Rachel Barten, Media en Cultuur (UvA), 2021
Philosophy of the Humanities 1
Book: History and Philosophy of the Humanities: An Introduction by M. Leezenberg and G. de Vries
Lectures by J. Diamanti
1. Forms
Chapter 1 Introduction
Both the philosophy of science and the philosophy of the humanities have a descriptive and
normative task: they describe which methods or styles of argument play a role in scientific
practice, and they explore and justify the standards for good research.
Since Greek antiquity, a fundamental distinction has been made between:
1. Knowledge (épistémè): timeless necessary truths, insights into the reality behind deceptive
appearances and answers to questions of why things are as they are
→ Those who aim for true knowledge should liberate themselves from the received opinion and its
delusion. They must proceed rationally and methodically.
2. Opinion (doxa): beliefs that are bound to a particular perspective and that are characteristic
of a particular period, group or individual.
During the scientific revolution (17th century), scientific knowledge became associated with on the
one hand mathematical methods and experimental techniques and, on the other hand, with
insights into a reality that exists independently of the mind. Meaning that scientific knowledge is
concerned with objective reality: concerning the things or facts themselves, instead of subjective
impressions: concerning the knowledge or opinions of the knowing subject.
In the humanities, it is not so much ‘truth’ that is sought after, but rather explications of the
‘meaning’ of texts, works of art, or cultural artefacts. Important developments in the humanities
often do not consist of uncovering new facts, but of introducing new perspectives or new
techniques of interpretation that do not necessarily exclude or contradict existing interpretations.
How can a profound change in (philosophical) thinking form the basis of the variety of disciplines
we nowadays label the humanities? New philosophical frameworks and ideas made the humanities
possible; societal developments made them desirable; and eventually, institutional changes made Met opmerkingen [1]: The modern distinction between
them real. the natural sciences, the social sciences and the
humanities is in part a product of institutional innovation.
Chapter 3 Logical Empiricism and Critical Rationalism
3.1 Logical Empiricism: The Vienna Circle
The natural sciences experienced radical changes in the turn of the 20th century. The belief that
man’s knowledge of theoretical physics was virtually complete, seemed to be a mistake when
major progress was booked in different disciplines in the first half of the century. E.g. predicate
logic. These radical innovations constituted a major problem for the epistemological justification of Met opmerkingen [2]: logical theory that analyses the
scientific knowledge that Kant had provided, since universal and indubitable foundations could in internal logic structure of statements.
fact be doubted or disputed after all. So questions were raised about the epistemological status of
Kant’s synthetic a priori statements and about how to account for the rapid growth and the Met opmerkingen [3]: A philosophical and scientific
successes of the exact sciences. A major development was The Vienna Circle, inspired by Ernst movement that laid the foundations of the philosophy of
science that would dominate our thinking about science
Mach. for a large part of the 20th century.
1
, Rachel Barten, Media en Cultuur (UvA), 2021
3.1a Rudolf Carnap: The Logic of Science
Carnap developed in great detail the epistemological ideas of the Vienna Circle and considered
himself a ‘scientific humanist’. The Vienna Circle attempted to recover the logic of scientific
knowledge. Their aim was not to give a psychological or historical description of scientists’
activities but to logically reconstruct the normative justification of the results of established theories
and hypotheses. Key question of logical empiricist: how can we account for both the success and
the change or growth in scientific knowledge?
After Kant’s belief was rejected there was especially progress in (predicate) logic. Logic
investigates the structure of and relations between statements, sentences, or propositions; it
studies the validity of arguments or chains of reasoning. Some basic logical concepts defined:
- Universal statement: a proposition that concerns an entire class of entities vs
singular/existential statement: a proposition that concerns individual entities
- Truth conditions: empirical conditions on the basis of which it can be established whether a
statement is true.
- Two statements contradict each other if they cannot be simultaneously true and they are
consistent when they can be simultaneously true.
- A statement is the logical or deductive consequence of one or more other statements if the
premises cannot be true without the conclusion being true as well.
- Two statements are logically equivalent when they are true in exactly the same
circumstances.
- Logical analysis: uncovering of the logical (as opposed to the grammatical) structure of a
sentence.
- Pseudo-statement: a statement that seems meaningful but does not have any empirical
truth conditions. (metaphysical statements)
The Vienna Circle promoted a scientific approach to philosophy that was meant to eliminate
metaphysical debates: (1) they shared the empiricist principle that only perception or experience is
a legitimate source of knowledge, rejecting all other presumed sources as intuitions, self-analysis
or tradition; and (2) they used logical analysis to determine whether a statement had any meaning
(at all).
