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Summary Politics, Ethics and Practice (ethics literature)
Summary of all the literature for the 'ethics' (Mondays) parts of the course.
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Voorbeeld 4 van de 42 pagina's
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Voorbeeld van de inhoud
Summary Politics, Ethics and PracticeEthics week 1
Wolff “Ethics and public policy” p.1-9
Moral and political philosophy: analysis of public policy, exploring foundational values, and
consolidating them into theories and prototype policies that can fit practical needs to improve the
moral quality of our public lives.
However, in reality this is not the case. In reality, philosophy fits badly with public policy needs. In
policy people present what is attractive and useful. In philosophy people present what is surprising
and sometimes irritating, the further from common sense the better. There is no pressure to come to
agreement, because disagreement facilitates discussion. This clashes with public policy needs.
But public policy is not a sphere of pure reason, you still need to convince others of your argument.
In the public policy arena, debate differs from abstract moral argument in three ways:
1. There is little space for ‘agreeing to disagree’, some policy or other is needed
2. There is an inevitable bias towards the status quo. The burden of argument for change is
often higher than for continuation of current policy.
3. Whether a moral view is correct, right or persuasive, takes second place to whether it is
widely shared or at least widely accepted in the sense that people are prepared to live with
it.
In public life you must have some policy, you then start from where you are. Then to move forward
you draw more people into the consensus view, to get the policy more widely endorsed (even if it is
based on different arguments = overlapping consensus by Rawls).
Engaged philosophy: start with a problem, then find theoretical tools to think about it.
Bottom up approach: first try to understand the policy arear to understand why it created moral
difficulties, then connect those difficulties or dilemmas with patterns of philosophical reasoning.
Ethics week 2 Ethics the basics
Mill Utilitarianism Chapter 1+2
Chapter 1: general remarks
Though in science the particular truths precede the general theory, the contrary might be expected
to be the case with a practical art, such as morals or legislation. A test of right and wrong must be
the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having
already ascertained it.
Morality must be deduced from principles. However, a set of principles or one leading principle is not
specified.
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,The utilitarian greatest happiness theory is by some seen as one of the great principles/ leading
theories, but it is not widely named as the leading moral principle.
On the present occasion, I shall, without further discussion of the other theories, attempt to
contribute something towards the understanding and appreciation of the Utilitarian or Happiness
theory (principle of utility, greatest happiness)
Chapter 2: what utilitarianism is
A misconception is that utility is the opposite of pleasure. A contrary misconception is to refer
everything to pleasure.
Utility is about pleasure and the exemption from pain.
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle,
holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to
produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by
unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.
What things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent, this is left an open
question.
So: pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable
things are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of
pleasure and the prevention of pain.
It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure
are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all
other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be
supposed to depend on quantity alone.
If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more
valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one
possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of
both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the
more desirable pleasure.
A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute
suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of
these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence.
(Mill compares humans to animals, we are higher beings. We would not trade our humanness for
being animals, even if it would mean that we sacrifice some happiness, because we would never
want to be a lower grade of being). “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied”
To sum up: the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are
desirable, is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments,
both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against
quantity, being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience, to which must
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,be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the means
of comparison according to utilitarians, this is the standard of morality
Against this doctrine, however, arises another class of objectors, who say that happiness, in any
form, cannot be the rational purpose of human life and action; because, in the first place, it is
unattainable: and they contemptuously ask, what right hast thou to be happy?
Counterarguments by Mill: yes a continuity of high pleasure is unattainable, but it is also
about the prevention of pain. Happiness then is a life with a few moments of transitory pain
with many pleasures. Humans are usually satisfied with this. If they are not they either only
care about themselves or they want mental cultivation.
It is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people
should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The multiplication
of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions on which any
person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, in other words
to be a public benefactor, are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to
consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few
persons, is all he has to attend to.
It is often affirmed that utilitarianism renders men cold and unsympathising; that it chills their moral
feelings towards individuals; that it makes them regard only the dry and hard consideration of the
consequences of actions, not taking into their moral estimate the qualities from which those actions
emanate. f no more be meant by the objection than that many utilitarians look on the morality of
actions, as measured by the utilitarian standard, with too exclusive a regard, and do not lay sufficient
stress upon the other beauties of character which go towards making a human being lovable or
admirable, this may be admitted. Utilitarians who have cultivated their moral feelings, but not their
sympathies nor their artistic perceptions, do fall into this mistake; and so do all other moralists under
the same conditions. this is justifiable because: if there is to be any error, it is better that it should
be on that side
Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require subordinate principles to
apply it by.
McNaughton & Rawling Deontological ethics
Constraints:
- Deontologists characteristically hold that we must not harm people in various ways. We
should not lie, kill innocent people, or torture anyone. These prohibitions constrain us in
what we may do, even in pursuit of good ends.
- Some see these constraints as absolute. Other deontologists have held that although
constraints are always a significant consideration they may be overridden, especially if that is
the only way to avoid catastrophe.
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, - Either way, deontology sometimes requires agents not to maximize the good. The term
‘constraints’ refers to moral restrictions that may require one not to maximize the good,
where these restrictions do not stem from our special relationships to others.
Duties of special relationship:
- Like constraints, the responsibilities that come with relationships can curtail our freedom of
action even when we could maximize the good by shirking them. Duties of special
relationship differ from constraints in that they are owed, by their very nature, only to those
to whom we stand in such relationships, whereas there are constraints against torturing or
unjustly killing anyone.
Permissions:
- Some deontologists claim that there is an unlimited duty of beneficence: you are required to
do as much good as possible provided it does not breach any of your other duties. However,
given the amount of suffering in the world and the disparities in wealth, to do this would
require enormous sacrifice from anyone with more than a minimal standard of living.
- There is some point, though its location is hard to determine, at which agents have done all
that duty demands. At that point they are permitted to decline to do more. Many
deontologists thus see the duty to do good as limited.
Agent-relativity and agent-neutrality:
- Simple consequentialism holds that the good determines the right – the amount of goodness
produced by an action is the sole determinant of its rightness – whereas the deontologist
denies this, holding that other considerations are relevant. More recent writers, however,
distinguish between the two in terms of agent-relativity and agent-neutrality, claiming that
simple consequentialism is an agent-neutral theory whereas deontology incorporates agent-
relative elements.
- The distinction between the agent-neutral and the agent-relative may be introduced by
reference to reasons for acting. Roughly, someone’s reason is agent-relative if, at base, there
is reference within it to the agent (for example egoism is own welfare, consequentialism is
general welfare).
- Agent-neutral reasons incorporate an added element of universality: to say that each of us
has reason to promote the general welfare is to say that each of us has reason to pursue
the common aim of promoting the general welfare (and this requires that any person
sacrifice their welfare if that will increase the general total), whereas according to egoism,
each of us has a distinct aim: I have reason to pursue my welfare, you yours.
According to simple consequentialism we each have reason to maximize the good, and
morally speaking this is all we have reason to do. We have one common moral aim: that
things go as well as possible. Deontology, by contrast, maintains that there are agent-relative
moral reasons. Duties of special relationship are obviously agent-relative. On this view, I am
required to care for my family, you for yours: we have distinct aims.
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