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Lectures Global & European Governance
Summary of all lectures of Global & European Governance. Complete samenvatting/uitwerking van alle hoorcolleges van Global & European Governance.
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Voorbeeld van de inhoud
Global & European GovernanceHC 1 - January, 8 2019 - Introducton to Internatonal Relatonn
The ntate an the main actor in internatonal relatonn
Origins of modern states
If you want to understand modern states, you have to go back to origin of states. For this course, it’s important
to understand what’s in the contract of countries, it’s not about the history of states.
- The peace of Westphalia (1648) de geboorte van het internatonale systeem zoals we het kennen
o It ended the Thirty Years’ War and the Eighty Years’ War
o Authority is territorially demarcated within distnct borders the states have to be
recognized as specifc states. Territoria worden afgescheiden door middel van grenzen.
o Once you have a state and other people recognize that state, another state is not allowed to
intervene in the domestc aaairs of that state.
External & Internal sovereignty
In order for states to functon, they both have to have internal and external sovereignty.
- Internal: people recognize the authority of the state; staten hebben autonomie binnen hun eigen
grenzen.
- External: It means that partcular country is recognized that he or she has the exclusively authority and
power to govern and rule over people. That has to be recognized by everyone else. The government
monarch has an exclusive authority over a specifc territory, that is separated by borders. That
territory is recognized by other governments. Die andere landen zijn het eens om zich niet te
bemoeien met de binnenlandse relates van dat land. Het is immers niet hun territorium.
o It doesn’t mean that they have equal power. The states can be equal legally, but it doesn’t
mean that their power is also equal.
o This doesn’t mean that external sovereignty is always respected (vb. WOI en WOII).
Survival and the future of states
Why has the state been survived for so long? The basic idea that exists in the literature is that larger
organizatonal structures have proved to be less efcient or eaectve than a state. Why?
- Internal conficts over the legitmacy and supremacy of rules
o The state doesn’t have these problems. The state adapts rules that aaect all citzens in the
same way.
- Lack of exclusive control over a fxed territory
o In empires, there was never a fxed territory and it was never clear what the boundaries
were. The internatonal organizatons also have diaerent members, members are exitng,
there are new members. It’s difcult to actually create control. States don’t have this
problem.
- Divided communites without common natonal identfy
o It’s difcult to build or create communites. States doesn’t have an empire.
o States manage to identfy the citzens with their state.
- The decline of states’ sovereignty due to globalizaton
o It’s true that the autonomy of countries has decreased due to globalizaton. We have to
accept the rules that organizatons take and have to comply. But this doesn’t mean that the
sovereignty of states has been decreased.
Staten in internatonal politcn at the internatonal level:
- States as actors: states have diaerent interest and they want to express these diaerent interests.
Therefore, they interact with each other and try to get what they want.
- This doesn’t mean that states can’t express the same interests. There can be a distncton between
domestc and internatonal politcs. They say that government act diaerently in domestc area than
they do in internatonal politcs, when they have to interact with governments of other states. Why is
this the case? The most important assumpton is anarchy.
- Anarchy: it isn’t a lack of order. But we should look at anarchy as if it’s a lack of higher/central
authority that can impose sanctons. There is no higher authority that they can turn to for resolving a
, problem. There is no higher authority that could impose sanctons at defecton states that don’t
behave to the internatonal agreements.
o Leidt tot het 911 probleem: bij internatonale problemen kan je geen hogere autoriteit om
hulp vragen.
o What are the consequences of this lack of higher authority?
Confict
Internatonal relatons are about trying to fgure out the game. What is going on?
What game is being played? Is it a game where we collaborate or where we got a
confict? It creates problems of cooperaton. There is no higher authority that makes
the others cooperate. wantrouwen t.o.v. andere staten en onzekerheid over
intentes van andere actoren.
Cooperaton problemn: informal game theory
There are two cooperaton problems: Collaboraton vs. coordinaton problems
Collaboraton games: prisoner’s dilemma (zie het artkel)
Example: you have a country A and country B. They agree to stop mining gold and just mine a specifc amount
of gold and sell that amount of gold. They collaborate and don’t have to pay the costs of mining gold. However,
each of these countries wants to contnue mining gold, because the more they’re mining gold, the more beneft
they will get. Both countries are beter oa if they contnue mining gold. And both countries know that. What
will they do? Will they cooperate, will they stop mining gold or will they contnue mining gold? It depends on
the situaton: if they trust each other they will be cooperatng. But in fact, they don’t know if they can trust
each other, so they both will contnue mining gold (and choose for ‘defect’). In that case, they will get the
highest outcome in both situatons, without knowing what the other country will do. If they choose defect, the
possible outcome will be 4 or 2, instead of 3 or 1. If they both choose defect, the outcome will be 2 and 2.
Country B
Cooperate Defect
Country A Cooperate 3 3 1 4
Defect 4 1 2 2
Pay oas: 4 > 3 > 2 > 1
o Dominant strategy: non-cooperatve behavior De beste strategie van elk land (zonder te
weten wat de ander doet) is wanneer een van de twee staten niet meewerkt (defect).
Hiermee behalen ze de hoogste opbrengst.
o Nash equillbrium: both players will defect outcome is 2 and 2.