→ Linguistic turn; instead of the foundation or justification of knowledge, this new philosophy
studies or investigates the meaningfulness of statements.
- Verification criterion of meaning; (1) the meaning of a statement consists of the method of Met opmerkingen [4]: The notion that a statement's
its verification, so empirical truth via an experiment or an observation; and (2) a theory is meaning is completely captured in its empirical truth
conditions.
confirmed or strengthened by observation (a later and weaker criterion).
- The logical relation between individual observation statements and general or
universal theoretical statements is not deductive or logically necessary but
inductive. According to Carnap, philosophy had to develop an inductive logic that Met opmerkingen [5]: Generalisation on the basis of a
could model the actual process of argumentation of the sciences (probability of limited number of observations; not a logically binding
form of argument.
statements).
Met opmerkingen [6]: Tarski’s conceptualization of truth
Questions and paradoxes around the concept of truth appeared. However, doubts were removed in purely semantic and language-dependent notions of
by the semantic concept of truth. word meaning, which have no metaphysical
implications.
3.1b The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction and Reductionism Met opmerkingen [7]: - Analytic statement: is true by
definition, on the grounds of the meaning of the term
In addition to the verification criterion, logical empiricism has two main features: (1) the distinction used
between analytic and synthetic statements; and (2) the emphasis on reductionism. - Synthetic statement: is true based on experience,
observation or extralinguistic facts
According to Carnap we should be able to reduce all scientific statements to statements
Met opmerkingen [8]: The insistence that every
about direct observation (reduction statement). All meaningful statements can thus be reduced or meaningful and therefore empirical statement can be
reduced or ‘translated’ into a statement about pure or
direct observation.
2
, Rachel Barten, Media en Cultuur (UvA), 2021
translated into a combination of purely analytic and purely synthetic or empirical statements, which
can be tested.
The Vienna Circle saw the ‘given’ of experience not as an unproblematic starting point for
constructing knowledge but rather as an endpoint of logical analysis. They also rejected (1)
realism; they believed that the statement that a correct theory not only corresponds to observations
but describes to the world itself correctly goes beyond our experience or observation and cannot
be independently verified; and (2) causality; it is meaningless to say that two constantly co-
occurring phenomena are causally related to each other.
3.2 The Vienna Circle and the Humanities
Given their aim of unifying the sciences, logical empiricists rejected the idea of a distinct domain or
status for the humanities with its own distinct objects and methods.
An emphasis on laws reflect the logical empiricist belief that only general laws can yield
genuine explanations. The aim of scientific knowledge involves the explanation of why something
happens. According to logical empiricists, explanation consists of embedding the explanandum in Met opmerkingen [9]: The statement to be explained
an explanans, which should be in the form of a general law. The statement about the phenomenon Met opmerkingen [10]: The explaining statement
to be explained is deduced logically from the universal law, which is called the deductive-
nomological model of explanation. Logical empiricists deny that other forms of explanation exist in
the natural, social or human sciences. The aim is the formulation of general laws. An interpretative
(verstehende) method may serve as a means towards this end, but it cannot replace it.
In the 1930’s, political developments destroyed the optimism of the Vienna Circle. The role
of the Vienna Circle in the public debate in the German language-area came to an end. In America,
its philosophical influence became bigger (American post-war analytical philosophy). Logical Met opmerkingen [11]: Anglo-Saxon current that
empiricism in the US moved close towards pragmatism. reduces philosophical questions to matters of meaning
and language use, would be unthinkable without logical
empiricism, especially formulated by Carnap.
3.3 Karl Popper: The Logic of Refutation
Popper rejected the linguistic turn as a waste of time, since the logical empiricist verification failed
to distinguish universal laws from metaphysical statements. He did, as the logical empiricists,
speak of the logic of the growth of scientific knowledge.
3.3a Induction, Deduction, Demarcation
For Popper, the central problem in epistemology is that of the growth of knowledge, which is Met opmerkingen [12]: The question of how it is possible
divided into two main questions: that our knowledge of the world can improve in the light
of experience.
