Ellemers, N., & Haslam, S.A. (2012). Social identity theory
Its core premise is that in many social situations people think of themselves and others as
group members, rather than as unique individuals. The theory argues that social identity
underpins intergroup behavior and sees this as qualitatively distinct from interpersonal
behavior
Social identity theory is a truly social psychological theory, in that it focuses on social context
as the key determinant of self-definition and behavior. People’s responses are thus
understood in terms of subjective beliefs about different groups and the relations between
them, rather than material interdependencies and instrumental concerns, objective individual
and group characteristics, or individual difference variables
“Mere categorization” effect – suggesting that the mere act of categorizing individuals into
groups made people think of themselves and others in terms of “us” and “them,” and was
sufficient to induce them to behave differently towards ingroup and outgroup members.
The concept of social identity is defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which
derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the
emotional significance attached to that membership”.
The basic principles of the theory address three main issues. First, they describe the
psychological processes that explain how people’s social identities are different from their
personal identities. Second, they distinguish between different strategies people can use to
derive a positive social identity. And third, they specify the key characteristics of the social
structure that determine which of these strategies is most likely to be used in any given case.
Psychological
Social categorization is the process through which separate individuals are clustered into
groups. Social categorization is seen as a common and functional psychological process
that provides a way of responding to complex social situations.
As a result of such classifications, we tend to focus on similarities between individuals within
the same category, and see them as interchangeable elements that share some
representative common characteristics. . At the same time, we accentuate differences
between individuals who are classified into different categories as a way of clarifying the
meaning of the situation
Social comparison is the process through which characteristic group features are
interpreted and valued. Because there is no objective standard that enables us to assess the
worth of different groups, we tend to decide whether a group is “good” or “bad” at something,
by comparing the characteristics that are seen to define them to the characteristics ascribed
to other groups
Social identification speaks to one key reason why groups of people are different from
object categories: the fact that the self can also be seen as belonging to a social group
Thus, when specific features are associated with a social group, or when these features are
valued in a certain way, the process of social identification determines how this reflects upon
the self. This can either imply that the self is identified with that group and presumably
shares its characteristic features, or lead to the conclusion that the self is distinct from that
group and its features.
Importantly, social identification not only refers to the cognitive awareness that one can be
,included in a particular group, but also incorporates the emotional significance of that group
membership for the self
Identity management strategies
Because the self is implicated in the group, people are motivated to emphasize and secure
the ways in which their group is positively distinct from other groups.
A core feature of SIT is that it specifies different strategies that members of low-status social
groups can adopt in order to address their situation and try to improve the value of their
social identity. This in turn has profound implications for the ways in which members of high-
status groups tend to protect and secure the current standing of their group.
Individual mobility is an individual-level strategy whereby people may seek to escape,
avoid, or deny belonging to a devalued group, and seek instead to be included in (or attempt
to “pass” as a member of) a group of higher social standing
Social creativity refers to a process whereby group members seek to redefine the
intergroup comparison by representing the ingroup in terms of positive rather than negative
characteristics. This can be achieved in at least three ways: first, by focusing on other
dimensions of intergroup comparison. Second, by including other groups in the comparison
(e.g., as when migrants compare their economic success to those in their country of origin
And third, by changing the meaning of low-status group membership.
Social competition refers to a strategy whereby group members engage in forms of conflict
designed to change the status quo (in ways that individual and social creativity do not).
Social change can be contrasted with individual mobility in the sense that it explicitly
addresses the situation of the group as a whole, where individual mobility seeks only to
improve the social standing of particular individuals. Social change is also different from
social creativity as it focuses on achieving changes to objective or material outcomes,
whereas social creativity focuses primarily on a cognitive reinterpretation of the status quo.
Importantly too, social competition involves concerted collective action oriented towards the
achievement of change. Here groups compete with each other for superiority on a shared
value dimension that reflects directly upon their mutual social standing.
Socio-structural characteristics
The theory proposes that the way in which people respond to their group’s circumstances
depends on perceived characteristics of the prevailing social structure. Obviously, laws and
cultural traditions or objective (im)possibilities may pose constraints on which forms of social
identity improvement can be realistically achieved. However, the socio-structural
characteristics to which SIT refers are explicitly defined as subjective belief structures
regarding the opportunities (“cognitive alternatives” to the status quo) and valid motives for
individual and group status improvement.
Permeability of group boundaries relates to the subjective belief that it is possible for
individuals to act as independent agents within a given social system. What matters in this
context, is whether people feel that by virtue of these defining group characteristics, their
access to other groups (and the material and psychological outcomes associated with them)
is restricted, or whether they believe they can achieve a position in society that reflects their
individual merit, regardless of their group membership.
,Stability of group status refers to the notion that some differences between groups are seen
as fluid and as subject to change, while other differences tend to be regarded as more
enduring and stable over time.
