Consciousness, Summary Exam
Chapter 1: The Problem:
Philosophical approaches:
Monism= the world consists of only one kind of matter (mind or body).
o Berkeley (Mentalism/idealism): everything consists of the mind. We only
have perceptions of the item, we do not know for sure if the item really exists.
o Materialism = the world only consists of matter.
Identity theory = mental states/experiences are identical to physical
states/experiences.
Functionalism = mental states/experiences are equal to functional
states/experiences (e.g., pain = crying. Thus, it is not about what the
body consists of but what the functions of it are).
o Epiphenomenalism = conscious experiences are by-product (epiphenomena)
of evolution and the relation between mind and body is not important.
o Neutral monism = there is one fundamental substance that is neither physical
nor mental, but is neutral in nature. The world’s neutral state determines
both its mental and physical state. There is interaction between the conscious
and the brain.
o Panpsychism = all matter in the universe possesses consciousness or mental
properties.
Dualism= the world consists of two kinds of matter (mind and body).
o Descartes (dualism): mind and body are separate entities, but the mind can
influence the body via the pineal gland (= substance dualism). The proof that
Descartes was thinking about this was proof that he existed “I think, I think,
therefore I am”.
o Problem of substance dualism: how does the mind interact with the body
when the two are made of different substances?
o Property dualism = mind and body are made of the same entity that can
possess both physical as non-physical characteristics. The same thing can be
described using mental terms or physical terms, but one description cannot
be reduced to the other (e.g., description of pain can be both in mental and
physical terms).
Huxley (Epiphenomenalism): physical events cause mental events, but
mental events have no effect on physical events. Problem: if the
mind does not have any influence on the body, how are we able to
talk about the mind?
Psychological approaches:
Phenomenology, introspection =
Psychophysics =
, Behaviorism =
Cognitive revolution =
Cognitive neuroscience, embodied cognition,
functionalism (implicit) functionalismimplicit) functionalism = mental states identified by their
functional role, not their phenomenal quality; allows attributing states to
computers, robots, animals
Chapter 2: What is it like to be…?
Nagel: “I think, What is it like to be a bat?” Bats use echolocation = they see by emitting sound
waves that bounce off objects and in turn are perceived by the bat.
Phenomenal consciousness = the experience of a certain creature (and what it is like to be
that creature).
Qualia:
Qualia = different ways in which individuals experience the world (subjective
experiences).
Relates to objective processes differently according to different approaches:
o Dualist: believes that qualia are part of a separate mental world from physical
objects like pots of coffee or brains.
o Epiphenomenalist: believes that qualia exist but have no causal properties.
o Idealist: believes that everything is ultimately qualia.
o Materialist: denies that qualia exist (Dennett: objectivity exists, subjectivity
does not).
Thought experiment 1: Mary, the color scientist: Mary is specialized in
neurophysiology of color vision, but she has been brought up all her life in a black
and white room. What happens if Mary is let out one day and sees color for the first
time? Possible reactions: (1) Mary is surprised: rejecting materialism and adopting
dualism. You believe that consciousness, subjective experiences, or qualia have an
additional value next to your knowledge about the world (Jackson, Chalmers). Or (2)
Mary isn’t surprised: adopting materialism/functionalism. You believe that knowing
all the physical facts tells you everything there is to know, including what it is like to
experience something (Dennett).
Thought experiment 2: the philosophers’ zombie: a zombie is someone who looks
exactly like you, but has no consciousness and no qualia. Is a zombie possible?
Possible reactions: (1) Yes, it’s possible: you believe in consciousness inessentialism
= consciousness is some kind of optional extra to behavior (Searle, Chalmers). If this
extra is unimportant, you adopt epiphenomenalism. Dennett: zimbo: humans are all
self-monitoring zombies that can talk and think about mental experiences, but it is
wrong to think that consciousness is something on its own. Or (2) No, it’s not
possible: you believe that everything that is completely equal to a human must
possess consciousness, otherwise we all would be zombies (Moody). Conscious
therefore isn’t inessential.
, The “I think, hard problem” of consciousness: how does the experience of consciousness come
into existence? Possible responses:
1. Hard problem cannot be solved: James: we can never know what consciousness is
exactly.
2. Hard problem can be solved / Try solving: Chalmers: using dualism by looking at both
the physical as mental aspect of every source of information. Clarke: quantum
physics.
3. Tackle easy problems.
4. There is no hard problem: Churchland: we can’t know beforehand whether a problem
will be easy or hard to solve. Dennett: it is not smart to make distinctions between
easy and hard problems beforehand, because there always will remain unanswered
questions.
Chapter 3: Conscious and unconscious action:
Milner & Goodale: conscious perception and action:
Distinction between two different tasks that the brain has to carry out:
1. Fast visuomotor control = vision for action, “I think, where”-system. Dorsal stream, fast
route. Information is being processed to guide coordination and movement. Not
conscious.
2. Less urgent visual perception = vision for perception, “I think, what”-system. Ventral stream,
slower and less urgent route. Information is being processed in a deeper sense to
create a conscious experience. Conscious, can be accessed by thinking about it.
Evidence:
Patient D.F.: has visual form agnosia = unable to recognize forms/shapes of objects
by sight, even though her low-level vision and color vision is intact. Milner &
Goodale: D.F. has lost much of the ventral stream that leads to visual perception, but
retains the dorsal stream needed for accurate visuomotor control.
Visual illusions are proof that “I think, consciously perceiving” does not always influence our
actions.
Visuomotor control is more dominant than visual perception in tasks that are
directed by the brain. This explains action before being conscious of it.
We can divide actions in 5 categories: (1) Actions that are always performed unconsciously,
(2) Actions that can intendedly be performed consciously, (3) Actions that were first
performed consciously, but in time become unconsciously, (4) Actions that can both be
performed consciously and unconsciously, (5) Actions that are always performed
consciously.
Theories about consciousness:
Causal and non-causal theories:
o Causal: Popper & Eccles: dualist interactionism = the independent ‘self-
conscious’ mind interacts with the ‘liaison areas’ of the dominant cerebral
hemisphere. There is a constant interaction between the mind and the brain.
