a) All Reading Notes for Introduction to International
Organizations
b) From Year I Block I 2020
c) CH 1:
2) All international organizations exist in the conceptual and legal space between state
sovereignty and legal obligation.
a) Therefore, they’re built on paradox:
i) they’re created out of the commitments that sovereign states make to each other,
and at the same time their reason for existing is to limit the choices of those same
governments.
3) Some institutions are able to coerce their member states into complying w/ their
commitments:
a) the UNSC has a military component
b) the IMF has coercive leverage over its borrowers
c) But usually: international institutions are left to find more subtle ways to cajole or
induce compliance from their members
i) In each org., the balance bw obligation, compliance, and enforcement is different
and therefore creates specific patterns of politics in the relations of each org. w/ its
member states.
4) As interdependence bw states increases, the importance of IOs increases with it
5) Most institutions (Inst) are not equipped with a legal body that has the authority to make
authoritative judgements in disputes over compliance
a) Inst also have weak instruments of enforcements, relying more on discrete tools that
work through persuasion, reputation, and status in order to improve compliance.
6) Obligations
a) Treaties, which provide the foundation to each of these international organizations set
the starting point for studying their power and effects
i) UN Charter, IMF Articles of Agreement, the Rome Statute of the ICC, and others
spell out commitments that member states are taking on and the powers that are
being granted to the O.
(1) activities of the O are governed by the commitments therein
ii) Treaties spell out in explicit “black letter” law the goals and powers of the
organization and the obligations and rules that govern member states.
b) In order to assess the impacts of IOs, one has to be realistic about obligations.
i) For instance, it’s easy to criticize the UN GA bc it passes lots of resolutions that
don’t seem to go anywhere, but the UN Charter only gives the GA the power to
“make recommendations” to states, and doesn’t give the GA power to take
decisions or impose new obligations.
(1) Therefore, the influence of the GA can’t be assessed by measuring compliance
and noncompliance with its resolutions:
, (a) It should therefore be assessed in light of the more subtle power it has to
define legitimate and illegitimate behavior, and the contribution that this
makes to the broader political environment of state behavior.
ii) For another, the UNHCR also gets bad publicity for the bad conditions of refugee
camps but:
(1) Camps are meant to be temporary but many have become essentially
permanent cities w/ hundreds of thousands of residents and few public
services
(a) UNHCR may be at the mercy of governments to the extent that the camps
are full of ppl whom the government refuses to see as refugees.
(i) Therefore, assessments on how well the UNHCR is doing need to
begin with an understanding of what the job entails and what other
forces are at work
7) Compliance
a) With a understanding of the legal obligations of states, one can then consider how
well states comply with those obligations as well as why/when/and with what effects
they’re violating them.
b) There are 2 moments in which state consent is explicitly in and around IO:
i) At the moment of joining the organization
ii) at the point where states see the opportunity to follow or to violate its rules.
c) It’s common to think about Its at the moments where a state is faced w/ strong
incentives to go against some rule of an IO
i) for instance: with the American decision to invade Iraq in 2003 in the ace of the
UN SC’s refusal to grant it the necessary authorization.
8) VII. Enforcement
a) Usually IO s can’t really take action against states that fail to live up to their
obligations
i) A few can, such as:
(1) The IMF which can refuse future loans to a state that failed to fulfill the terms
of pervious loans
(2) UN SC can authorize military action against a state that threatens
international peace and security
(3) WTO can authorize retaliatory trade sanctions against members who violate
their commitments.
ii) Usually, IO enforcement often involves playing on the apparent desire of states to
be seen in a positive light
9) VIII. Sovereignty and Consent
a) State Sovereignty is defined by the legal and normative framework that constitutes
states as the final authority over their territory and the people within it.
i) States are sovereign in the sense that they aren’t subject to any higher political or
legal authority.