- The beter outcome will be if they both cooperate, but according to theories, it’s almost impossible to
choose for this opton, because you don’t know what the other country will do. If you choose for
cooperate and the other country chooses for defect, then you’ll get the lowest outcome. If you choose
for defect, without knowing what the other country will choose, then you’ll get the highest outcome
possible.
Coordinaton games
- Batle of the sexes
o Where do you and your partner what to spend your holidays?
You like to put eaort to come to an agreement. Once you have agreed to go hiking
or lying on the beach, you want to do that actvity. The difcult part is what the
agreement would be about.
You don’t want to do the actvites separately.
When you play this game, there are two diaerent outcomes: you either go together
hiking or you go together to the beach.
The queston is: which one will prevail?
Partner 2
Hiking Beach
Partner 1 Hiking 4 3 2 2
, Beach 1 1 3 4
Pay-oas: 4 > 3 > 2 > 1
- How do they make sure the laws are harmonized? It’s clear that a lot of countries provide from free
trades, but the queston is: which products will beneft from this trade and which not? Which
memberstate system are you going to adopt?
- How to induce cooperaton?
o Pre-commitment / limitatons
o Emotonally blackmail your partner to join you because of the costs (some countries who
have already put a lot of costs into the agreement can use this method to infuence the
decision-making process).
o Power of the weak you are kind of weak when you say that your citzens are agreeing with
this stand. You need to give them some concessions.
o Change things this tme we’re going to the beach and hope that we’re going to hike next
tme.
o Threat you can threat them and try to force them to do what you want them to do.
o Bribes you can promise something in exchange for something else.
o Gender setng you’re the one that decides where to go on vacaton and you are only
looking at hiking locatons.
Pareto fronter: de twee extreme posites vertegenwoordigen een Pareto optmum, dus ook alle mogelijke
combinates, deze kunnen worden weergeven op een Pareto fronter.
Implicatonn from anarchy
- Collaboraton leads to defecton problems
o Benefts from cheatng are higher than the benefts from stcking to a deal (cooperatng)
o Fear of being exploited
- Coordinaton leads to agreement problems
o It is hard to agree on a soluton, but once you agree on a soluton, it is easy to stck to it.
o States are not always actors and not always sure which game they’re playing. A state of
anarchy is not always clear. Some actors will be thinking that they are playing an coordinaton
game and others will think that they’re playing an defending game (think about the game the
Isle of Ted in the tutorial)
, HC 2 - January 11, 2019 - Realinm & UN
Realinm
Realism is mostly focused on a partcular problem in internatonal politcs: the security dilemma. The security
dilemma is one of the major issues that tes a lot of realists together. The purpose of a state is to feel more
secure and to survive and to survive, you need to feel more secure. So, understand that it’s ofen a cumulate of
incapability’s in order to prevent other states from atacking it and destroying it completely. Once you decide
to do this, other states think about your intensions. That’s what we call the dilemma of interpretaton: how do
we interpret the signals that other countries send us?
The second dilemma is: How do we respond to that? Or we interpret it that they want to impose their
preferences and are more likely to wage war against their enemies. This is ofen one of the dilemma’s in
internatonal relatons. The problem here is, you can’t be certain as a state leader that today’s intentons and
motves will be the same as in the future. Even if today’s government is very denying and doesn’t want to
atack other countries, maybe tomorrow’s government will be diaerent. Maybe there will be some changes.
What you ofen do is at the dilemma of response is that you start building yourself because, as a state leader,
you want to be secure from invasion. In the end this contnuous and you end up in a less safe world.
The security dilemma ends in a way called the Security paradox: By actng in a way to feel safer, you actually
end up less secure, because the world is full of weapons, every country is militarized.
The queston is, why would other states trust you that you won’t build an army or that you won’t be aggressive
in the future? This is one of the major problems of realism. This reminds you of the following: it’s a Prisoners
Dilemma you want to be safe, thus the whole idea is to avoid prisons, weapons, war, but by doing that, you
actually create a suboptmal outcome, an outcome you didn’t intend to do. In this case that would be a less
safe world.
There are very diverse forms of realism. If you want to unify all the diaerent kinds and theories of realism, they
all have three main assumptons:
1. Groupism understanding of how the world works
Individuals are members of a group and they act as members of a group. They’re unifed by a
common identty and they share an in-group cohesion. The same tme, the more you identfy
by a partcular group (in-group cohesion), the more it leads to out-group animosity.
Best example: natonal identtes; the states.
Naton states are the main organizaton and the most successful in organizing societes. The
state is the most unifed groupism according to realists.
2. Egoism self-interest; desire to win, getng the most proft
Self-interest drives politcal behavior
The primary goal of a state is survival, based on the realist theories. Because of that they
need to pursue their self-interest in internatonal politcs. They need a kind of secure from
outside invasion.
3. Power centrism
Based on the realism theories, we leave in unequal societes: some countries have higher
populaton, some have more power in terms of economics and some have more power in
military sources.
Power is one of the most important concepts in realism. You never know if your friends
become your enemies in the future.
There are diaerent states that compete with each other. This is also in everyday life (vb.
sportclub/hockeyteam: your self-interst is to win and if you don’t win, the others win and you
lose. To do that, you need to cumulate more power). It’s a very compettve world.
Varieten of realinm
Realism is a very broad church and very diverse approach in politcs. It contains of:
- Classical realists
- Structural realists (also called neorealists)
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