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  5. Ethics, Globalization And Sustainability (FI2V20001)

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Samenvatting Ethics, Globalization & Sustainability (alles)

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In dit document zijn al het leeswerk en alle lectures (behalve week 5) van het vak Ethics, Globalization and Sustainability samengevat. Ook staan er aantekeningen van sommige werkcolleges bij. Met behulp van deze samenvatting heb ik het vak met een 7 afgerond. NOTE: niet heel de law of peoples ...

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Voorbeeld 4 van de 36  pagina's

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  • 30 april 2021
  • 36
  • 2020/2021
  • Samenvatting

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Voorbeeld van de inhoud

EGS NOTES

WEEK 1 – the social contract domestically
A theory of justice, Chapter 1 p. 1-4

The primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society. Justice is the first virtue of social
institutions. Laws and institutions, no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or
abolished if they are unjust. Hence, it does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are
outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many.

- In a just society, the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled. The rights secured by
justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.

Injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice. This is an ideal
picture. Assumption: society is a more or less self-sufficient association of persons who in their
relations to one another recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who for the most part act
in accordance with them. This results in conflicting interests, regarding the distribution of greater
benefits produced through collaboration. A set of principles is needed for choosing among various
social arrangements which determine the division of advantages and proper distributive shares.
These are the principles of social justice: they provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic
institutions of society and define the appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens of social
cooperation. A society is well-ordered if everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the
same principles of justice and the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to
satisfy these principles. A general desire for justice limits the pursuit of other ends, leading to a
friendly environment. This is, again, an ideal situations, since men disagree about stuff like justice.

- Each has a conception of justice, understands the need for a characteristic set of principles
for assigning basic rights and duties and determining the proper distribution. (5)

The concept of justice is distinct from various conceptions of justice, since it is specified by the role
which these different sets of principles have in common. Those holding different conceptions of
justice can still agree on just institutions. Men can agree to this description of just institutions since
the notions of an arbitrary distinction and a proper balance (included in the concept of justice) are
left open for each to interpret according to the principles of justice which he accepts.

Agreement in conceptions of justice is thus needed, next to the need for compatibility of individual
activities and the achievement of social ends in efficient and just ways. The scheme of social
cooperation must be stable, regularly complied with and acted upon, with an enforcing actor. The
way in which a conception of justice specifies basic rights and duties affects efficiency, coordination
and stability. One conception of justice is preferable to another when its broader consequences are
more desirable.

Social justice is justice with the subject of the basic structure of society, because its effects are so
profound and present from the start. Because of ‘natural lottery’, the institutions of society favour
certain starting places over others. Cannot be justified but determine life fundamentally. It is these
inequalities, inevitable in the basic structure of any society, to which the principles of social justice
must in the first instance apply. Two limitations:

- Special case of the problem of justice, there is no reason to assume that the principles
satisfactory for the basic structure hold for all cases.

, - Principles of justice examined would regulate a well-ordered society, meaning everyone is
presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions. Strict compliance.
According to Rawls, the nature and aims of a perfectly just society is the fundamental part of
the theory of justice.

The concept of the basic structure of society remains vague. Rawls starts by discussing principles
which do apply to what is certainly part of the basic structure, then he attempts to extend the
application of the principles so they cover what would appear to be the main elements of this
structure. Instead of perfect generality, it is sufficient if they apply to the most important cases of
social justice. A conception of justice, then, provides a standard whereby the distributive aspects of
the basic structure of society are to be assessed. The principles of justice are a part of a conception of
justice as a social ideal. To understand a conception of justice we must make explicit the conception
of social cooperation from which it derives. Social ideal has this conception, encompassing efficiency
etc next to justice. Rawls takes the concept of justice to be defined by the role of its principles in
assigning rights and duties and in defining the appropriate division of social advantages. A conception
of justice is an interpretation of this role. Personal entitlements are often derived from social
institutions and the legitimate expectations to which they give rise.

The aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of
abstraction traditional social contract theory. The guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the
basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the principles that free
and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of
equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. These principles regulate everything,
from modes of social cooperation to potential forms of government. This way of regarding the
principles of justice is what Rawls calls justice as fairness. A group of persons must decide once and
for all what is to count among them as just and unjust.

Rawls’ state of nature is a hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of
justice. No one knows his place in society, class position, social status, fortune in the distribution of
natural assets and abilities (natural lottery), intelligence, strength etc. The principles are chosen
behind a veil of ignorance, ensuring no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles
by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. The principles of justice
will be the result of a fair agreement. The initial situation is fair between individuals as moral
persons, as rational being with their own ends and capable of a sense of justice. The original position
is, one might say, the appropriate initial status quo, and thus the agreements reached in it are fair.
(page 12). Justice as fairness: the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.
First a conception of justice is chosen, than laws and institutions in alignment with this. Then,
everyone could view all arrangements as meeting the stipulations which they would acknowledge in
an initial situation that embodies widely accepted and reasonable constraints on the choice of
principles. A society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to
being a voluntary scheme, since it would be chosen by free people under fair circumstances. In this
sense members are autonomous and regulations self-imposed.

- Parties in the initial situation are seen as rational and mutually disinterested. (not taking an
interest in anothers interests.