1. The question of the justification of induction (Hume’s problem)
Met opmerkingen [13]: The question of whether and
a. Popper’s solution: induction can be justified neither logical nor psychologically. All how indurctive arguments may be justified
knowledge has a preliminary or hypothetical character, as it can at any moment in
time turn out to be incorrect. In Popper’s view, the true logic of the growth of
scientific knowledge is not inductive but deductive in character. This leads to a
simple but radical solution: induction cannot be justified at all; it doesn’t need to be
justified since it plays no role in the growth of scientific knowledge.
2. The question of how scientific knowledge can be distinguished from non-scientific or
pseudoscientific knowledge claims = demarcation (Kant’s problem)
a. Since induction cannot be justified, it cannot constitute the ‘method’ that
distinguishes successful empirical science from metaphysical and other non-
scientific statements or systems either. Popper refuses to reject metaphysical
statements as unverifiable and therefore meaningless. He argues that speculative
myths or metaphysical ideas can certainly play a positive role in the sciences, for
they can serve as the theories or hypotheses that we can subsequently put to tests.
3
, Rachel Barten, Media en Cultuur (UvA), 2021
Similar to ‘real’ scientific universal statements, they are not verifiable but they are
falsifiable.
Popper: what characterizes science is that scientific knowledge distinguishes itself not by empirical
verifiability but on the contrary by falsifiability. A truly scientific theory is formulated in such a way
that it can be rejected, or refuted, on the basis of experience and can be improved in the light of
experience. Because of falsifiability true scientific knowledge can also grow.
The demarcation criterion involves the question whether a theory is falsifiable or not. A
theory that takes “the crucial test” gets a degree of corroboration. Met opmerkingen [14]: The degree to which a theory
has thus far survived tests.
3.3b Testing Theories
Popper shows himself to be a rationalist instead of an empiricist. Theories precede experience. Met opmerkingen [15]: Rationalism: the belief that the
Knowledge is not founded on experience, but it can be corrected in the light of experience. human mind does not derive its knowledge passively
from observation but itself plays an active role in
Scientific knowledge is divided from dogmas or superstition because it invites criticism and the forming knowledge.
possibility for improvement. Hence, he argued that pure observation is impossible since each
observation is inevitably guided and coloured by our beliefs, expectations and interests. What
matters is that theories/statements are critically put to the test.
- Basic sentence: a singular statement that can serve as a premisse in the empirical testing
of a theory, which is a universal statement.
- Potential falsifier: when a basic sentence contradicts a theory.
Popper held that accepting a basic sentence is a matter of decision or convention. The decision to
accept a basic sentence may be caused by an observation but it cannot logically be justified by it,
because logical relations only hold between sentences, statements or propositions and not
between a statement and an observation. Popper’s position may be called conventionalist, for him, Met opmerkingen [16]: Convensionalism: the belief that
basic sentences are not statements that connect a theory with observation or statements of pure imporant choices in science are the result of
agreements or conventions.
observation but logically singular statements that may test a theory and that we may agree to
accept for the time being.
The recommendation to critically test a theory is intended as a precaution against
conventionalist stratagems that try to reconcile an already accepted falsifier with a theory. The Met opmerkingen [17]: Reinterpreting a basic statement
empirical/informational content increases with the number of potential basic sentences it excludes. of observation so that it is no longer at odds with a
theory.
A theory with a greater predictive range than its rivals or a theory that allows for the deduction of
more precise predictions has a larger set of potential falsifiers. For this reason, as long as it has
not been falsified, we will prefer such a theory over competitors that have more restricted reach or
make less precise predictions.
Popper was a realist who believed that in our scientific theories, we strive for truth.
However, we can never be certain that a theory is definitely true. He captures the idea of the ever-
closer approach to truth in a notion of verisimilitude. Met opmerkingen [18]: The degree to which a theory
- Fallibilism: the belief in the idea of the fundamental fallibility of all knowledge - including the approximates the truth.
fallibility of knowledge that has been accepted as true since time immemorial. We can
never assume that we possess the truth. However, that is no reason to end our search for
it.
Chapter 4 Historicizing the Philosophy of Science
4.2 The Development of Scientific Knowledge According to Thoman Kuhn
In the 1960’s Kuhn and Foucault found important discontinuities in the development of the natural
science and the ‘human science’, which problematized the simple idea of scientific progress. The
historiographies of Kuhn and Foucault may be characterized as neo-Kantian, both carried out Met opmerkingen [19]: The 19th century and early 20th
empirical historical investigations into the conditions for the possibility of knowledge but emphasize century current that regarded the Kantian subject not as
universal and unchanging but as historically and/or
culturally determined.
4
