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Full Literature summary of the course Migration and Citizenship
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A complete and detailed summary of the literature for the course Migration and Citizenship
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Migration and Citizenship Literature SummaryINTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, REMITTANCES AND DEVELOPMENT: MYTHS AND
FACTS BY; HEIN DE HAAS
Abstract
Debate on labour migration between global South and North usually focuses on the receiving end of migration
(the side which receives immigrants), but the bias doesn’t let us understand the developmental causes and
consequences of migration on the sending end (the side which produces emigrants). Migration has developmental
roots, so thinking that migration can be stopped/immigration can be ‘solved’ through aid and trade is useless.
Migrant remittances (sums of money migrants send back to their origin country) contributed a lot to the
development and living conditions of the sending countries. Restrictive immigration policies and unattractive
investment environments, which interrupt circular migration patterns, prevent the high developmental potential
from happening. Some policies can encourage investments and remittance transfers, but the key is to encourage
circular migration. Migration is inevitable, so freer circulation both increases migration control and enhances the
contribution migrants make to the development of their origin countries.
Introduction
Debate on int’l South-North labour migration focuses on interests and consequences of migration for receiving
end, which ignores the social and economic contributions migrants make to their home countries. Ignoring the
‘other side’ makes it harder to understand the developmental causes and consequences of migration. Because on
receiving end migration and development policies are kept separate, the positive connection between migration
and development isn’t made, so potential contribution on both ends is decreased.
Migration-development = reciprocal relationship because migration is part of development processes & affects
migrant societies (both ends). Immigration policies in receiving countries affect mobility and economic behaviour
of migrants →link between development and immigration policies
Because focus has been one-sided, ‘migration myths’ have been taken as truth. Analysis of 7 migration myths
wants to give a more nuanced, balanced perspective on migration and development, and how more effective
policies can maximize the developmental benefits of migration.
Migration myths
Myth 1: we live in an age of unprecedented migration. There is no skyrocketing migration due to globalization,
nor a migration control crisis. Levels of migration similar or less than ones in 20 th century. Volume of migration
hasn’t changed, but direction has: post-WWII decolonization and rapid economic growth in the West has led to
much more South-North migration, where “culturally and physically distinct” immigrants are more visible than
they were before.
Myth 2: poverty and misery as root causes of labour migration. Generally, the poorest do not migrate because it
involves costs, risks, knowledge, social networks, and aspirations. Most important cause: level of socioeconomic
development + relative deprivation (global inequality of development opportunities). After several decades of
sustained growth and progressive convergence of income gaps with receiving countries →emigration decreases,
immigration increases. Migration-development relationship not linear or inversely proportional, more of an
inverted U-curve: steep increase in emigration at the beginning, then gradual decrease; described as the ‘migration
hump’; doesn’t go in one direction only.
Myth 3: development policies, development assistance, and trade liberalization are a good ‘solution’ to migration.
Development lets people migrate and have higher aspirations. Economic growth related to trade liberalization
leads to more migration in the short-medium run (not less). Very short paragraph with another reason why such
practices are harmful but it’s very economic and I don’t get it.
Myth 4: migration isn’t a source of development because it brings a brain drain. Reality is more nuanced: not all
migrants are highly-skilled, only happens a lot in a minority of countries, in most labour-exporting countries
<10% of best-educated emigrate. Hard to generalized economic, social, and cultural effects of emigration of
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,skilled and educated people. The outcome of these types of analyses (<10% one) is value-laden. Brain drain can
come with a brain gain: highly skilled bring remittances, investments, innovation, etc. and can incentivize stay-
behinds to study. Labour is much more productive in wealthy, industrialized countries, and there’s mass
unemployment in developing countries for highly educated. Highly skilled migrants are used as export products
by gov’ts by producing a surplus, e.g. nurses in the Philippines, to bring in remittances from abroad. Highly
skilled migrants also have social and political roles, bring about “civil society” in origin countries, help
emancipate women and minorities: organizing and expressing opinions in destination countries helps them reform
domestic policies in origin countries. Brain drain can occur, and migration isn’t always positive, but it’s
impossible to stop migration of highly and low skilled migrants.