(1) Therefore, they have the exclusive right to make decisions over all domestic
matters without interference from outside
ii) Sovereignty is an international institution in the broadest sense of the word
“institution”:
, (1) It’s a set of rules that organizes social and political practice. It’s not,
however, a formal organization
(2) The institution of sovereignty demarcates a domestic realm in which states
have absolute authority and an international real in which the problems of
interdependence get worked out.
b) Sate consent is therefore the crucial element that brings international obligations into
existence
i) Few exceptions:
(1) UN charter includes a clause that requires that members of the org. “shall
ensure that states which aren’t Members of the UN act in accordance with”
the principles of the UN Charter.
(a) It creates a legal obligation on members rather than nonmembers, and is
therefore consistent with the traditional interpretation of sovereignty that
says the gov.s must give consent to any limit on their own sovereignty, but
it’s effect is to set some standards of behavior that apply to nonmembers.
(b) Generally, IO s create obligations on states only bc the states have agreed
to be bound by them.
c) Under the system of state sovereignty, states are free to withhold/withdraw their
consent to these rules as they see fit
i) This leads to the problem of figuring out how to enforce IO decisions against a
member state
ii) State sovereignty both empowers international law and undermines it
iii) “States are violating their international obligations when they break rules that they
have consented to, but it can’t be said that they’re breaking the rules if they’ve
chosen not to join the organization in the first place.
(1) Ex: Canada
(a) Canada has long accepted that the ICJ has automatic jurisdiction over
Canada’s legal disputes w/ governments that have similarly accepted the
ICJ jurisdiction.
1. But, in the late 1990s, Canada wanted to reduce fishing in the
North Atlantic in order to prevent the extinction of cod stocks
a. Therefore they imposed strict new catch limits that covered
both the Canadian and foreign vessels on the high seas which
was legally suspicious therefore:
i. Canada Sent a memo to the ICJ that excluded from its
jurisdiction“any disputes arising out of or concerning
conservation and management measures taken by Canada
with respect to vessels fishing in the area of the North
Atlantic”
ii. Canada previously had a legal obligation to accept ICJ
jurisdiction, but due to this move, it no longer had any such
obligation
(2) Ex: North Korea
(a) North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons in 1993
10) “Enchanted” International Organizations
, a) The view, or chain of reasoning that says since cooperation is better than conflict, and
since Io s exist to international cooperation, they must therefore be an improvement
over whatever existed before the IO was invented —> leads to an “enchanted” view
of international law and global governance.
i) A view that celebrates Io s as the manifestation of international cooperation and
promotes compliance with their rules as an inherently desirable policy choice
(1) If IL is seen as the foundation to a civilized world order, and IO as the
embodiment of cooperation, then compliance with them seems like the only
sensible choice and anything that undercuts them is a danger.
(a) This was seen with the British referendum on EU membership in 2016
b) IO s should be viewed as tools that can be used for a wide range of purposes and their
political effects depend on who is using them and for what ends.
11) Global Governance and International Organizations
a) Global governance: the broad range of rules and actors that make up an international
regime on an issue
i) Could include many important international forces, actors, and rules
ii) The study of global governance therefore is seen as a more comprehensive
endeavor than is required to understand merely the official and formal
international laws on an issue.
b) Formal IO scholarship focuses on the particular rules that define or issue from a
specific legal body such as the UN or the ICJ
12) CH 2:
13) 2: Theory, Methods, and International Organizations
14) All organizations share some basic features
a) All organizations discussed in the book were:
i) founded by states with an explicit inter-state treaty
ii) Have states as their members
iii) Have independent corporate personalities
b) Formal IOs are stuck in a dilemma bc their powers and existences are derivative of
the actors that they are supposed to regulate, govern, or influence
15) Ios and International Theory
a) Theory: a set of ideas that simplifies the complexity of the world and identifies the
key forces and actors within it
b) Realism:
i) states are motivated by a sense of their own insecurity to continually look for
ways to increase their power
ii) Power is understood in terms of material, military resources like tanks and bombs,
and in contribution of these to the power/security of a country
(1) it excludes power that’s carried by shared ideas/social forces
iii) Suggests that international politics should be understood as the pursuit of military
dominance by states in an effort to reduce their sense of insecurity in relation to
other countries