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studiemateriaal.
Inhoudsopgave
Cognition and emotion H3: cognitive theories of emotion p. 2
Cognition and emotion H4: cognitive theories of emotional disorders p. 11
A cognitive approach to panic p. 17
Modification of information-processing biases in emotional disorders p. 21
Cognitive behavioral processes across psychological disorders p. 24
H2: attention
Cognitive behavioral processes across psychological disorders p. 29
H5: thoughts
Anxiety disorders in children and adolescents p. 33
Depression in children and adolescents p. 36
Interpersonal processes in social phobia p. 39
Interpersonal processes in depression p. 45
Familial and social environments in the etiology and maintenance of p. 50
anxiety disorders
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,Cognition and emotion H3: Cognitive theories of emotion
Mick Power and Tim Dalgleish
Introduction
The starting point for the theories to be presented in this chapter is an attempt to
provide a cognitive account of normal emotions. One of the issues that highlights the
question of the role of cognition in emotion arises from the focus of the so-called Zajonc-
Lazarus debate. The debate centered on the question of the primacy of affect or the
primacy of cognition in the generation of emotion. Zajonc argued that the initial
processing of stimuli assesses the affective tone of the stimulus as positive or negative,
safe or threatening, and that ‘cognitive’ processes occur subsequent to this affective
processing. Lazarus argues that Zajonc had confused conscious processing with cognitive
processing, and that he had assumed that any automatic processes were affective
processes.
The ‘emotion’ and the ‘cognition’ are integral and inseparable parts of each other, and
though it is useful to use different names for different aspects of the generation of
emotion, the parts are no more separable than are waves from the water on which they
occur. Both the categorical and the dimensional approaches have strong vocal
proponents, and both have been very influential areas of psychology and adjoining
fields. Although appraisal theorists generally agree that there has to be some basic
categorization of emotions, there is no agreement about how many such basic emotions
there should be.
Categorical versus dimensional approaches to emotion
There have been long-standing proposals about whether or not emotions are best
characterized by specific dimensions or by discrete categories of emotions.
Dimensions
Osgood’s work on the “semantic differential” identified dimensions related to arousal and
valence in factors that consistently emerged from ratings of verbal and pictorial mood
and emotion-related stimuli. The Watson et al. (1998) Positive and Negative Affect Scale
(PANAS) based on the model continues in widespread use. The scale consists of 20
positive and negative affect-related items, which the respondent has to indicate whether
or not the item currently applies. Although studies such as these of self-reported
emotion and affect have been takes to support the dimensional structure of emotion,
with most support for two separate dimensions of Valence and Arousal, there are a
number of shortcomings of these studies in relation to measurement problems.
Basic emotions
The issue of whether there are some emotions that are more fundamental or basic than
others has exercised the minds of emotion theorists. This concept of basicness – the idea
that there is a small handful of core human emotions – has considerable purchasing
power for theoretical psychology. Potentially, it provides a framework within which to
divide up, integrate and organize the confusion of our emotional experience. It was not
until the publication of Darwin’s book, “The Expression of The Emotions in Man and
Animals”, that serious consideration was paid to the potential importance of basic
emotions in biology and psychology. Since Darwin, the basic emotion debate has shifted
in and out of fashion.
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,A formulation of the basic emotion debate in terms of the philosophy of
emotion
The concept of emotion includes an event, a perception or interpretation, an appraisal,
physiological change, a propensity for action, and conscious awareness. Emotion as a
paradigm case could also embrace overt behavior. It is only meaningful to distinguish
one emotion from another on the basis of the appraisal components. A case can be made
for distinguishing emotions on the basis of core components other than appraisal. A
number of authors, such as William James, have suggested that emotions can be
distinguished on the basis of physiology. While there may be differences in this behavior
between emotions, there is also considerable overlap and it is not possible to distinguish
emotions on the basis of their behavioral or physiological correlates alone. It is more
parsimonious to propose that there are a number of distinct autonomic states associated
with emotion but that some states may be associated with more than one emotion and
hence one cannot distinguish emotions on the basis of physiology alone.
A common criticism of basic emotions is that they are an empirically driven concept with
little theoretical justification. In addition, there are numerous conflicting definitions and
proposals about what basic emotions are. Within the framework that we have proposed,
basic emotions would very clearly be a small set of core emotions in the form of
combinations of the components of event, interpretation, physiological change,
appraisal, propensity for action, and conscious awareness. A strong version of the basic
emotion theory would be to suggest that there is a universal set of appraisal scenarios
found in all cultures, that these appraisal scenarios are distinct from each other, and that
they cannot be reduced to more fundamental appraisal components. A weaker form of
the basic emotion theory would be to argue that there are a number of common and
central appraisal scenarios, distinct from each other, which emerge in human societies
and which underlie and shape emotional development.