Legitimacy of current status relations refers to moral convictions that determine the
motivation to change, where permeability and stability indicate perceived opportunity for
change. Legitimacy can refer to a number of different aspects of a given social situation:
- the basis for including individuals in groups can be seen to be illegitimate in being
based on incorrect assumptions about group-defining characteristics
- Status relations between groups can be also seen as illegitimate if important status-
defining features are selectively ascribed to some groups rather than others under
conditions where there is no objective indication that this is valid.
- Finally, the ascription of higher value to certain group characteristics can be seen as
illegitimate
Building on the above principles, a number of core predictions were subsequently
systematized within Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) definitive statement of SIT:
1 To the extent that individuals internalize a group membership as a meaningful aspect of
their self-concept, they will strive to make favorable comparisons between this group and
relevant outgroups, in order to achieve or maintain a positive social identity.
2 As a result, social categorization can be sufficient to engender intergroup discrimination
and intergroup conflict (i.e., in the absence of a conflict of interest over the division of
resources or material outcomes, for example, as a result of historical antagonism).
3 The search for positive social identity may take different forms (individual mobility, social
creativity, social competition), depending on consensual definitions of social reality that
pertain to socially shared justifications (legitimacy of group and individual outcomes) and
perceived cognitive alternatives to current status relations (permeability of group boundaries
and stability of status relations).
An important conclusion from efforts to recreate the initial minimal group studies was that the
effects obtained in the minimal group studies could be reliably reproduced when methods
specifically excluded the possibility that they arose from
(a) material gains and instrumental benefit (as suggested by instrumental or
economic approaches to intergroup relations)
(b) a conflictual history (as suggested by sociological approaches to intergroup
conflict), or
(c) personality or a priori individual differences
The key problem with thinking that SIT is “all about” mere categorization and ingroup
favoritism, is that this characterization
(a) fails to recognize that the theory distinguishes between a number of different
identity enhancement strategies
(b) neglects the fact that the core predictions of SIT refer to specific boundary
conditions
(c) overlooks the moderator variables that are predicted to impact on people’s use of
particular identity enhancement strategies
While the minimal group studies demonstrated that social categorization can be sufficient to
raise ingroup favoritism, it was never argued that categorization is necessary for such effects
, to emerge. Thus, over the years, it has come to be generally understood that SIT
complements realistic conflict theory and that social identity concerns can interact with
instrumental concerns.
During the 1990s the emphasis in social identity research shifted from demonstrating the
basic phenomenon of intergroup differentiation, to examining why people might be motivated
to act in ways that reflected a group-level definition of self rather than an individual level
definition. These efforts related to the so-called “self-esteem hypothesis,” advanced by Hogg
and Abrams. This proposed two corollaries of SIT’s core predictions: (a) successful
intergroup discrimination should elevate self-esteem, and (b) depressed or threatened self-
esteem should promote intergroup discrimination
The self-esteem hypothesis was criticized for its formulation and the way it was carried out. It
was also criticized for more metatheoretical reasons. In particular, Turner (1999) voiced a
concern that to focus on self-esteem as the critical factor in intergroup differentiation could
lead to a misrepresentation of the theory’s core ideas. For if positive ingroup differentiation is
seen to be driven by self-esteem needs, then this may be taken as implying that, in
situations where the individual self is connected to others in a group, intergroup behaviors
primarily serve individual-level motives. This emphasis on individual-level instrumental needs
and concerns is at odds with the group-level approach that is central to the SIT (and
metatheory).
Turner’s self-categorization theory (SCT) further specifies and extends Tajfel’s original
proposition that social categorization serves as a basis for understanding and responding
meaningfully to complex social situations. However, SCT focuses more explicitly on the fact
that social categorizations can be made at different (nested) levels of inclusiveness or
abstraction (e.g., Londoner, UK citizen, European) and that the same individual can be
included in multiple categories on the basis of different (cross-cutting) criteria.
Core assumptions and hypotheses:
1 The self is represented cognitively in terms of self-categories that can be defined at
different levels of abstraction. These range from exclusive self-categorization in terms of
personal identity (e.g., “I, Christine”) to inclusive self-categorization in terms of broad social
identities (e.g., “us Dutch”).
2 The formation of self-categories is partly a function of the metacontrast between interclass
and intraclass differences. This means that people will tend to define themselves in terms of
a particular self-category (e.g., as Dutch) to the extent that the differences between
members of that category on a given dimension of judgment are perceived to be smaller
than the differences between members of that category and others that are salient in a
particular context (e.g., Belgians, Germans).
3 Metacontrast also partly determines the internal structure of self-categories and the
prototypicality of particular category exemplars. This means that a person’s capacity to
represent and embody a given social category increases to the extent that the differences
between them and other members of that category are smaller than the differences between
them and members of other categories that are salient in a particular context.
4 The salience of a particular self-category leads to the accentuation of perceived intraclass
similarities and interclass differences. In this way, patterns of assimilation and contrast
reflect the relative interchangeability of category exemplars in relation to a currently salient
self-categorization.
