TOPIC 1: HISTORY OF INTEGRATION
The Schuman Plan for Coal and Steel
Good for integration
9 May 1950: The Schuman Declaration
Devised by Jean Monnet but read to press by Robert Schuman The French Foreign Minister
A scheme for pooling coal and steel supplies of Germany and France: surrendering
sovereignty and creating a common market
Solving two German problems with one plan
1. Prevents militarisation and therefore war
2. Ensures supplies of coal to French steel industry once Ruhr Region reverted back to
German control
Invited other European states to join
26 July 1952: Treaty of Paris entered into force
6 states took part in the negotiations and ratified the Paris Treaty
Germany, France, BENELUX and Italy
Treaty expired 50 years later in 2002
The institutional arrangements of the ECSC are the embryonic form of the core institutions
of the European Union today
[1] The High AuthorityCommission
[2] The Common AssemblyEP
[3] Council of Ministers
[4] Court of Justice
* There is no European Council*
27 May 1952: Treaty establishing the European Defence Community signed [never ratified]
Attempt at a European Defence Community
The cold war and the growing tensions between East/West Germany & communism ideology
meant it was desirable to provide Germany with some defence again
Jean Monnet proposed the EDC to avert the formation of a German army with the formation
of a European Army
It was a French idea but it collapsed when France failed to ratify the treaty because German
rearmament, even as part of a European Army, was unpopular in France
1958: Treaties of Rome
Good for integration
Two treaties so there are now three treaties with different institutions knowns as ‘The European
Communities’
European Economic Community [EEC]
Later renamed EC in The Maastricht Treaty then becomes the TFEU in The Lisbon Treaty
Created the general common market and CAP
1979: First direct elections to parliament
Core of the institution existed in 1958 [Common Assembly]
Treaty of Rome said it would be elected by universal suffrage via a
voting system and Council of Ministers was supposed to set up elections
but procrastinated and appointed members in the same way they did
under the ECSC Common Assembly
Changed its name to EP in ‘62
EP threatened to take the Council of Ministers to the ECJ so in ’79 direct
elections were held
EURATOM
Created common market for nuclear energy
1965: Empty Chair Crisis
Integration is intergovernmental
, France stopped attending CoM meetings because they planned to transfer more power to the Commission
and introduce more QMV in The CoM
More supranational: QMV means MS can be outvoted and Commission is supranational
1966: The Luxembourg Compromise
Integration is intergovernmental
Ended the empty chair crisis & France came back to Council of Ministers
The Compromise
1. Veto power:
-For every MS on topics deemed ‘very important national interest’
-MSs invoked veto which meant that unanimity had to be reached in decision making regardless of
what the treaty voting requirements were
-Could not decide what to do when agreement was not reached which prevented decision-making for
almost 20 years
2. CAP: QMV
3. Weaker Commission:
-Tethered to CoM [intergovernmental]- CoM approval requirement for several policy measures
limited the Commissions power to implement policy
4. QMV:
-Commission wanted more but France wanted less
-Agreed that whenever a decision was subject to QMV a MS could invoke veto power and then it
would have to be agreed by unanimity instead
Compromise is now defunct but MSs still prefer to make unanimous decisions in practise
1968: Merger Treaty
Merged executive institutions of the ‘European Communities’ so they have 1 CoM and 1 Commission for all
o They already shared the EP and Court of Justice
Each community remained legally independent so the executive still acted in accordance w/rules
governing each community
1970s: Dark ages for integration
Bad for integration
1970s: European economies
Recession + oil shortage [quadrupling of price]
Governments try to preserve domestic markets and producers with protective measures and
would not agree to further integration
1973: Accession of Denmark, Ireland & UK
EU 9: become a member of all 3 communities
De Gaulle resigned and so there is no longer objection to UK membership [tried in ‘60s]
Economically it was not going well for these countries but it was for the EU
1974: The European Council
Formally institutionalised: another intergovernmental institution
1980s: Southern Enlargement
1981: Accession of Greece
EU 10
1986: Accession of Spain and Portugal
EU 12
Against the advice of the Commission who believed they were not economically ready
MSs believed membership a good way to support these new democracies whose
dictatorships had recently ended
1987: Single European Act [SEA]
Integration is revived
The first major amendment to the Treaty of Rome
Set out to complete the objective of the common market from the Treaty of Rome