In sum, most researchers in the area of basic emotions have argues for a core set of
emotions that can be distinguished by distinct universal or physiological components. We
propose that a basic emotion is one that incorporates one of a core set of basic scenarios
that may either be distinct and universal or merely distinct, ubiquitous and subjective to
minor variation. The most useful evidence would consist of data in support of the
existence of a set of universal appraisal scenarios. Unfortunately, there is almost a
complete absence of research on this kind.
The arguments for basic emotions
While acknowledging a diversity among proponents of the basic emotion concept, Ekman
et al. (1972) have pointed out that every investigator has obtained evidence for a
central list of six basic emotions – namely, happiness, surprise, fear, sadness, anger and
disgust. The general point to make is that there are many affects – that is, consciously
experienced valenced states that are not related to emotion but that are related to drive-
states or to other cognitive experiential states. Ekman suggests 9 characteristics that
distinguish basic emotion:
1) Distinctive universals in antecedent events. Perhaps the most important
point to make about Stein’s theory is that the nature of the appraisal associated
with each basic emotion is defined functionally. In this analysis, then, there exist
a small number of core human goals that are shared across cultures. These goals
are, in turn, associated with a core set of appraisal, planning and action
processes relating to the attainment, maintenance and reinstatement of the
goals. Basic emotions are seen as those that incorporate appraisal processes
linked to these pan-cultural, universal goals. Nevertheless, the evidence points to
some universal aspects of appraisal, in addition to some understandable cultural
variation;
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, 2) Distinct universal signals. Much of the research that has considered whether
emotions can be distinguished from each other in terms of facial expression, in
contrast to the work considered earlier, which has focused on self-reported affect.
The work on facial expression has shown that there are a small number of core
emotions, each of which can be characterized by a unique configuration of facial
musculature. The empirical core of Ekman’s thesis is a series of studies that seem
to show that different cultures label emotions in the same way. Several other
authors have questioned the universality thesis. They argue that it is not facial
expressions that are universal signals but the single muscle actions from which
the expressions are compiled. Russell raises an issue about the ecological validity
of much of the research, pointing out that it has mostly been carried out with
Westernized participants. In sum, according to Russell, the jury is still out on the
question of distinctive universal signals. We have suggested that the search for a
concept of basicness within behavioral correlates or signals of emotion such as
facial expression is not conclusive;
3) Distinctive physiology. The work of LeDoux and colleagues on fear conditioning
in the rat has identified the importance of a fast, direct route via the thalamus to
the amygdala, and a higher indirect route for slower, more detailed processing via
the cortex to the amygdala. We find it difficult to agree with the logic of the
approach if it states that only those emotions that have dedicated neural circuits
can be considered basic. The demonstration that fear conditioning can occur via a
direct rapid route or via a slower cortical route shows that even within the
affective neuroscience of fear, there is considerable complexity with emotion
mechanisms continuing to develop along with higher brain mechanisms. Perhaps
no such straightforward dedicated neural circuit could ever be identified for
happiness. The variation in underlying physiology between different
manifestations of the same emotion can be greater than the differences between
emotions;
4) Presence in other primates;
5) Coherence among emotional response;
6) Quick onset;
7) Brief duration;
8) Automatic appraisal;
9) Unbidden occurrence.
Towards a core set of basic emotions
Extrapolating from all three approaches, there is a core list of basic emotions: anger,
sadness, fear and disgust. These four basic emotions would involve appraisals of stimuli
in terms of current goals and plans being in some way compromised. However, there is
also a place for an emotional response to goals and plans being successfully maintained.
Happiness should also be regarded as a basic emotion.
The higher order factor provides an interesting question for interpretation: some
individuals are simply more emotional than others. Such higher-order factors can also be
interpreted to show correlations between pairs of emotions. To conclude, we have
arrived at a list of basic emotions as follows: anger, fear, disgust, sadness and
happiness.
Network theories
Network theories follow in a long tradition. One of the most detailed and elegant network
models of autobiographical memory was presented by Breuer and Freud in 1895. Freud
argued that one or more early traumatic events, thoughts of wished can form a
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