Essayvragen en antwoorden over de volgende artikelen:
1) Egypt
Alaa al-Din Arafat, The rise of Islamism in Egypt (2017); chapter 3, “The Muslim
Brotherhood’s ideological and organizational development”
James Toth, Sayyid Qutb: The life and legacy of a radical Islamic intellectual (2013);
chapter 5, “Qutb’s radical Islamism”
Olivier Roy, “Political Islam after the Arab Spring: Between Jihad and Democracy”
(2017)
2) Iran
Ostovar, Afshon. Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary
Guards. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, chapter 2: “From Ali to Khomeini”
(20 pages).
Haghighatjoo, Fatemeh. “The Green Movement and Political Change in Iran.” In
Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation, edited by Daniel
Brumberg and Farideh Farhi, 224-250. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 2016.
3) Saudi-Arabia (NL)
Bowen, Wayne. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Greenwood Press, 2008,
chapter 5: “The House of Saud (1700-1902)”
Hegghammer, Thomas. “Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia.”
International Affairs 84, no. 4 (2008): 701-715
Wehrey, Frederic. “Saudi Arabia’s Anxious Autocrats.” Journal of Democracy 26, no.
2 (2015): 71-85
4) Yemen (NL)
Hill, Ginny. Yemen Endures: Civil War, Saudi Adventurism and the Future of Arabia.
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, chapter 1: “The Last Imam:
The 1962 Revolution in the Yemen Arab Republic”
Blumi, Isa. Destroying Yemen: What Chaos in Arabia Tells us About the World.
Oakland: University of California Press, (2018, chapter 5: “Making Yemen Dance”
Ibrahim Fraihat, Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab
Spring. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016, chapter 2: “Yemen”
5) Gaza (NL)
Filiu, Jean-Pierre. “The twelve wars on Gaza.” Journal of Palestine Studies 44, no.1
(2014): 52-60
,Levin, Geoffrey. “One step forward or two steps back? Unilateralism and Israel’s
Gaza disengagement in the eyes of the world.” Israel Affairs 20, no. 1 (2014): 87-103
Berti, Benadetta. “Non-state actors as providers of governance: the Hamas
government in Gaza between effective sovereignty, centralized authority, and
resistance.” The Middle East Journal 69, no. 1 (2015): 9-31
6) Algeria (NL)
Sebastian N., “Islamic Movements Engaging with Democracy: Front Islamique Du
Salut (FIS) and the Democratic Experiment in Algeria,” India Quarterly 71, no. 3
(2015), pp. 255-271
Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global
Threat?,” Carnegie Papers 104 (2009), pp. 1-11
Hamza Hamouchene and Brahim Rouabah, “The Political Economy of Regime
Survival: Algeria in the Context of the African and Arab Uprisings,” Review of African
Political Economy 43, no. 150 (2016), pp. 668-680
,1 EGYPT
Alaa al-Din Arafat, The rise of Islamism in Egypt (2017); chapter 3, “The Muslim
Brotherhood’s ideological and organizational development”
Who’s the author?
The author of the book is Alaa al-Din Arfat. He has worked a Professor of Middle
East Politics and International Relations at Université Francaise d’Egypte (UFE) in
Egypt. When he was writing this book, in the period between 2010 and 2015, he was
also working as a senior political analyst in CEDEJ in Egypt.
Briefly summarize the chapter (100-200 words)
The MB was established in 1928 by Al-Banna and the goal was to restore the
Islamic Caliphate. Besides a political and religious organization, the MB was also a
social movement. In 1951, Sayyid Qutb joined the MB. His ideology is hugely
influential among revolutionary groups.
The MB contains 4 generations and they all have own ideas about Islam,
politics and society. These generational divisions result in issues the organization
has to deal with and complicate the unity of the group.
The purpose of the chapter is to trace how the MB developed ideologically
since its start. The major argument is that a lack of ideological development in the
MB was the main reason for the downfall of the group. The two major theorists Al-
Banna and Qutb have not been able to facilitate the achievement of the group’s goals
or to guide their transition into a modern political party. They didn’t accept moderate
ideas or modernize the group: the MB has never believed in democracy. Violent
rejection of democratic principles is a deep-rooted core value and a shortcoming of
the MB.