White Paper [Cockfield paper] incorporated in the SEA
-Programme for completion of the common market within 7 years setting out over 300 directive/
regulations that would need to be adopted
Institutional [decision-making] reforms to free common market
, 1. Introduction of Cooperation Procedure in EP
2. QMV in CoM for decisions related to the common market
Luxembourg Compromise is not invoked anymore; the EU is too big for unanimous
decision making which creates constant intergovernmental disputes
1990: German reunification
No official accession of East Germany; automatically part of EU when reunified with West
1993: Treaty of Maastricht [TEU]
Good for integration but very intergovernmental treaty apart from creation of EMU
Creation of the three-pillar structure and ‘EU’ has legal personality
Abolished with Lisbon but still relevant for analysing decision-making
Historical institutionalism:
-Understand how we got there by looking at history
-CFSP is still intergovernmental; remnant of old pillar structure
First Pillar:
-‘European Communities’ [ECSC, EEC {renamed ‘EC’} & EURATOM]:
- Supranational cooperation =community decision-making
Second pillar:
-CFSP: New area of cooperation
-Intergovernmental cooperation=unanimous decision-making
Third pillar
-JHA: New area of cooperation
-Intergovernmental cooperation=unanimous decision-making
Had both economic and political initiatives in TEU
Economic
-EMU: Committed most MSs to adopting a single currency
Political
-Introduced the co-decision procedure [OLP]; EP has equal power to CoM
-Introduced European Citizenship
Copenhagen European Council 1993: ‘Copenhagen Criteria’
Formal criteria were laid down for the first time for successful EU membership application
There was concern about the preparedness of the former communist states for membership
This criterion contributes to significant ‘Europeanization’ of their politics, economy and institutions
i. Political Criterion:
oStable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and the protection of
minorities
ii. Economic Criterion:
oFunctioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures within the
single market of EU
iii. Acquis Communautaire:
oMust be able to take on obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union
1995: Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden
EU 15
Neutral states; cold war has now ended
1 January 1999: Euro launched
After a decade of preparations, the Euro came into existence
- First few years: Only an electronic currency
-2002: Coins and banknotes were launched and the biggest cash changeover in history took place
Denmark, UK and Sweden did not adopt it
-There are eight EU MS that still do not have the Euro
1999: Treaty of Amsterdam
, EU is preparing for eastern enlargement at the end of the cold war
Several institutional changes were necessary for this enlargement
However, Amsterdam was a modest treaty; want to reform institutional decision-making so new MSs
have to accept it as part of the acquis communautaire
2003: Treaty of Nice
Amended Treaty of Rome [TFEU] and Treaty of Maastricht [TEU]
Achieved decision making reforms necessary for eastern enlargement
-More policy fields are decided by QMV in CoM [OLP]
-Re-weighing of votes under QMV: more difficult, required a triple majority: a majority of weighed votes, a
majority of MSs and 62% of the EU population
Rejected by Irish referendum but reversed in subsequent referendum
2004: Constitutional Treaty
Rejected by French and Dutch referendums
Controversial: Littered with supranational language
Re-negotiated and lead to Lisbon Treaty
2004: Eastern Enlargement
EU 25
2007: Accession of BG and RO
EU 27 [weren’t democratically ready in 2004]
2009: Treaty of Lisbon
Amended Treaty of Rome [TFEU] and Treaty of Maastricht [TEU]
Abolished the 3 pillar structure and instead we have the TFEU and TEU
Achieved more institutional decisiomaking reforms
-More policy fields are decided by QMV in CoM [OLP]
-Co-decision procedure is re-named the ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’ and becomes the main decision-
making procedure covering more policy areas which gives more power to EP
2013: Accession of Croatia
EU 28
2020: Brexit
EU 27
Summary: From Paris to Lisbon
1. Results of enlargement
Now the EU is bigger it is a more important international organization
QMV in the Council of Ministers
-Unanimity with 28 MSs is too difficult
The Franco-German axis is less dominant because other powerful EU states
New policy debates due to new MSs
-Scandinavians bought discussions on env policy which the EU had not looked at before
2. Changing policy process
Relationship b/w institutions changed
EPs power in OLP because people started to point out that the EU was not democratic
More interest groups acting on the European level to achieve their goals
Policy processes become more varied because of differences in policy fields
Policy processes more efficient?
