Introductie + hoofdstuk 1
Thinking about social violence in Brazil
20 years ago the authoritarian regimes in Latin America began to fall and Brazil became
democratic. Since then, criminal and police violence has increased, just as human rights abuse.
Criminals reject the law and parallel powers and authorities have emerged in the favelas, where drug
traffickers who are very poor and uneducated (and mostly nonwhite and adolescent) rule. The changes
in state institutions have made violence increase, but the worldwide spreading of cocaine and arms are
factors too. Rising crime justifies repressive policing, corruption is unstoppable, the rich flee into
gated communities and the poor rely on criminals to protect them. Criminals build links to powerful
state segments to gain local power which is more powerful then police forces. Because of the political
relations criminals have with state actors criminality keeps existing.
Analyses of crime and violence have always used a top-down approach, but in this book a
micro-level approach is used. Violence is examined in three Rio favelas. Civic mobilization can be a
solution to control violence, when coordinated with state action. The politics of favelas and the
political operations of criminal gangs are important to understand democracy and law in Rio and
Brazil.
Existing approaches to violence in favelas
The study of favela violence in Rio is dominated by two ways of thinking.
1. The divided city approach: favelas are set apart from the city because of criminal dominance
which is caused by state police failure. Violence police to repress crime became part of the
problem. In the eyes of many citizens this makes police and the state equal to traffickers. This
approach doesn’t go far enough in examining how deep interconnections between state
officials and favela leaders contribute to violence.
2. Neoclientelist approach: examines how contacts among trafickers, police, business leaders and
favela residents contribute to the violence in Rio. Traffickers hold connections with official
statesmen to obtain resources and to keep their political dominant position in favelas. They,
and other poor people, survive in the Brazilian ‘democracy’ by clientelism: a hierarchical
model in which powerful high-status actors deliver aids to lower-status actors in exchange for
favors. Traffickers, politicians and favela residents are similar; traffickers assemble the
resources necessary to provide basic welfare and public services to favela residents by
criminal activities and contact with politicians. Traffickers can buy themselves the security to
continue with their criminal activities.
But political relations in Rio are more complex. No one wants traffickers, so every government
will try to destroy them. So the two approaches above are not good enough.
Violent democracy in Latin America
Some scholars say that violence and inequality in Latin America is caused by state failure, others
say it is caused by external social forces who do not live by the rule of law and engage with state
actors to promote illegal activities and human rights violations. These external social forces exist
in the so called ‘brown areas’ where the state has almost no presence and people are very poor.
But the state is an active promoter of violence itself too, so it’s presence will not immediately
mean the disappearance of violence in these areas, and state power help to build and maintain
trafficker power itself too. Because the state has no power in these areas, local gangs provide a
parallel state structure and an alternative rule of law. They do what the police cannot. They have
connections with the police though, who are corrupt.
1
, Only by understanding how criminals and other persistently violent actors in and outside the state
work together to perpetuate violence will we appreciate the full challenges facing Latin America’s
democracies today.
Fitting criminals into the political picture
What role do persistent violent actors have in the polity?
Criminals play a critical role in political systems. They support the state structure. The
international debt crisis made that governments of developing countries are unable to pay for
mayor new challenges. At the same time the drug- and waponmarket has increased because of the
globalization. Because the state can’t do it anymore, criminals provide some social services to
citizens. Citizens turn to illegal markets and crime because they are excluded from the labour
market and inequality is growing. This makes crime grow and security a luxury product. Criminals
use violence to achieve their own goals and those of who cannot be helped by the police.
Criminals work with state officials because they need their protection and support because whitout
them they are weak social actors who can easily be killed or jailed. State officials in their turn, can
control violence in this way (but not stop).
How criminals interact with other citizens and state officials.
The dangerous behaviour of criminals does make it hard to maintain relationships. Criminals must
be careful with who do work, because his criminal activities could be exposed and put him into
danger. Politicians must be careful too, their positions could be lost when their ties to criminals
would be exposed. Relationships are kept secret for the outside and to limit the information people
know about each other.
Structures of violence in urban Brazil
Criminals provide power to politicians by supporting them during elections and provide them
monopoly access to favelas. In exchange, politicians provide limited services to criminals. Local
civic leaders mediate these relations, just as the relations between traffickers and favela residents
on whom they depend on for protection but who also cause a lot of violence.
How can violence be controlled?
The most popular political response is to use more repressive policies. But giving the police more
power and more weapons only allows the corrupt police to demand a larger cut of the drugs trade.
NGO’s claim that the local civil society most be stronger and have closer ties to the state to
control violence. But often those organisations are being take over by traffickers. The best solution
is when civic and state actors work together to fight crime. Permanent control in favelas should
reduce violence too. Crucial is to hold on to those ways of policing; interest in favelas is often
soon gone which makes crime go back to old habits. In many cases, favela violence becomens
worse when many police is there or when the state involves because they make traffickers angry.
Traffickers rule in the favelas and everyone who wants to do something in it should contact them.
NGO’s who interfere in a favela will first go to the favela’s traffickers.
Hoofdstuk 2
Network approach to criminal politics
Er is ontzettend veel criminaliteit in Rio de Janeiro, ook al is het een democratisch land (Brazilië). Dit
hoofdstuk gaat over de natuur, de compositie en operatie van illegale netwerken en de effecten die ze
hebben op de democratische regering.
- Illegale netwerken definiëren
Criminele netwerken bouwen vertrouwen op en creëren normen en ideeën om criminele activiteiten in
stand te houden. Criminelen voelen zich beschermers van de organisatie en gebruiken de
netwerkcapaciteit om politieke macht te krijgen. Omdat ze buiten de norm leven, is dit soms lastig.
Toch hebben overheid en criminelen elkaar nodig om andere actoren en netwerken buiten spel te
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