Besides that, the MB suffered from domination by the Qutbist faction and
marginalization of the MB’s politician faction. Because of that, when the military
removed MB Morsi from power in 2013, the group was unable to respond, and the
organization got into a crisis.
Briefly explain what the four different generations represented according to
Arafat and what the major division within the movement were.
The first generation is the Old Guard or veteran generation, aged around 60-80. This
generation is conservative and lived through the Nasserist suppression. Their key
objective is to maintain the cohesiveness and the survival of the group.
The second generation is the Middle Generation, aged between 50 and 60.
They are also called the younger generation, the group politicians, the reformists or
the liberal faction. They are mostly part of Islamic Student associations, who joined
the MB in the 1970s. This generation is characterized by more liberal views on
minorities and women, acceptance of politics and forming alliances with non-
Muslims.
The third generation is the Neo-Organizationalist/Conservatives, aged in 40s
and 50s. This generation prefers behind-the-scene actions and missionary work, to
political action. This generation occupies mid-level positions within the organization,
and they are responsible for spreading their ideas in rural areas.
The fourth generation is the Blogger generation, aged from 20 to 30. This
generation is mostly urban, and more intellectual but not necessarily less
conservative than other generations. They are affiliated with student groups and
, constituted paramilitary forces. They play a role in street politics and acted as go-
betweens between the MB and other political opposition forces. They have greater
contact and exchange of ideas with other movements due to technology.
The generational divisions in the MB center around 4 key issues. The first
issue is the lack of separation between politics and religion, which drives many youth
away from the group to seek political solutions. The second issue is the differing
views between generations on gender equality and minority rights. The third issue is
the scope and pace of change. Senior leaders are more modest and slower, where
the youth is more revolutionary. Young generations believe that the MB should
change its political strategy and the secrecy that surrounds it: they believe this
reduces their popularity. The fourth issue is the hierarchical structure that offers
promotion to loyalty, rather than “platforms and new ideas”. Youth would like to see
more transparency and democracy.
Can you say that the Muslim Brotherhood is a nonviolent movement?
No, you can’t say that the MB is a nonviolent movement. When the MB was founded,
the organization turned violence against its opponents. In the 1970s the organization
renounced violence and said that social change was the way forward. However, this
angered many members of the MB who rejected the idea of moderate political
policies and caused violent spin-off groups. The MB was indirectly involved in these
violent groups. The July 3, 2013 aftermath shows that the MB had working ties with
terrorist networks. Even though the organization of the MB wanted to renounce
violence at some point, violence was too strongly intertwined with certain MB
members and their ideology.
What were the most important spearheads of the Freedom and Justice
Movement?
The Freedom and Justice Party was based on Shari’a. The economic platform
embraces neoliberal policies, and the state’s economic role should be limited. The
FJP supported the idea of Islamic banking. For Social Justice, the party wants state-
sponsored aid and charity work for underprivileged groups. This should be funded by
oil and gas revenues and based on the Islamic economic system. The foreign policy
supports the idea that Arab and Islamic unity is a condition of Egyptian national
security. Education is focused on religious guidance and deepening out Arab and
Islamic identity. In cultural terms, the party promotes “self-censorship” and state-run
censorship to promote positive Islamic role models in cultural sectors. All citizens are
equal according the FJP, however women’s rights should be subject to the principles
of Sharia.
What, according to Arafat, were the Muslim Brotherhood’s main shortcomings
that contributed to its demise after 2011?
The MB lack theorists and accompanying ideological development. They have two
major theorists: Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. They were both not able to facilitate the
achievement of the group’s religious and preaching goals or guide their transition into
a modern political party. Rather they created a group that educates its members in
undemocratic and violent ideas.
Second, the MB suffered from domination by the Qutbist faction and the
marginalization of the MB’s politician faction. This marginalization shrank the ability of
the MB to make political compromises and maneuvers when facing with opposition
from non-Islamist forces. For example after Morsi was removed from power in 2013,