QMV in Council, no veto
Power of EP, more democratic
, TOPIC 2: POLITICAL SCIENCE APPROACHES TO STUDYING THE EU
1. Theories of European Integration [1950s]
-Theories of IR applied to the EU
2. Theories of EU Governance [1990s]
-Theories of comparative politics applied to the EU
-Study daily decision-making in the EU
3. Democratic Deficit Studies [1990s]
-More competences were transferred to the EU in the Maastricht Treaty
-Alleged democratic deficit compared to MS liberal democracies
4. Europeanization studies [1990s]
-How being a member of the EU influences the MS
Chronology
Started with The Grand Theories of Integration
Then we have Theories of EU Governance
Then Democratic Deficit Studies and Europeanization added on top
THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Question: Who is responsible for integration?
A. Intergovernmentalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism; considered to be one and the same
B. Neo-functionalism; sometimes called ‘supranationalism’
C. Supranational Governance
-Kind of b/w
Integration
The combination of independent units [MSs] into a newly created unit [EU]
-Integration describes the end result
-Integration is a process of increasing interconnection between states on economic, legal and political fields
- Still do not know the end product of integration
The Context
Pre-European integration realism was the dominant theory in IR
The state is a single unified actor and the only actor in international politics, IOs only facilitate
cooperation b/w states at the international level, they are not actors in their own rights
Relinquishing of national sovereignty which European integration entailed challenged realism
ECSC is a supranational institution, IOs no longer just facilitating cooperation b/w states
Need to understand role of the state in European integration
New theory...…neofunctionalism
Dominant approaches to understanding early phases of European integration came from IR
The Two Grand Theories of Integration: neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism
NEOFUNCTIONALISM [1950s]
Integration is supranational; driven by commission then spill-over means it takes on a life of its own
Proponents: Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg, Philippe Schmitter
1. Concept of the state is more complex than realists suggest
-What realists say about the state does not apply to the EU
The state is not a single unified actor
-Government’s decisions are influenced by pressure from sub-units [local, regional, national]
-Not just one voice
The state is not the only actor involved in international politics
- International activities of state are an outcome of pluralistic policy process in which government is
influenced by interest groups and bureaucratic actors
, 2. Non-state actors are important in international politics
Interest groups and bureaucratic actors
Transnational Corporations
EU institutions
Commission is the most important non-state actor
=Manipulates domestic/international pressure on MS to integrate
3. EU integration is advanced through spill-over; takes on a life of its own
Functional spill-over: Cooperation in one policy field is followed by cooperation in other policy
fields because the interdependence of policy fields
Result: Coal and Steel leads to integration of other sources of energy such as nuclear
energy
Political spill-over: Actors at the national level shift their loyalties, expectations and activities to
the supranational level and interact directly with EU institutions
Result: Actors demand EU rules not national rules because their goals are better
achieved at the supranational level
a) Once the Coal and Steel sector is integrated interest groups in that
sector need to exert pressure at supranational level [High Authority]
b) Interest groups would then realise the need for further integration as a
result of their activities at the supranational level and advocate this on
the national level
c) Interest groups from other sectors will also realise they want
integration too and push for it
Cultivated spill-over: Attempts of Commission to advance integration by pressuring governments
to integrate; now applies to supranational institutions generally
Result: Supranational institutions become agents of integration
a) All institutions want more power
b) More power=more decisions in more policy fields
c) The first two spill overs were more important to neo-functionalist;
cultivated was added later to explain the role of the Commission in
integration
Geographic or exogenous spill-over: Attraction of the EC/EU will lead to enlargement
