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Summary Geo-economics literature
Geo-economics, all relevant literature combined with the summaries from the lectures. With this summary and the lectures I got a 8,7!
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WEEK 1Blackwill, D., Harris, J. (2016). Chapter 1: ‘What is Geoeconomics?’ in War by Other
Means – Geoeconomics and Statecraft, Harvard University Press.
What is Geo-economics?
p. 1: The term geo-economics is in much use today, but almost always without a
specific working definition. Some authors tend to focus on the use of geopolitical or
military power for economic ends. Others tend to define geo-economics more
broadly, as “the entanglement of international economics, geopolitics, and strategy”,
a kind of catch all definition that obscures more than it clarifies. Still other primarily
stress trade and the protection of industries.
p. 2: history has not looked kindly on any country that has allowed its geopolitical
responsibilities to outstrip its economic wherewithal for long. It is as good a universal
law as one could hope to find in politics. And just as with physical laws of nature,
there is no exceptions for size: great powers have found their economic
constraints no more pliant(=soepel) in the face of geopolitical burdens
than any other country.
These and other earlier interpretations of geo-economics are useful, but they are also
incomplete.
p. 3: We urge the following definition of geo-economics:
Geo-economics: the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national
interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other
nations’ economic actions on a country’s geopolitical goals.
On this understanding, geo-economics stands as both a method of analysis and a
form of statecraft.
The fist dimension of this three-part definition (“the use of economic instruments to
promote and defend national interests”) applies in a general way to traditional
understandings of how domestic economic strength promotes US power projection,
at least in theory.
p.4: similarly, the final element of this definition of geo-economics (“the effects of
other nations’ economic actions on a country’s geopolitical goals”), while
historically underattended(=ondergewaardeerd) compared to other aspects of IRs,
,has attracted growing interest in recent years. The revival of international political
economy certainly deserves some of the credit for this renewed interest.
But across much of the literature, the predominant focus remains at the level of the
system, rather than nation-state, in attempts to explain how broad economic
phenomena might impact multilateral institutions (like globalization).
Alan Dobson: “economic affairs still often sit uneasily beside political and diplomatic
matters.”
p. 5: Given their magnitude and long tails, both The financial crisis (08/09) & the rise
of China have helped bring economic phenomena and their geopolitical impacts into
foreign policy reporting and commentary.
pp. 5-6: Our focus is instead the middle element of our definition of geo-economics
“the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national
interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results”. For it is these
economic techniques of statecraft that, while aptly describing much of foreign policy
practice today, puzzlingly remain underexplored territory, especially in any
conceptual way and especially in the US.
pp. 8-9: It is worth elaborating our definition with a few additional clarifying points:
p. 9: Point 1: Geo-economics is different from geopolitics
Rather than focusing on economics as the means to advance geopolitical aims, some
definitions of geo-economics have reversed this means-ends relationship,
emphasizing instead how countries might apply military or geopolitical muscle (hard
power) to bring about beneficial economic results.
Part of the difficulty is that, much like geo-economics, there is no single agreed-upon
definition for geopolitics; if anything, that term is invoked even more loosely than
geo-economics.
pp. 9-10: Widely cited definition: geopolitics is a method of foreign policy analysis
that seeks to understand, explain and predict international political behavior
primarily in term of geographical variables. Other more general definitions tend to
focus on the relationship between politics and terriroti-that is, the art and practice of
using political power over a given terroroty.
,p. 10: put otherwise, geopolitics is really a set of assumptions about how a
state exercises power over territory-what constitutes this power, and how
it is increased and spent down.
Most geopolitical accounts traditionally explain and predict state power by reference
to a host of geographic factors (territory, population, economic performance, natural
resources, military capabilities, etc.) Geo-economics, in our view, is about providing a
parallel account of how a state builds and exercises power by reference to economic
factors rather than geographic ones. On this understanding, then, the use of military
power in service of economic goals fits more comfortably as a facet of geopolitics than
of geo-economics.
pp. 10-11: The logic of geopolitics is traditionally zero-sum, while the logic of
economics is traditionally positive-sum.
p. 11: Mandelbaum: “the heart of politics is power; the aim of economics is wealth.
Power is inherently limited. The quest for power is therefore competitive. It is a ‘zero-
sum game.’ Wealth, is limitless, which makes economics a positive-sum game.”
It turns out however, that when [economic actions] put to geopolitical use,
economic instruments can produce outcomes that are every bit as powerful
and as zero-sum as those resulting from traditional military showings of state
power.
pp. 12-13: “separation of economics from US foreign policy and security policy
reflects a shift from earlier American experience. For its first 150 years, the
American foreign-policy tradition was deeply infused with economic
logic. Unfortunately, thinking about international political economy has become a
lost art in the US.”
p. 13: if the US was once so adept at this brand of economics-centered statecraft, why
are we not anymore? (Ch. 6)
Point 2: To focus on the use of economic instruments to advance
geopolitical ends is to say nothing about the nature of the ends
themselves; whether the ends of foreign policy are also changing stand as
a separate question.
