Normative Ethicaa hheorie:缺 Re igaiou: Approacahe:
hopica 1缺 Natura Law
Background informaton (P146 – P148)
Aquina:’ four tier: of aw from Summa Theologica
(a) Eternal Law (P148-P149)
Eterna Law – best interpreted as principles by which God created and controls universe
Human beings caannot under:tand God’s Eternal Law
Doesn’t mean they cannot work out, througah rea:on, its meaning in human life
(b) Divine Law (P149-P150)
Aquinas believes moral requirements are knowab e by human rea:on
Divine Law – God’: eterna aw revea ed througah Reve ation such as:
Ten Commandments
Jesus Revelatons such as (Mathew 5: 3,5-9)
These revelatons are affirmation: of what is knowable by reason
(c) Natural Law (P150)
Follows direcation of Eterna Law
Ratonal exercise of ‘thinking along the grain of nature’ to work out what is good for human
flourishing
God explains man has natura inca ination to do gaood and ratonal capacity to work out what is right
and proper to do
God’s Eterna Law revea ed througah nature
(d) Human Law (P150-P151)
Human Law comes from the idea that man i: :ocaia
Human Law is regau ation: and aw: :ocaiety make: up in order for us to functon co-operatvely
This is why :ocaietie: e:tab i:h gaoverninga authoritie: who set rules on how citiens should behave
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,Aquina:’ Natura Law
Basis of Natural Law can be found in Ari:tot e’: teacahinga
Simi ar to virtue ethica: – Aquinas agrees cultvatng virtues is essental to good life
Aquinas’ disagrees with these virtues and proposes cardinal virtues: prudencae, ju:ticae, caouragae and
temperancae
Emphasises caentra ro e of prudencae (practcal reasonpphronesis) in determining what is right and
proper to do in each situaton
Core comes from Paul (Romans 2:15) of ‘the law that is writen on men’s hearts’
Aquina: rejecated Divine caommand theory – argues that God commands what is right rather than
what God commands becomes right
Aquinas believes mora ity i: rooted in rea:on rather than in :caripture, although it’s justied and
developed in scripture
(a) The telos (P152-P153)
For Aquinas’ – univer:e ha: purpo:e
Things on earth like plants seem to achieve their te o: (purpose)
On y human: have fu y rationa thougaht – we can use to work out what is good for us and how to
achieve our telos in life
On y in our next ife where we can ind what God fully meant for us
To achieve that goal, we need to ive thi: ife in faithfu :ervicae to God
If humans achieve their goal of flourishing – leads to eudaimonia – fu fouri:hinga of human person
and abilites
This goes further – happiness is fu e:t :en:e of union with God in the bliss of heavenly life
Desire to be with God is caentre of our natura de:tiny – how we were created and to which
our intellect directs us – our goal is our heavenly home
But, Aquinas’ believes by u:inga our rea:on we caan ive on earth a: gaood a: we caan
(b) Ius and lex (P153-P154)
Ius is the princaipa of aw rather than exact wording of a given regulaton
Lex is the etter of the aw (speciic regulaton) as in statue law
Aquinas is a way: ta kinga about iu: when discussing laws like Natural Law rather than lex, a legalistc
system of precise regulaton
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,(c) Primary and Secondary Precepts (P154-P155)
Primary precept of Natural Law is natura inca ination to do good and :ecaondary precaept: follows
from this inital insight
Based on Aquinas’ writng, commentators have implied five broad area: of mora caonducat (POWER):
Preservaton of life
Ordering of society
Worship of God
Educaton of children
Reproducton
These precepts are intrin:ica to the idea of doinga gaood and avoiding evil
Exp aininga what doinga gaood mean: rather than something adding to demand of doing good
Referred to as Primary Precaept:
From these we caan derive Secaondary Precaept: u:inga our phrone:i:
U:inga primary precaept: like reproducton, educaton of children, preservaton of life and ordered
society we can derive rationa princaip e: like family life, sexual conduct and so on
(d) Prudence and natural law (P155-P116)
For particau ar caa:e: Aquinas understands we need the virtue of phrone:i:
We don’t know by intuition or gaut fee inga in what we should do
Intrinsic to human nature – we are rationa careature:, capable of directng our behaviour through a
process of thinking
Genera precaept: of Natura Law doe:n’t cahangae but applicaton does – we need to look at results of
our actons in a ratonal way
Implicaton – necae::ary procae:: of rea:oninga to be gaone througah in partcular cases – can’t be
solved by gut feeling
We need to look at each applicaton of precepts in a rationa way and Natural Law has to be
under:tood :ituationa y
Prudence entails three inte ecatua :ki :
Understanding Judgement Good deliberaton
Ability to grasp overall picture Capacity to know what is right Using what is available, when
of what is going on in a given thing to do in circumstances, no means available to know
situaton determining what is right and what we can’t do and give up
proper impossible enterprise – why
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, judgement is pointless without
being able to deliberate well
(e) The principle of double efect (P157-P158)
Princaip e of doub e efecat – one of the clearest ways in understanding natural law and its concern
with consequences
Doub e efecat – when an act may have more than one efecat, and be known to have more than one
E.g. – an acton to save one person’s life which means harming someone else – what maters
is intenton – aim of act was not harm to second person but (good) intentons of saving irst