Result: There is a que of states wanting to join; Western Balkans in 2025
4. Spill-back?
Integration only works one way
Monnet Method
Integration by stealth which means so gradually one wouldn’t notice
Start off small [coal and steel] and then spill over from one economic field to another and eventually
from market integration to political integration
Neofunctionalism builds on this idea [more like just functional spill-over aspect]
First president of the High Authority [52-55] but resigned because integration wasn’t going fast
enough in ‘55
INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
Integration is intergovernmental; driven by national governments who can stop it at any time
Proponents: Stanley Hoffman, Andrew Moravcsik, Geoffroy Garrett
The need for a new theory
Before intergovernmentalism theory
-Haas looked at early years and said realism could not explain the relinquishing of national sovereignty
which European integration entailed
-The Empty Chair Crisis ‘65 changed this because the resultant Luxembourg Compromise affected
decision-making until the SEA
The Empty Chair Crisis ‘63
-Hoffman drew attention to how important individual MSs are; if France doesn’t show up to CoM no
decisions can be made
-Back to theory of realism; states are still the most important actors in international politics
, 1. States [more specifically nat. govts] remain the most powerful actors in the integration process
a. Control Pace: Can stop integration when they want; no automatic spill-over
-Change the treaties which changes the powers of the supranational institutions or
-Withhold funding of supranational institutions
b. Promote National Interests: Supranational institutions are agents of MSs
-Commission proposes legislation MSs wanted
2. High politics [security and defence] will not be integrated
Where national interests coincide MSs accept integration; not in high politics
Moravcsiks Liberal Intergovernmentalism [1993]
Integration is intergovernmental; driven by national governments who can stop it at any time
+ reflects individual MSs preferences and bargaining powers
Subsequent version of intergovernmentalism
-States [more specifically nat. govts] remain the most powerful actors in the integration process
Adding to the existing theory
-Applied his analytical framework to 5 key episodes in construction of EU and concluded that major
choices in favour of EU were a reflection of MS preferences not of supranational institutions
-However, he did not treat MSs like black boxes [input/output] regarding preference formation and said
we need to look at its internal workings
Two level game
Level 1: Preference formation in MS based on economic benefits
=Come to Brussels with a fixed position
Level 2: Intergovernmental bargaining process [CoM/European Council]
=Outcome reflects the relative bargaining power of that MS [not all are equal]
THEORY OF SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE: Stone Sweets and Sandholtz
Mixture of two grand theories; EU is integrated to a different degree in each policy field
EU Policy fields fall under different policy-making processes
-Continuum from intergovernmentalsupranational; measures intensity of each factor
CFSP: Intergovernmental policy field
Competition law: Supranational policy field
3 Factors
1. Transnational Society: non-governmental actors engaging in cross-border EU exchanges;
social, economic, political
2. EU Organizations: Governmental structures at European level that produce, execute and
interpret EU rules
3. EU Rules: Legal constraints on actors formed at a European level
How it works
Non-state actors engaging in cross border transactions
Believe that separate national rules are an obstacle to greater gains
Transnational society push for more EU rules and governmental structures [institutions]
at European level to supply them
Put pro integration pressure on national governments and EU for this
=More supranational policy field so lots of EU rules and governmental
structures at EU level
THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE/POLICY MAKING PROCESS [1990s]
Question: How does the EU work today?