Myth 5: remittances are mainly spent in sending countries on conspicuous consumption and non-productive
investments. This myth has existed since the 1970s and believes that most able-bodied workforce (young men)
has left so agricultural labour lost; supposedly, this lost labour effect affects other industries as well, undermining
the development-potential. Different faults (methodological and analytical) have led to the pessimistic
perspective. In fact: empirical work shows that remittances go to investments in agriculture and other cultural
enterprises, int’l migrant households tend to invest more than non-migrant ones, remittances can lead to increased
economic activities and wealth rather than passive dependency. Also, consumption and ‘non-productive’
investments (housing, sanitation, food, schooling, etc.) can have positive multiplier effects of all sorts
(productivity, freedom of choice, economic activity, etc.), so general prosperity of sending countries in the long
run. However, migration doesn’t automatically lead to development: changes can be negative when development
constraints (bad infrastructure, red tape, corruption, etc.) are present, and the development context on the sending
end also has an effect. In some cases, households do retreat from local economic activities, just because
remittances allow them to do so.
Myth 6: orientation of migrants to their home countries is an indication of the lack of social and economic
integration in the receiving countries’ societies. Some gov’ts (e.g. Dutch) discourage dual citizenship and
remittances (latter seen as ‘disappearing’ income). This shows the bias in the debate, ignores the potential
contribution to sending countries, is factually incorrect as migrants’ commitment to home countries =/=
inability/unwillingness to integrate. Might be the case, but even ‘integrated’ migrants can use their acquired
cognitive and economic capacities to their benefit in their home countries. Transnationality isn’t incompatible
with integration. Anti-transnationalization policies tend to be ineffective, harmful to integration (discourses tend
to have anti-immigrant linings), and increase distance between alienate immigrants and majority groups in
receiving societies.
Remittances as the new development mantra?
Increase of South-North migration has brought exponentially increasing remittances. They have been more than
foreign aid, private capital transfers, foreign direct investment, and developmental aid. Main beneficiaries are
lower middle-income countries.
Remittances to sending countries have allowed for drastic improvements in living conditions, have been a crucial
source of foreign exchange, and have given hope to sending gov’ts that migrants are potential investors in
domestic economy. This surge has become the ‘development mantra’ for World Bank, gov’ts, and development
NGOs.
Strong argument that remittances = safety net for relatively poor areas; remittances free from political barriers and
controls. Basically, remittances benefit exactly to who needs the money, and redistributes welfare in a bottom-up
way without bureaucracy and corrupt gov’t officials.
Euphoria of remittances as more viable form of development aid is partly true, but overly optimistic, because: 1)
magnitude of migration and remittances is overestimated (only very small % of population is int’l migrants, and
remittances are tiny part of GDP of developing countries), 2) unrestrained optimism ignores reality (selectivity
and heterogeneity of the impact of migration and remittances—benefits don’t usually go to poorest members of
the communities or poorest countries), 3) migration and remittances don’t automatically generate development
and economic growth on sending side (related to unfavourable investment climate, oppression, political
instability, as we all restrictive immigration policies which encourage undocumented migration and permanent
settlement, and interrupt circular migration).
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,Linking immigration and development policies
Migration-development relationship most clearly manifested at individual, household, and community levels.
Most effective policies: improve legal position of migrants, general social and politico-economic contexts in
sending countries; structural improvements →migrants much more likely to be actively involved, invest, travel,
and return to home countries.
Remittances are important and potentially positive for development, but migration isn’t a cure-all for it
(development). Benefits of remittances depend on general development conditions in sending countries. Micro-
level strength of remittances is also main weakness: individual migrants can’t remove general development
constraints, so migration can’t replace good governance in sending countries.
Gov’ts and development agencies can increase positive effect of migration on development in sending countries:
1) they can try to reduce transaction costs of remittances, 2) remittances can be encouraged through tax-
exemption and other special fiscal policies, and 3) gov’ts can provide material and immaterial support to self-help
orgs established by migrants to promote development/establish development projects in sending countries.
Two major incoherencies in policies of receiving countries: 1) potential discrepancy between development
agencies’ aim to help the poorest and aim of creating a migration-development policy link (migrants aren’t
usually poorest, nor are their countries of origin), 2) fundamental discrepancy between gov’t’s restrictive
immigration policies, and desire to stimulate circular and return migration. Immigration policies are main way
that receiving end affects development contribution of migration in sending end. More positive migration-
development link for policies needs destruction of 7th migration myth.
Myth 7: states are able to ‘manage’, largely control, or stop migration. Policies can affect character and volume,
but cannot stop it altogether: most Western countries’ policies’ goals are unrealistic and bring about
counterproductive results, because they think effective migration-control = zero migration.
Higher than present migration-control is impossible without diminishing civil and human rights. Near-total
migration-control is only possible in totalitarian states. Migration movements tend to gain their own momentum.