,If some understandings of geo-economics employ a reverse means-ends
configuration (again, military power in service of economic aims), others focus only
on the ends.
Indeed, many a foreign policy commentary has invoked the term geo-economics as a
way of arguing that priorities of foreign policy either would or should shift toward
economic goals and away from military-oriented ones.
p. 14: Edward Luttwak 1990: “As the relevance of military threats and military
alliances wanes, geo-economic priorities and modalities are becoming dominant in
state action.”
p. 15: Geo-economics approaches are concerned only with how states are exercising
economic and financial tools to achieve their desired geopolitical aims. However, as a
state comes to perceive the geopolitical climate as increasingly about economic power
projections and hones its own geo-economic reflexes accordingly, it may be the case
they this realization and re-tooling process leads to changes in its foreign policy
strategies.
States can and often do design geo-economic policies that simultaneously advance
multiple interests – geopolitical, economic, and otherwise. China’s strategic
investments in Africa stand as perhaps the strongest example. But in this respect,
geo-economics is no different from any other brand of statecraft (think, for example,
of the economic spoils that war can produce). It is the presence (and not the solitary
presence) of an important geopolitical interest that is controlling, in other words.
p. 16: Point 3: Geo-economics attempts at power projection can take
many forms. And just as not all states are created equal in their capacity
to project geopolitical power, there are certain structural features – or
geo-economics endowments – that dictate how effective a country is
likely to be in the use of geo-economic tools.
Not only do states deploy geo-economic tools against a broad range of noneconomic
ends, they also use these tools in a variety of ways. The most obvious distinction here
is between positive and coercive forms of geo-economic leverage.
But geo-economic attempts differ across a range of other scores: objectives can be
shorter-term or longer-term; some measures are more transactional (where
,objectives are narrowly construed and anticipated benefits are fairly well identified),
while other are more general (where objectives are broader and benefits are less
understood); and the range of geo-economics techniques during wartime will differ
from those in peacetime or in the absence of active military conflict.
Geo-economic power, like geopolitical power, is a function of certain structural
factors and policy choices. Much as states differ in their capacity to project
geopolitical power, there are certain structural features – or geo-economic
endowments – that shape how successful a country is likely to be in the use of geo-
economic tools.
p. 18: Point 4: There are some fuzzy, borderline cases.
When it comes to applying this conception of geo-economics to real-world cases, no
matter how carefully constructed the parameters, inevitably certain fuzzy, borderline
examples will arise.
P. 19: The actions and policies of interest here are economic techniques of
statecraft; sometimes these techniques will involve tools that are
straightforwardly economic in nature, and other occasions they will involve
mechanism that are not purely economic in nature but where the means by
which states are trying to influence the behavior of other states are economic
cyberattacks against critical economic infrastructure of another country would
be considered geo-economic, whereas against military and other government
target not.
That is not to say that geo-economic techniques of statecraft cannot exist in
conditions of warfare; they can! But the choice to counterfeit an enemy’s currency
during wartime, for instance – a clear form of geo-economic statecraft – stands as an
enterprise substantially separate from questions of military targets and war-fighting
strategy.
Economic blockades that rely on aspects of military power arguably pose something
of a hybrid case, but they are worth including within the realm of geo-economics for 2
reasons.
,Military and humanitarian aid are a part of forms of aid of a conceptual
understanding of geo-economics – least interesting aspects of geo-economics
instruments.
CERTAIN CASES ARE FUNNY.
p. 21: Point 5: Geo-economics is distinct from foreign (or international)
economic policy, mercantilism, and liberal economic thought.
Cohen & Pastor define foreign economic policy: governmental actions intended
to influence the international economic environment (as opposed to the geopolitical
environment)
Cohen: “international economic policy must be viewed as being a separate
phenomenon, not a tool for use by either foreign policy or domestic economic policy
officials.”
pp. 21-22: A tendency to view mercantilism and liberal economic thought as
direct opposites and a corresponding tendency to view geo-economics as some
repurposed form of mercantilism and therefore as somehow inherently in tension
with or opposed to liberal economic thought.
Liberal emphasis – limited state involvement in private markets
Mercantilist emphasis – heavy state intervention in economic life
p. 23: Baldwin: mercantilists viewed extensive state intervention in the economy to
be in the national interest and liberals did not, does not mean that liberals were
unconcerned with state interests – on the contrary, most saw laissez-faire as merely
a better means of advancing the interests of the state.
For both camps, the question was how, not whether, to shape economic policies
to serve state interests. they only differ in tactics.
p. 25: In sum, the real divides between mercantilism and liberalism concern
how best (not whether) to pursue geo-economics.
Mercantilism thus stand as only one of many forms of geo-economics, liberalism
too.