A. Neo-institutionalisms
-Formal & informal institutions matters because they create opportunities and constrain political actors
Formal institutions: Focuses on rules and structures
Informal institutions: Focuses on norms of behaviour
B. Governance & networks
-Network analysis
-Epistemic communities
C. Multi-level governance [MLG]
,NEO-INSTITUTIONALISMS
Three varieties; not a single theory but a set of approaches that look at institutions in a different way
Rational Choice Institutionalism [RCI]
Focuses on constraints that formal institutional structures impose on political actors
Focus of analysis=formal institutions
To understand activities of political actors we need to identify the parameters set by the fact that they are acting
w/in a specific framework of rules
Interest Groups
Activities of interest groups reflect:
Procedure that prevails for the passage of legislation that affects them
Access points available to them in that process
Previous relationships they have established with w/key decision-makers
Make a rational choice weather to lobby MS govt or EU institution:
Is the policy making process intergovernmental/supranational?
Is the MS govt or EU institutions open to listening to these groups?
Do they have a previous relationship with MS govt or EU institution?
Institutions are created for rational reasons because they are efficient and reduce transaction costs
Also uses principal-agent theory
Highlights the difficulty of principals [Nat govt] in keeping control over the activities of their
agents [supranational institutions]
Principal=Actors that set up institutions and designate tasks
Agents= Supranational institutions
MSs choose the institutional design and policy fields but it leads to dispersal of authority not
initially envisaged
Range of tasks P delegates; Difficulty to monitor what A are doing
Number of P with each MS enlargement; Attempts of A to play off preferences of
different coalitions of principals against attempts of other principals to restrain them
QMV; Constraints on Commission [A] to construct a winning coalition in support of
its proposals
Historical Institutionalism [HI]
Emphasises that:
Political relationships have to be viewed over time
Decisions are made according to perceptions and w/in constraints structured by pre-existing institutional
relationships
Incorporates informal constraints on behaviour of political actors such as values and behavioural norms
‘Path dependence’: central to HI theory
-Once one decision is made, it makes it more likely that policy continues to develop in the same direction
-In extreme ‘path dependence’ can lead to ‘lock-in’ whereby other avenues of policy are completely blocked off
because of bias of existing route
o All reform to CAP is blocked by France despite the obvious negative effects of it
-This means that once a decision has been made it may eventually produce unanticipated or unintended
consequences
EU from HI perspective
Critique of intergovernmentalism; nat govts are not entirely in control of the process of European integration
Once one decision has been made at EU level in the future;
It may produce unanticipated/unintended outcomes
Govts may find it difficult to change decisions either because
1. Preferences of govts change over time [govt changes or needs change]
2. Voting in the CoM changes; difficult to agree move back from policy once agreed
Sociological Institutionalism [SI]
Emphasises that:
Behaviour of political actors is shaped by informal values and behavioural norms
3 features of SI distinguish it from other forms of institutionalism:
1. What constitutes ‘institutions’ is considered broadly
Institution definition encompasses: formal rules and symbol systems, cognitive scripts
and moral templates that provide meaning which guides human actions
, Blurs line separating institutions from culture
2. Suggests institutions have a deep effect on preferences and identity of actors
3. Institutions are created/ developed because they contribute to social legitimacy rather than
efficiency [RCI]
Logic of instrumentality [RCI] vs logic of appropriateness [SI]
It might not be in MSs instrumental interests to enhance EP power but it is appropriate
to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU
Excursion: Guidelines for researchers working with the institutionalist framework
By Stone Sweets and Sandholtz in ‘The institutionalization of European Space’ [2001]
Must identify relevant actors and their interests
Close network analysis approach
Trying to find out who is acting
Must describe perceived function of institutions in order to understand behaviour of actors
Try to understand why people are doing the things they are doing
There are difference explanations such as pressure to act a certain way
Must identify exogenous [external cause] or endogenous [internal cause] changes that may lead
to institutional change
What influences it from outside [economics, prices] and inside [change in govt]
Must describe meso level: what organizations and networks are active in certain policy field
Meso level=population which falls b/w micro and macro level
Eg A community, organization, interest groups, civil society