We consider both intention and re:u t: of an acation – an important part of moral life is making
judgements about intenton and behaviour
We don’t condemn someone because they have commited an acton – we must consider
what they intended to do
In natural law approaches – four caondition: are normally required in principle of double efect:
Acat mu:t not be evi in Evi and gaood that Intention of agaent Proportiona :eriou:
it:e f caome from acat mu:t mu:t be gaood rea:on mu:t be
be at ea:t equa pre:ent to ju:tify
a owinga indirecat bad
efecat
Ki inga i:n’t Good mu:t outweigah Agent mu:tn’t want to Siganificaant point –
intrin:icaa y evi in the evi bring about an evil Aquinas insists on
way murder (wrongful result proporton
killing) always is
Genera ru e – people
shouldn’t perform acts
which are in any way
harmful
Circaum:tancae: have to
be :eriou: before we
do something with bad
side efects
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,Real and Apparent Goods
Aquinas believed God instlled in all humans inca ination: to be ieve in caertain way: – leads to
highest Good
Believed most basic natural inclinaton of humans is to act in such a way that “gaood i: to be done
and pur:ued, an evi i: to be avoided”
Since we were designed to be in perfect union with God we wou dn’t knowinga y pur:ue evi
If someone does something morally wrong they do this because they consider it to be a good, but it
is not really good but rather an apparent gaood as it doesn’t it the perfect human ideal
To work out what is rea gaood and an apparent gaood we need to u:e our rea:on caorrecat y and
choose to do the right thing
No one :eek: evi – only sought as an apparent good and so rests on mi:gauided reason
Interior and Exterior Act
Interior acat: is the intention of an act whereas exterior acat: is the acat it:e f
Aquinas believed both intention and acat it:e f were important
E.g. a good exterior act which comes from a bad interior act is wronga
Good interior acts (intentons) don’t a way: ead to good exterior acts (actons)
(f) Modern developments of natural law (P155-P156)
Outlined by John Finni: in his book Natural Law and Natural Rights
Infuencaed by Ari:tot e’: teaching
Believed natural law were ‘ba:ica form: of human fouri:hinga’ and forms were by everyone who
considers what to do and these include:
Life, knowledge, play, work, aesthetc experience, friendship, practcal reasonableness and
religion (the spiritual aspect of ourselves) – being deprived of these limits flourishing
Areas of flourishing are supported by ba:ica methodo ogaicaa requirement::
Pursuit of goods, coherent plan of life, No arbitrary preferences among values, detachment
and commitment, ‘the (limited) relevance of consequences’, ‘respect for every basic value in
every act’, the requirements of the common good, following one’s conscience
Objectve knowledge of morality possible
Common good is deined as people realising their own basic values as other reasonable
personal objectves – certain absolute dutes and rights are derivable:
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, Rights not to be tortured, not to be taken as means to another end, not to be lied to,
not to be condemned on false charges
(g) Strengthsp Objectons to theories (P158-P160)
Strengath Objecation
Rationa – Natural Law uses Impracaticaa - Predictng consequences works, and is the best way of
practcal reason – common- deciding what will do the most good
sense approach
Objecative – Natural Law Unca ear caonca u:ion:
gives us rules that are true It may be possible to construct natural law arguments that point in
independently of our opposing directons
individual thoughts and
desires For instance, the Humanae Vitae argued that obedience to natural
law (preservaton of life) meant that it was wrong to use articial
methods of birth control
But part of the purpose of human nature is using our intellect to
determine what is best for human flourishing and for instance
articial methods of birth control
Purpo:e - World has Purpo:e - Idea of ‘purpose’ in nature can be explained by science
meaning, purpose and (evoluton and natural selecton)
values
F exib e - allows for Vagauene::
secondary precepts to vary It doesn’t enable us to be precisely certain about what to do in
according to culture, as they signiicant cases (conflictng rules)
are the practcal
working out of the For instance, simply knowing the general principle that we should
univer:a y app ied primary preserve life doesn’t tell us which life ought to be preserved
precepts
Doub e Efecat - gets around Doub e Efecat - brings in consequentalism through the back door.
problems of conflictng You are allowed to do some terrible things because of double efect,
secondary precepts and at other tmes you can’t do really helpful things
Virtue: - Focuses on human hoo optimi:tica - It has a too optmistc view of human nature.
virtues and excellence – the Augustne disagrees (original sin), as does Calvin (total depravity)
cardinal virtues of prudence,
justce, temperance, Hobbe: thinks humans are too inherently selish
forttude
Autonomy - Natural Law Natura i:tica Fa acay –
allows individual, using How we are is not the same as how we ought to be. Just because sex
reason, to work out for produces babies, this doesn’t mean that every act of sex ought to be
themselves what is open to procreaton.
objectvely right and true,
not relying on religious GE Moore’s Open Queston:
authority, scripture or Everything has the capacity to be x but nothing can intrinsically be x
traditon Is x good?
hoo :imp i:tica - Humans do not have a single ‘ixed’ human nature.
