Literature for DAT exam I
Lecture 1
Teorell introduction
The world has witnessed an extraordinary improvement in the realm of democracy in the past 35 years
or so. Beneath the global trend of democratization, however, the “third wave” of democratization has
also been marred by serious undercurrents pulling in the opposite direction.
What forces drove these patterns of regime change and stability within countries across the globe? There
are 4 distinct answers to that:
1. Modernisation theory (Lipset)
a. Alleges that democratization in the last three decades is the upshot of a general trend
toward furthered economic development, deepened industrialization and educational
expansion.
2. The transition paradigm/ The strategic approach
a. Democracy has been brought about from above through the strategic skills, and at times
sheer luck, of elite actors manoeuvring under profound uncertainty.
3. Social forces tradition
a. Democratization during the third wave has been triggered by mass mobilization from
below, most notably by the working class.
4. Economic approach
a. Democratic institutions have been granted by the rich as a concession to the poor. This
should have been made possible through weakened fear of redistribution resulting from
eroding economic inequality.
(Teorell elaborates on these approaches in chapter 1 of the book) Teorell argues that all these approaches
are incomplete. (Then a summary about the methodological choices made here comes, we also kind of
discussed this in the AcSki tutorial, so perhaps recall these slides for extra info) There is a lot of variation
in democracies and there is a movement towards democratization but also reversals away from this. Plus
there could be differences over the short-run and long-run.
Factors driving and not driving the third wave
Teorell revives the tradition initiated by Lipset according to which socioeconomic modernization is a
broad, coherent syndrome underlying several societal process, such as industrialization, education,
urbanization and the spread of communications technology.
,However, modernization affects regime outcomes by hindering authoritarian reversals rather than
promoting transitions toward democracy. If democracy is a ladder, modernization does not help
countries scale upwards; it helps them avoid falling downwards.
The strongest bite in modernization’s assemblage is exerted by media proliferation. As radios, TVs and
newspapers spread in the population, anti-democratic coups are either deferred or aborted. Media
proliferation as the most prominent mechanism behind the modernization helps explain its asymmetric
nature.
The democracy-promoting effects of the media cannot materialize under authoritarian conditions. For
the media to work as a safeguard as democracy, some freedom of the press has to be established. What
this implies is that the effect of the media proliferation on democratization increases with the level of
democracy already achieved. For this reason, widespread access to media outlets defers backsliding
from these achieved levels rather triggering movement toward more democracy.
Whereas societal modernization accompanying long-term economic development thus helps sustain
democracy, the effect of short-term growth on the prospects of democratization is exactly the opposite.
Economic upturns help sustain autocracies, whereas economic crises trigger transitions toward
democracy. (The exact explanation for this is on page 6)
Deteriorating economic conditions also help fuel the mobilization of mass protest against the regime.
Only peaceful demonstrations are effective in promoting democratization, whereas the use of violent
means proves largely ineffectual.
Democratization is rooted in economic and social conditions not only within the boundaries of the nation
state, but also within the international system. As the “wave” of metaphor itself would suggest, there is
evidence of democratic diffusion effects.
Regional organizations may encourage democratization by pressurizing authoritarian regimes.
Also, the importance of colonialism in the history of the developing world may have been exaggerated.
That is, democratization during the third wave did not ensue from increased economic equality.
Having a predominantly Muslim population, or being dependent on foreign trade, are both factors that
appear to impede democratization. This is hard to explain though, so probably not necessarily true. The
dependency theory isn’t true: Countries whose trading patterns are heavily geared toward the capitalist
core of the world system, such as toward the US and Europe, were not less likely to democratize during
the third wave.
Institutions under authoritarianism
,Military dictatorships, according to expectations, are more prone to democratize than single-party
regimes. Multiparty autocracies are more prone to democratize than other species of the authoritarian
brand. Explanation: competition in multiparty autocracies is a dual battle, where the incumbent elites
and the opposition simultaneously compete for votes in electoral arena and struggle over the very rules
that shapes this arena. The end result could be change in either the opposition’s or the regime’s favoured
direction, making autocratic multiparty competition an inherently unstable equilibrium. The logic of
these unstable dynamics, however, tends to push multiparty autocracies in the direction of
democratization. Intra-regime divisions were established.
These two processes – divisions within the incumbent regime and unification of the opposition forces –
reinforce one another. They are more likely to be triggered when the multiparty autocracy faces
exogenous shocks, be they domestic or international.
Theoretical implications
Structural theories are not very successful at explaining short-term democratization. Even over the long
haul, some countries deviate far from their structurally predicted longrun equilibrium levels of
democracy. As compared to explanatory performance on a yearly basis, however, structures explain a
whole lot more over the longer time horizon.
He gives a summary from page 11 to 12 and then argues that a successful future theory of
democratization needs conditions, strategic interaction among elite actors, and popular mobilization
from below. Structural conditions affect the regime preferences of the general public, whose action (or
threat of action) is responded to (or anticipated by) elites in office making decisions on regime change.
Moving away from the obsession with redistributive politics and toward a focus on the various
“authoritarian bargains” or “dependency relations” that structure the workings of different types of
autocracies thus ought to be the preferred strategy for future modelling attempts in this tradition.
Policy implications
The structural indeterminacy of democratization in the short-run affords domestic actors considerable
room for manoeuvre. This implies that foreign assistance with democracy promotion, targeted at
domestic pro-democracy forces, may pay dividends. A two-pronged strategy is needed to promote
democracy:
1. In countries that have already made some progress toward democratization, these reforms may
be safeguarded by widening media access through the spread of radio, TV and newspapers
, among the population. When censorship has lifted and some freedom of the press has been
attained, this works as an antidote to anti-democratic coups d’état.
2. In more authoritarian settings efforts to mobilize non-violent popular insurgencies against the
incumbent regime should be promoted. This is particularly rewarding where there are intra-
regime splits between hardliners and soft-liners to exploit, and when mobilizing tactics can be
found that damage the material and other support bases of the regime.
Economic sanctions or violent military intervention have dubious consequences for democratization.
Promoting economic development under authoritarian regimes (as part of a modernisation path I think)
would not be an advisable strategy for fostering democracy. To begin with, democratization is spurred
on by short-term economic crises, not growth (1). And long-term development does not affect the
prospects for democratization, but the chances of sustaining democratic reforms that have already been
enacted (2).