Migration networks tend to facilitate continuing labour, family, and undocumented migration over formally-
closed borders. Hence, immigration correlates more with economic growth than immigration policies.
Labour supply from developing countries but also persistent demand for migrant labour in developed ones.
Assumption that migration can be ‘managed’/curbed is unrealistic: so long as labour supply and demand last and
global inequalities persist, South-North migration can’t be stopped since it’s also a two-way street.
Temporary workers in as a way to prevent permanent settlement has been counterproductive: a significant part of
‘temporary migrants’ stay permanently (because of the rights they acquire, employers don’t want them to leave,
they get married).
Restrictive immigration policies have many harmful effects: lower visibility and control over migration due to
more undocumented migration and people smuggling with the exploitative treatment they receive; asylum
procedures used by non-refugees; labelling and stereotyping of immigrants as ‘economic refugees’ and ‘illegals’;
criminalization of migration. Results of these policies: “preventing people working so that they would not become
citizens forced them to become citizens in order to work.”
Anti-immigrant policies can justify public xenophobia and counter the desired integration of migrants. Severely
restrictive immigration policies tend to encourage permanent settlement of migrants and interrupt circular
migration patterns, which lowers potential contribution to the development of sending countries.
Conclusion
Specific policies can increase development potential of migration by facilitating remittance transfers and
investments, but coherent migration and development policies must encourage circular migration (of both highly
and low skilled labour migrants, both demanded). Highly restrictive policies encourage public fears of ‘waves’ of
immigrants, which shows a lack of understanding the nature, magnitude, and developmental causes of migration.
Restrictive policies on both sides encourage permanent settlement and discourage circular migration. Instead,
more beneficial would be the creation of attractive social, economic, and political environments that encourage
migrants’ involvement in home countries, their return and circulation, and social and economic investments.
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, Opening borders and guaranteeing migrants’ rights increases developmental potential of labour migration of both
sides. Doing so means: less criminalization of ‘economic migration’, more circular migration, more visibility of
migrants, and less people smuggling.
Only liberalizing policies for highly skilled workers will neither remove the need for low skilled works in the
agricultural and service sectors, nor resolve undocumented migration-related issues.
Receiving societies can’t create illusions of temporary stays and should accept that a significant portion of
migrants stay. Circular migration =/= temporary migration. Not letting people freely migrate between home and
destination countries only makes it more likely for them to settle: if they have fewer fears of being unable to
return to their destination countries, they’re more likely to return, circulate, and investing in their home countries.
Since migration is inevitable, immigration policies should allow for freer circulation, because it can enhance the
developmental contribution that migrants have on both receiving sending societies. Not only, but such policies
benefits the migrants themselves.
FITZGERALD – INSIDE THE SENDING STATE: THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN EMIGRATION
CONTROL
Introduction
Processes of emigration control overlooked in sociology
Examining emigration politics in Mexico (Mexico-US migration largest sustained flow in the world
currently)
Mexican government’s efforts to control the volume, duration, skills and geographic origin of emigrants
haven been constrained from without and within
Without: powerful actors in the US government permitted/stimulated illegal migration, thus
undermining Mexican emigration policy
Within: municipal governments defied restrictive federal policy by using emigration as an escape
to reduce local political and economic crises
State Emigration Control
Neopluralist approach = disaggregating ‘’the state’’ into a multilevel organization of distinct component
units in which state officers and other political actors compete for their interests
Highlights unequal power relations between different interest groups →there is not one single
interest from ‘’the state’’
i.e. influence by both federal emigration policies and local policies of catholic church
Most western-European states had a laissez-faire approach because capitalism allowed workers greater
freedom of movement to sell their labour
But this does not apply to Mexico; shifts in federal policy of Mexico can be explained by stages of state-
building and historical conjuncture
Two main factors that limit ability of central governments to enforce their emigration preferences
1. Bureaucracy limits state capacity to put formal rules into practice
2. Sending states tend to be in dependent relationships to destination states (asymmetric
interdependency)
Methods
Review of Mexican migration laws 1909-1996 + interview
‘’Bleeding Mexico White’’: 1900-1925
Discouraging emigration, because afraid that it would create shortages in Mexico itself
Mexico nationalist (avoiding humiliation by the US), state-led nationalizing
Law: freedom of exit and travel within the country, but workers must have signed contracts
In practice: people crossed the border without contracts
Northern states denied workers exit permits because of labour shortage
WW1: US allowed entry to 70.000 contracted workers
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