Summary of *SOME* of the reading materials & lecture questions for the final exam (2023) for Intelligence Communities, the Cold War, and Decolonization. INCLUDES notes from (Total: 35 pages):
Christopher Andrew’s chapter (2010) “20. Intelligence in the Cold War” in “The Cambridge History...
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Summary of *SOME* of the reading materials & lecture questions for the final exam (2023) for
Intelligence Communities, the Cold War, and Decolonization. INCLUDES notes from (Total: 35 pages):
● Christopher Andrew’s chapter (2010) “20. Intelligence in the Cold War” in “The Cambridge History of the Cold
War” (volume II, 2010).
● Richard Aldrich’s article (2002) “‘Grow your own’: Cold War intelligence and history supermarkets”.
● Jonathan Corrado’s article (2023) “Rethinking Intelligence Failure: China’s Intervention in the Korean War”, pp.
199-219.
● Amy Zegart’s website article (2012) “The Cuban Missile Crisis as Intelligence Failure”
● Len Scott’s article (2020) “November 1983: the most dangerous moment of the cold war?”, pp. 131-148.
● Simon Miles’ website article (2021) “The Mythical War Scare of 1983”.
● Kevin P. Riehle’s article (2020) “The Defector Balance Sheet: Westbound Versus Eastbound Intelligence Defectors
from 1945 to 1965”, pp. 68-96.
● David Robarge’s article (2003) “Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angleton and CIA Counterintelligence”,
pp. 21-49.
● David V. Gioe & Joseph M. Hatfield’s article (2020) “A damage assessment framework for insider threats to
national security information: Edward Snowden and the Cambridge Five in comparative historical perspective”,
pp. 704-738.
● Daniela Richterova & Natalia Telepneva’s article (2020) “An Introduction: The Secret Struggle for the Global South
– Espionage, Military Assistance and State Security in the Cold War”, pp. 1-11.
● Mark T. Berger’s article (2009) “The real Cold War was hot: The global struggle for the Third World”, pp. 112-126.
● Thomas J. Maguire & Hannah Franklin’s article (2021) “Creating a Commonwealth security culture? State-building
and the international politics of security assistance in Tanzania”, pp. 12-33.
● Martin Grossheim’s article (2019) “The East German ‘Stasi’ and Vietnam: A Contribution to an Entangled History
of the Cold War”, pp. 136-152.
Intelligence Communities, the Cold War, and Decolonization Notes on
*SOME* Readings
Table of Contents
“The Cambridge History of the Cold War” 1
20. Intelligence in the Cold War 1
“‘Grow your own’: Cold War intelligence and history supermarkets” 3
“Rethinking Intelligence Failure: China’s Intervention in the Korean War” 5
“The Cuban Missile Crisis as Intelligence Failure” 8
“November 1983: the most dangerous moment of the cold war?” 11
“The Mythical War Scare of 1983” 13
“The Defector Balance Sheet: Westbound Versus Eastbound Intelligence Defectors from 1945 to
1965” 14
“Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angleton and CIA Counterintelligence” 17
“A damage assessment framework for insider threats to national security information: Edward
Snowden and the Cambridge Five in comparative historical perspective” 20
“An Introduction: The Secret Struggle for the Global South – Espionage, Military Assistance and
State Security in the Cold War” 23
“The real Cold War was hot: The global struggle for the Third World” 25
“Creating a Commonwealth security culture? State-building and the international politics of
security assistance in Tanzania” 27
“The East German ‘Stasi’ and Vietnam: A Contribution to an Entangled History of the Cold War” 32
, 1
“The Cambridge History of the Cold War”
20. Intelligence in the Cold War
Intelligence = least understood aspect of the Cold War.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
While SIGINT was more voluminous than human intelligence (HUMINT), it is still absent from most
Cold War histories.
➔ Amnesiac approach to SIGINT’s role has distorted the Cold War’s understanding.
➔ KGB owed much of its SIGINT success to its recruitment of personnel in foreign embassies in
Moscow.
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
Intelligence operations stabilised/destabilised the Cold War.
➔ Missile Gap: Delusion that the Soviet Union (USSR) was increasingly out-producing the US.
➔ The ability of both superpowers to monitor each other’s nuclear strike force was crucially
dependent on the IMINT revolution (e.g., construction of the high-altitude U-2 spy plane).
➔ After the missile crisis, the available intelligence to both East & West on their nuclear strike
force became an essential element in stabilising the Cold War arms race.
Covert Action
Covert Action: Secret attempts to manipulate the course of events through different methods (e.g.,
bribing opinion formers, paramilitary operations). Played a central role in the establishment of the
Soviet bloc in Eastern & Central Europe.
➔ History of covert action has been distorted by over-concentration on the US experience:
◆ The US bribery/operations to ensure the defeat of the Communists in the 1948
Italian general election.
◆ Success of overthrowing supposedly pro-Soviet regimes in Iran & Guatemala, led it
to ignore the warning signs later left by other, less successful, operations (e.g.,
Indonesia, Cuba’s Bay of Pigs).
➔ 1960s onwards, the KGB played an even more active global role than the CIA in Asia, Africa
& the Middle East.
◆ American covert action against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, was less
successful than against the Russians in Afghanistan.
Scientific & Technological Intelligence (S&T)
S&T = greatest success of the Soviet bloc intelligence operations in the West during the Cold War.
➔ The American defence industry proved much easier to penetrate than the US federal
government.
Political Intelligence Analysis
Soviet bloc had an inbuilt advantage over the West in intelligence collection:
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