoral persons in terms of bad brains: on the one hand, ascribing moral qualities
to the brain reduced part of the personhood to cerebral functioning; people’s brains are
beyond their control. On the other hand, the neurobiological purview augmented these
immoral persons; their brain, their biochemical composition and their hereditary make-up
were not integral parts of their moral being. Considering immoral behavior to be the
consequence of an insane brain divested immoral persons of responsibilities in a twofold way:
, o The brain as part of nature could not be held accountable.
o Persons being subjected to disease were not liable either.
Nature and disease prevented the ascription of responsibility and guilt to immoral persons.
There is a very pessimistic view of rehabilitation related to this; an affliction of the brain
could lead to a distortion of a person’s morality. If this affliction was permanent, the potential
for change was limited or even non-existent. This means that immoral persons are unalterable
and remain wicked until death.
Risk-need-responsivity model for offender assessment and
rehabilitation – Andrews & Bonta
The RNR is perhaps the most influential model for the assessment and treatment of offenders.
o Risk: match the level of service to the offender’s risk to re-offend
o Need: assess criminogenic needs and target them in treatment
o Responsivity: maximize the offender’s ability to learn from a rehabilitative
intervention by providing cognitive behavioral treatment and tailoring the intervention
to the learning style, motivation, abilities and strengths of the offender.
i) General responsivity: calls for the use of cognitive social learning methods to
influence behavior. These are the most effective regardless the type of offender.
ii) Specific responsivity: a fine-tuned version of the previous intervention. It takes
into account strengths, learning style, personality, motivation, and bio-social
characteristics of the individual.
A brief history of risk assessment
First generation: professional judgement
For the first half of the 20 th century, the assessment of offender risk was left in the hands of
probation officers and prison staff, and clinical professionals. The assessment of risk was a
matter of professional judgement.
Second generation: evidence-based tools
In the last half of the 20 th century, there was a growing recognition that the assessment of risk
needed to depend more on an evidence-based science. This would be based on items that have
been demonstrated to increase the risk of reoffending. Such tools are the SFS and the SIR.
These risk assessment instruments soon proved to be better at predicting criminal behavior
than professional judgement. Shortcomings to this method were that it is atheoretical, and that
the scales do not account for offenders changing for the better.
The period between 1970 and 1980: first generation assessment (professional judgement of
risk) second generation assessment (actuarial assessment of risk).
Third generation: evidence-based and dynamic
Research now focused on assessment instruments that included dynamic risk factors. These
instruments were sensitive to changes in an offender’s circumstances and also provided
correctional staff with information of what needs should be targeted in interventions. Changes
in scores on risk-need instruments are associated with changes in recidivism. The risk-need
instruments offer a way of monitoring the effectiveness of programs and supervision
strategies.