An un-Chri:tian theory - Protestants such as John Calvin saw natural
law as unbiblical and saw the Bible as a principal moral guide
Even before the Fall man needed positve law (explicit
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, commandments of God) to know what is morally correct
Humanae Vitae
“Each and every marital Act must of necessity retain its intrinsic relatonship to the procreaton of
human life”
Every tme you have sex – has to be possibility of ofspring
Primary precept – reproducton – sex is for having children always
Approach could be consequental which is consistent with eudaimonia
Manualist approach of natural law which is deontological
Scaho ar y objecation:
Hume – Treatse of Human Nature – Natural Law combines what is the case with what ougaht to be
the case
We can’t derive a moral imperatve by observing facts of nature
Jame: Racahe : – Assumes moral principles are by God – modern science contradicts this
Science only sees cause and efect – morals comes from human mind
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,hopica 2缺 Situation Ethica:
(a) Joseph Fletcher and William Temple (P165-P167)
Joseph Fletcher’s 1966 book Situation Ethics:n The Nee ooralit outlined his view on Situaton Ethics
– controversial
Saw it :imi ar to Ari:tot e’: view: in Nicomachean Ethics
His ethics were similar and ba:ed on teacahinga: of Wi iam hemp e (1881-1944)
Joseph Fletcher’s Situaton Ethics (P167)
Fletcher argues three approacahe: to moral life:
Legaa i:m Antinomiani:m (anarchism) Situationi:m
Fixed mora ru e: – universal – Denia of po::ibi ity of any Believes ab:o ute y in ru e of
always to be followed ru e: – no rules to follow but ove – believes it needs to be
only our own choices applied situatonally
Fletcher sees this as a major Midd e garound between the
faw of major religions and other two approaches
believes it leads to Puritanism
Laws shouldn’t get in the way
of doing the right things
(Mathew 3:22)
“Sometmes you have to put
your principles to one side and
just do the right thing” –
Fletcher on a St. Louis taxi
driver
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,(a) The four working principles (P167-P168)
Pragamati:m Re ativi:m Po:itivi:m Per:ona i:m
We have to Whatever we do must be Belief in God of love (a Requires we p acae
seek pracaticaa related to both the facat: higher God for non- peop e, not princaip e: or
:o ution: about our:e ve: and what Christans) is po:ited ru e: or thinga:, at centre
whicah work to we are ab e to do and the then supported by logic of our moral
achieve partcular facts of the consideratons
success situaton
Situationa – absolute Be ief in :upremacay of Peop e caan experiencae
demand to do the loving ove means we must and apprecaiate ove –
thing remains reason out what they should be the focus
supports that love in of unconditonal love
the situaton that faces
us
Love re ativi:e: the ab:o ute ho be ieve in Agaape Objects caannot
– doesn’t absolute the ( ove) i: :upreme – experience love
relatve must assume God is
loving
Can di:regaard an ab:o ute Situaton Ethica: eave:
ru e like ‘do not murder’ if out a argae majority of
relatvely it’s the beter thing Chri:tian ethica:, can it be
to do like murdering a argued is it Christan?
terrorist
Doe:n’t mean everythinga i:
ab:o ute y re ative, only love
is
Problems – too onga without
a definitive aw to fo ow –
can get complicated – too
similar to Act Utlitarianism
with its strengths and
weaknesses
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, (b) The six propositons (P168)
Propo:ition 1缺 Propo:ition 2缺 Propo:ition 3缺 Propo:ition 4缺 Propo:ition 5缺 Propo:ition 6缺
On y one hhe ru inga Love and Love wi : the On y the end Love’:
‘thinga’ i: norm of ju:ticae are the neigahbour’: ju:tifie: the decai:ion:
intrin:icaa y Chri:tian :ame, for gaood whether mean:, made
gaood; name y decai:ion i: ju:ticae i: ove we ike him or nothinga e :e :ituationa y,
ove缺 nothinga ove缺 nothinga di:tributed, not not
e :e at a e :e nothinga e :e pre:cariptive y
Love is gaood Love is the You have to Con:equentia Love is
in it:e f Chri:tian ru e be loving , te eo ogaicaa – app ied
whether you everything is
ike the geared
per:on or not towards goal
of makinga ife
a: gaood a: it
caou d be for
people, this is
what love
requires
Does leave
the queston
about how
forgiveness,
humility and
other virtues
might be seen
under the
descripton of
love
These propositons are all variation: of the theme of always considering the most loving result
But, Fletcher wa:n’t a: caategaoricaa a: hemp e in that everything is reducible by love
(c) Faith and situaton ethics (P168-P169)
Fletcher’s book on situaton ethics – fi ed with referencae: to Chri:tian iterature – unca ear that
:ituation ethica: require: a Chri:tian be ief
In the bible (Mark 12 29:31, 1 Corinthians 13:13) ove i: caentra – Jesus calls it the fir:t
caommandment
Even though in late life F etcaher gaave up hi: Chri:tian be ief, he didn’t gaive up Situation Ethica:
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