Must describe macro level of rules: existing rules, procedures and organizational forms
Must identify the policy entrepreneurs that promote institutional innovation
Policy entrepreneurs- skilled social actors and must convince others that a set of
policy decisions makes sense and can be consistent with basis interests or identities
NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE
Includes Network Analysis and Epistemic Communities
Policy Network Analysis
‘Policy-network’: set of resource dependent organizations
Each group making up a policy network needs something that the others have in order to
fulfil its own objectives
Resources are exchanged in the process of bargaining
The extent to which organizations depend on each other for resources shapes the policy
outcome
o The Commission needs experts to advise them and the experts want rules from
Commission that benefit them
Policy networks range from tightly knit policy communities to loosely bound networks
-You cannot see policy-networks in the treaty; goes beyond the OLP
o Agricultural policy network; farming industry, consumer protection groups,
environmental groups-all part of network
Epistemic Communities
‘Epistemic Communities’: Network of professionals
Knowledge-based groups with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain
Most likely to be influential when policy makers face uncertainty over policy choices
They provide a way of understanding how professionals come to dominate policy making
Connection to ‘policy-networks’; actors in the policy network may ask for advice from ‘network of
professionals’
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE [MLG]
Policy-making is a result of coordination across different levels
Collective decision making involves loss of control for the government of individual states
[not state centric]; non-hierarchical, interconnected and multi actor nature of contemporary
governance
Decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels and they sometimes
overlap
Vertically: supranational, regional, national, local
, Horizontally: Within each level
Political systems of MSs are not separate [Moravcsik assumption] but connected in many
ways
Roots in neofunctionalism but less concerned with process of integration and more with explaining
how the EU works
Against realism and intergovernmental perspective
Putting theory in its place
Level Type of decision Bargaining mode Rationality ‘Best’ theory
Super-systemic History-making Intergovernmental Political Liberal
[macro level] intergovernmentalism
Neofunctionalism
Systemic Policy-making Inter institutional Political; Neo institutionalism
Technocratic
Sub systemic [micro- Policy-shaping Resource exchange Technocratic; Policy network
level] Consensual analysis
Peterson and Bomberg : Pragmatic approach [1999]: Decision making in the European Union
3 different types of multilevel EU decision making
Super-systemic, systemic, sub systemic
Correspond to three different modes of bargaining
Intergovernmental, inter-institutional, resource exchange
1. Super systemic [macro level]: What should be done?
History making moments that alter the way the EU works as a system of gov
Reflect political rationality; desire of MSs govts to remain in power
Bargaining is primarily intergovernmental and integration theories such as liberal
intergovernmentalism [Moravcsik] and neofunctionalism [Haas] are most applicable
2. Systemic level: What should be done?
Policy-making decisions generally taken by CoM and COREPER [Permanent Representatives
Committee] and EP
Reflects political rationality; desire of MSs govts to remain in power
Bargaining is primarily inter-institutional so neo institutionalism most appropriate
3. Sub-systemic [meso level]: How should we do it?
Policy shaping decisions are where policy options are formulated and are generally taken by Council
WGs, Commissions DGs, Committees of MS civil servants and private actors
Reflects technocratic rationality [experts]
Bargaining is primarily related to resource exchange so network-analysis is most appropriate
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT STUDIES [1990s]
Question: What are the consequences of the EU on democratic decision-making?
Democracy in the EU
For a long time decisions at the EU level were taken by elites in the context of ‘permissive consensus ‘
Permissive consensus: citizens allow elites [Commission] to shape integration
-Peoples of Europe do not understand the complexities of European policies or institutions
-Right and legitimate for elites to make decisions without consulting European citizens
However, negative votes in referenda on EU treaties increasingly signalled the European publics objection to
further integration
New EU treaties, # of policy fields being transferred to EU level; demanding more accountability in
policy making process
Debates concerning popular control over the integration process and the accountability of EU elites have grown
However, the related concepts of democracy and legitimacy are contested
Democracy: Citizens control over leaders
-Important source of legitimacy but not the only one
