Literature week 2 Core Debates in PS
Lecture 3
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, “How Democracies Die” - YouTube video
Inspired by Trump’s rise, they wrote this book. They recognized Trump to be authoritarian, based upon
observations elsewhere. They do not see him as the problem, but as a symptom of the problem.
How does a democracy avoid getting authoritarian leaders in a place of lead in the first place? -> think
about this, because democracies are about freedom of elections.
There is a strain of authoritarianism running through the USA as a substrain of political culture; since the
1930s there have been 30-35% approval rates. But none of these figures have ever made it to presidency
(e.g. Henry Ford). But with Trump it did. Reasons:
1. The way presidents are chosen has changed -> not anymore selected by party leaders in the
“smoke-filled backroom”. This way, extremists couldn’t get to presidency (filtration system).
After 1968; voters can select the president-candidates. More dangerous in Republican parties
because they do not use the concept of superdelegates.
2. Authoritarians come to power not on their own, but with their allies from the Republican party.
Do mainstream politicians draw a line, or do they overlook the democratic violations/do they
enable the autocrat? This paves the way for the authoritarian. This also happened in Italy
(Mussolini) and Germany (Hitler).
a. Mistake of the mainstream politician: They hope to lift on the popularity of the
authoritarian. They think they can keep them from crossing the line.
3. The constitution by itself was not enough to protect the country. Even though the USA has a
really strong constitution. Constitutions work best when these two unwritten norms are accepted
(the soft guardrails):
a. Mutual toleration; accepting legitimacy of our partisan opponents, not viewing each other
as rivals
b. Institutional forbearance; self-restraint of not using all of our powers -> institutional
hardball; undermining the letter of the law by using it in a way that is not aligned with its
spirit
i. In the last 30 years these two norms have been eroded. By the 2000s, leading
Republicans have started to question the legitimacy of their Democrat opponents.
When we come to see our opponents are rivals, we are more inclined to let go of
institutional forbearance, because you feel like you need to stop them.
1. Why? Norm erosion is driven by partisan polarisation. Today there is
huge polarisation. Politics is not anymore just about taxes, healthcare,
etc, but also on race, religion, skin colour, culture:
a. Successes of civil rights movements -> Southern Americans
became more Republican. Afro Americans to democratic party.
b. Immigration -> Most immigrants moved to Democrats
c. Christians moved to Republicans
i. This led to the Republicans remaining mostly white and
Democrats were mostly coloured
, ii. Polarisation is fueled by that these white Christians
(Republicans) feel like their country is being taken away
from them, they feel like there is an existential threat
iii. When we see the other as an enemy, we start to justify
radical moves like election fraud.
What has to be done?
- The Republican party has to be more diverse; not only white Christian males
- Democrats should play tit-for-tat; play them at their own game?
- NO. This will spiral and lead to normalisation. -> when they will they should build the
most huge coalition, also with private parties and make sure they are not going down the
spiral. A lot of deliberations should take place.
- They should return to forbearance, even when they view it as “weak”
- Really tough dilemma, no easy choice for the opposition
- Democrats should win the elections
The role of inequality:
- Inequality also leads to more polarisation
After the civil war the polarisation between the two sides diminished because the Republicans made a
compromise on removing racial equality from the political agenda. This pleased the Democrats.
The limits of the court in protecting us:
- Supreme Court is originally a small, conservative court
- So doesn’t like to go political
- Only time the SC will rule that president overstepped its bound, is when Congress votes that this
happened
- So SC uses a lot of forbearance
- So SC is quite good at checks and balances
Sometimes leaders invent a crisis.
Why not change the electoral form?
- USA is attached to its political Constitution from the 1700s -> therefore a lot of political
legitimacy. E.g. in Europe a lot of Constitutions have changed after WWII.
- Usually one side is benefiting from the status quo, so hard to get consensus
Two-party system: there is no way that these two parties can represent all citizens. They are now more
homogenous than they were in the past.
Weakening of social groups (e.g. Unions) leads to less people voting. Because parties link to social group.
On democratic backsliding - Bermeo (2016)
Scholars have devoted huge amounts of attention to explaining why democracies break down, but
systematic and explicitly comparative work on precisely how they break down has been less common.
, Democratic backsliding at its most basic denotes the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the
political institutions that sustain an existing democracy. But this could be by any institution and by any
actor; so very broadly defined.
Backsliding might result in either complete democratic failure or the weakening of institutions without a
clear regime shift. In fluid and unclear situations, it becomes increasingly difficult to take effective action
to defend democracy.
Positive trends
- Coups d'état have declined since the Cold War, especially military coups, as the likelihood of
democracies being targeted has dropped dramatically.
- Executive coups, where leaders suspend constitutions to gain power, were common during the
Cold War but have plummeted since the 1990s, with only one recorded between 2000 and 2013.
- Election-day vote fraud has also seen a decline, with blatant fraud becoming less common,
though more subtle forms of electoral malpractice remain. Observers report fewer incidents of
ballot-stuffing or count falsification.
Continuing challenges
- Promissory coups: Promissory coups are a type of democratic backsliding where leaders oust an
elected government, framing the action as temporary and pledging to restore democracy through
elections. These coups have become more common, rising from 35% before 1990 to 85%
afterward. However, the promised elections often either take a long time or favor the coup
leaders, rarely leading to stronger democracies. In several cases, coup opponents won elections,
but significant democratic improvements have generally remained elusive, with few exceptions.
Most nations see democracy weakened after such coups.
- Executive aggrandizement refers to the gradual weakening of checks on executive power by an
elected leader without replacing the executive itself. Unlike coups, it happens slowly, often
through legal means, such as constitutional reforms, referenda, or gaining control of legislatures
or courts. These changes are framed as democratic because they are made by elected officials.
This process hampers the ability of opposition forces to challenge the executive, concentrating
power over time without an overt, immediate overthrow of institutions. This trend can occur
under both populist and non-populist leaders.
- Strategic election manipulation is a subtle form of democratic backsliding, where incumbents tilt
the electoral process in their favor without resorting to blatant fraud. This includes manipulating
media access, using government resources for campaigns, disqualifying opposition candidates,
and altering electoral rules, all while maintaining the appearance of legality. It differs from overt
election-day fraud by happening before the election and avoiding obvious violations. The rise in
election monitoring has pushed politicians to adopt these strategic methods, making election
manipulation harder to detect.
Confronting backsliding
- The decline of coups has shifted democratic backsliding toward a slower, incremental process
rather than sudden, violent collapses. This form of erosion, often achieved through executive
aggrandizement and strategic election manipulation, weakens democracy bit by bit, posing unique
scholarly and political challenges. Research tends to focus on outright democratic collapses,