,Luttwak - From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics Logic of Conflict ,
Grammar of Commerce
The deference (=de verdediging) that armed strength could evoke in the dealings of
governments over all matters - notably including economic questions - has greatly
declined and seems set to decline further. Everyone, it appears, now agrees that the
methods of commerce are displacing military methods - with disposable capital in
lieu (=in plaats van) of firepower, civilian innovation in lieu of military- technical
advancement, and market penetration in lieu of garrisons and bases
Should we conclude from all this that the world is regressing to a new age of
mercantilism? Is that what "geo-economics" identifies, quite redundantly? Not so.
The goal of mercantilism was to maximize gold stocks, whereas the goal of geo-
economics (aggrandizement of the state aside) could only be to provide the best
possible employment for the largest proportion of the population.
In other words, mercantilism was a subordinated modality, limited and governed by
the ever-present possibility that the loser in the mercantilist (or simply commercial)
competition would switch to the grammar of war.
"Geo-economics," on the other hand, is emerging in a world where there is no
superior modality.
HC1: Realist conceptualization of geoeconomics emphasizes how competition for
relative power continues to drive state behavior in international relations,
albeit(=hoewel) using economic as opposed to military means (Luttwak 1990)
Wigel – Conceptualizing regional powers’ geoeconomic strategies: neo-
imperialism, neo-mercantilism, hegemony, and liberal institutionalism
Geo-economic strategies (Wigell) – REALISM
• Geo-economics usually starts from the premise of the relative
decline of military concerns and the rise of economic concerns in
relations between states
According to Huntington (1993, p. 72), “in a world in which military conflict between
major states is unlikely, economic power will be increasingly important in
determining the primacy or subordination of states.” By merging geopolitics and
,economics, the geoeconomic perspective highlights how in the current international
system, economic—rather than military— leverage is more consequential in the
pursuit of national interests.
• The post-Cold War era is characterized not so much by political or
ideological rivalry but by economic competition
With the partial exception of Russia, it is also economic—not military—capabilities
that underpin the resurgence of regional powers.
• Geoeconomics: the geostrategic use of economic power (Wigell,
2015)
Realist:
Within the Realist paradigm geoeconomics has strong links to geopolitics
—economic foreign policy is deployed not only to maximize the country’s
socioeconomic wellbeing but also to fulfill broader geostrategic goals
Such a realist conceptualization of geoeconomics emphasizes how competition for
relative power continues to drive state behavior in international relations, albeit using
economic as opposed to military means
Neo-imperialism:
economic power = means, strategic frame = competitive
Economic force, coercion, imposition, and bribery
a mala fide, unilateral pursuit of national interest by the dominant
power, sustained, if necessary, by coercion, imposition or bribery, and
the creation of dependent relations that limit the sovereignty of
neighboring states
It is not so much concerned with enlarging its territorial control, as with pursuing
various forms of economic control, shaping the regional economic structure in such a
way that makes weaker states dependent on the regional powerThe means employed
are economic, but the goal is geopolitical—creating neo-imperial relations with
weaker neighbors and thus substantially limiting their sovereignty in relation to the
regional power’s interests.
,the exercise of power in the case of neo-imperialism involves economic force,
coercion, imposition, and bribery.
Hegemony:
economic power = means, strategic frame = cooperative
Provision of public and private goods
= a more benevolent leadership (than neo-imp) that includes the provision
of collective goods.
Without resorting to coercion, the EU uses its economic domination to uphold
hegemony in relation to its periphery. An important motivation is to ensure the
security of the continent.
hegemony referring to more benevolent leadership that includes the provision of
collective goods, whereas neo-imperialism refers to a mala fide, unilateral pursuit of
national interest by the dominant power, sustained, if necessary, by coercion,
imposition or bribery, and the creation of dependent relations that limit the
sovereignty of neighboring states.
Liberal/Institutionalism
economic power = goal, strategic frame = cooperative
Economic integration and multilateralism
A liberal conceptualization of geoeconomics: economic power is
used and pursued as an end in itself and not necessarily through a
competitive strategic frame.
Strategic goals are more purely economic and may be pursued, not
as a zero-sum game with the goal of maximizing relative gains, but
in cooperation with others in the pursuit of common goals
Contrary to realists, who argue that states are naturally competitive, liberals take the
option of cooperative engagement between states far more seriously.
Both strategic uses of economic power seem perfectly plausible:
external economic policy instruments may be used for exerting
political influence, with the aim of improving the country’s
geopolitical status and/or economic power may also be used for
, purely economic ends, to preserve or attain a privileged position
for the country’s economy in the international arena
In either case, economic power is leveraged for national advantage.
In contrast, liberal institutionalist and hegemony strategies are pursued by regional
powers with an essentially cooperative strategic frame, in which the role of mutual
gains and benefits in interactions with neighboring countries are highlighted. Both
strategies refrain from coercion, which is seen as detrimental to the long-term
interests of the regional power
Both neo-mercantilist and neo-imperialist strategies stem from a competitive
strategic frame in which foreign relations are treated as a zero-sum game in which
one side’s gain is another’s relative loss. Both strategies may deploy economic power
as aggressive leverage to extract concessions and pressure neighboring countries in a
unilateral pursuit of national interest.
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