Since each desires to protect his interests, no one has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for
himself in order to bring about a greater net balance of satisfaction. Instead of utility, two other
principles will be chosen:

- Equality in assignment of basic rights and duties

, - Social and economic inequalities are just only if they result in compensating benefits for
everyone, in particular the least advantaged members of society.

It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper.
Since everyone’s well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could
have a satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing
cooperation of everyone taking part in it, including those less well situated. Randomness of natural
lottery and social circumstances when obtaining political and economic advantages have led to these
principles.

Justice as fairness, like other contract views, consists of both an interpretation of the initial situation
and of the problem of choice posed there and a set of principles which, it is argued, would be agreed
to. The content of the relevant agreement is not to enter a given society or to adopt a given form of
government, but to accept certain moral principles (16).

Rawls want to say that one conception of justice is more reasonable than another, if rational persons
in the initial situation would choose its principles over those of the other for the role of justice.
Conceptions of justice are to be ranked by their acceptability. As circumstances are presented in
different ways, correspondingly different principles are accepted. The concept of the original position
is that of the most philosophically favoured interpretation of this initial choice situation for the
purposes of a theory of justice. Reasonable restrictions to impose on arguments for principles of
justice are made vivid, and therefore on these principles themselves. Reasonably, no one should be
advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles. It
also seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original position are equal.

The principles of justice are those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would
consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural
contingencies. Sometimes, our sense of justice can guide us, while sometimes we must adhere to its
principles. If there are discrepancies between feelings and principles, we can either modify the
account of the initial situation or we can revise our existing judgements. Going back and forth will
likely lead to further agreement.

The interpretation of the original position Rawls presents attempts to accommodate within one
scheme both reasonable philosophical conditions on principles as well as our considered judgements
of justice. A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on
principles, instead, its justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations.

Why, if the agreement of the original position is truly hypothetical, should we take any interest in the
principles originated from it? The conditions embodied in the description of the original position are
ones we accept. What we shall do is to collect together into one conception a number of conditions
on principles that we are ready upon due consideration to recognize as reasonable, leading to limits
on fair terms of social cooperation. We need a conception that enables us to envision our objective
from afar, the intuitive notion of the original position is to do this for us.

A theory of justice, Chapter 2 p. 11

Two principles (in lecture bit). These principles primarily apply to the basic structure of society. Very
many liberties are all required to be equal by the first principle, since citizens of a just society are to
have the same basic rights. The second principle mainly applies to distributions of income and
wealth. The principles are to be arranged in serial order. A departure from the institutions of equal
liberty required by the first principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, greater social and

, economic advantages. The general conception of justice imposes no restrictions on what sort of
inequalities are permissible, it only requires improvement of everyone’s position. The serial ordering
of principles does express an underlying preference among primary social goods. When this
preference is rational, so is the choice of these principles in this order (63). Through this, the general
conception of justice is put aside by Rawls to fall back on when necessary.

The fact that the two principles apply to institutions has certain consequences. The rights and
liberties referred to by these principle are thus those which are defined by the public rules for the
basic structure. Liberty is a certain pattern of social forms. Institutional interference of multiple rights
with each other could thus form an issue. When principles mention persons, the reference is to
representative persons holding the various social positions, as established by the basic structure. By
raising the prospects of the representative man in one position we presumably increase or decrease
the prospects of representative men in other positions, so the second principle refers to the
expectations of representative individuals.

A theory of justice, Chapter 3 p. 20 & 24

The principles are those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would accept in
a position of equality to settle the basic terms of their association. It must be shown that the two
principles of justice are the solution for the problem of choice presented by the original position. The
absolute best for any man is that everyone else should join with him in furthering his conception of
the good, but this is unrealistic, leading to the idea that all others are required to act justly, while you
might not want to yourself. That is why the two principles are reasonable. According to Rawls, they
are the best reply to corresponding demands of others. The choice of this conception of justice is
thus the unique solution to the problem set by the original position.

Just the fact that a situation constitutes an equilibrium, does not make it right or just. The
philosophically favoured interpretation of the initial situation incorporates conditions which it is
thought reasonable to impose on the choice of principles. It is a status quo in which any agreements
reached are fair. Justice as fairness is being able to use the idea of pure procedural justice from the
beginning. According to Rawls, there is one interpretation of the initial situation which best expresses
the conditions that are widely thought reasonable to impose on the choice of principles, yet lead to a
conception that characterizes our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. The original
position is thus the most favoured or standard position.

We must then nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to
exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage. This is done by the assumption of
the veil of ignorance. Parties do not know their own or societal position. They must choose principles
the consequences of which they are prepared to live with whatever generation or class or whatever
they turn out to belong to. The only known particular fact is that the society is subject to the
circumstances of justice and whatever this implies. The arbitrariness of the world must be corrected
for by adjusting the circumstances of the initial contractual situation.

Lecture

Descriptive vs normative, or is vs ought. Important to keep in mind when doing ethics.

Ideal theory vs non-ideal theory: perfect circumstances, everyone is compliant, rational and
reasonable vs. taking messy reality into account. First ideal and then applied to world or solely
applied to world.

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